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Abstract
This dissertation studies how patient access to specialized services in referral networks can
be improved. The first study focused on optimizing and coordinating referral and scheduling
decisions in a centralized referral network. I proposed a bi-level optimization model which
enables the referrer to make optimal decisions for different scenarios based on available
capacity in the network and operational competency levels of surgeons. First, I derived
optimal scheduling policies for each surgeon in the network. Next, optimal referral decisions
for the central referrer were derived for each capacity scenario. Finally, I studied how
incorporating fairness in referral decisions can impact patient access to surgeons.
The second study applies deep reinforcement learning (DRL) algorithms in centralized
referral networks that help referrers make optimal decisions during the patient referral process
while considering different challenges such as distance of the patient from the specialist
and wait time. First, I studied the potential impact of using these algorithms in a single
centralized referral network. Next, I defined a general framework under which two adjacent
centralized referral networks that are applying DRL algorithms can collaborate. Finally, I
studied how governments can motivate networks to collaborate and what the impact would
be of this collaboration on patient access to surgeons.
The third study focuses on the patient referral process in the Waterloo Cataract referral
network. First, I analyzed the data and three different ways that are practiced by the network
to refer patients to surgeons. Next, I simulated the whole network and studied how changing
current referral policies or adding more surgeons to the network can impact patient access
to surgeons.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
On-time access of patients to specialized services is one of the main concerns of decision
makers in many health care systems. Waiting too long for specialists not only puts patients’
lives in danger, but also results in excessive costs, putting pressure on the healthcare system.
In fact, the cost of wait time per patient to the health care system in Canada is estimated
to be approximately between $2,254 and $6,838. Exacerbating this situation are imbalanced
referral rates to specialists; there are some specialists who are overloaded with referrals,
making patient wait times far too long, while there are other specialists who have spare
capacities.
Patients can gain access to specialized services through two main referral schemes, namely
centralized and decentralized referral networks. Under both referral schemes, the patient is
first seen by a general practitioner (GP). Under the decentralized referral scheme, which is
the dominant one in most countries, including Canada, when further treatment is needed
the GP has access to a limited number of specialists in the network and directly refers the
patient to one of them. Under a centralized referral scheme, the GP sends the patient to a
referral network. Then, the process of referring them to a specialist is handled by a third
party called the central referrer which has access to all specialists in a network.
In recent years, numerous referral networks have moved toward centralizing their referral
processes to specialists. However, as indicated by various studies, there are still various
questions around centralization: 1) how should centralization be implemented, 2) what
policies should be applied by different players of a centralized network, and 3) to what
degree can a centralized network actually improve patient access to specialists?
The first chapter of this thesis studies how referral and scheduling policies in a centralized
referral network can be coordinated. To ensure the mathematical tractability of the problem,
we focused on a centralized referral network with two specialists where different scenarios are
defined based on available capacity in the system and the specialists’ operational competency
1

level. To coordinate the referral and scheduling decisions, we modeled the system as a bilevel optimization problem and extracted optimal referral and scheduling policies for each
scenario. Model extensions were then studied which examine fair-allocation referral models
and the benefit of centralization.
In the second chapter of the thesis, we were inspired by how COVID-19 affected referral
networks in Canada, so we applied a Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) methodology
on a centralized referral network which allowed us to study referral rates in a larger scale
referral network with multiple specialists. In addition, we applied the methodology on two
centralized networks and studied how collaboration between the two networks could further
improve patient access to specialists. We show that reinforcement learning methodologies
have the potential to significantly help decision-makers in a centralized referral network
reduce patients wait times. Our results also indicate that a right amount of incentive from
the government can play a great role in motivating networks to collaborate which results in
improved access to specialists.
In the third chapter of the thesis, we focus on the centralized cataract network in Waterloo
which covers referrals from three major cities, namely Kitchener, Cambridge, and Guelph,
and more than 100 townships. We studied the current referral process and its impact
on patient average wait time over the next four years and investigated to what degree
implementing different referral policies or adding more resources to the network could further
improve patient access to specialists. Our results show that the system utilization rate is
high and, therefore, implementing new policies without adding more resources to the network
does not have a significant impact on patient average wait time .

2

Chapter 2
Coordinated Referral and Scheduling
Decisions for Specialized Healthcare
Services
2.1

Introduction

In many health care systems, providing access to specialized services in a timely manner is
challenging. Wait times are often long and highly variable leading to inequities in access to
specialized care. Many studies have associated poor health outcomes with prolonged wait
times (Lawrentschuk et al. 2003a, Haddad et al. 2002a, McKeever et al. 2006) and wait
times for specialized services have been recognized as a key impediment to access to quality
care (Sanmartin et al. 2000, BA et al. 2005, Bichel et al. 2009, Viberg et al. 2013a, Patel
et al. 2018, Bleustein et al. 2014). While these challenges have been acute and persistent in
single payer systems such as those in Canada (Barua and Jacques 2018) challenges in access
to specialized services are also present in privatized healthcare systems (Penn et al. 2019,
Shulkin 2017).
Strategies to manage wait times effectively include attention to the operations of the
specialized service as well as improving the referral system which manages the transition
of patients from primary care to the provider of specialized care. With respect to the
provider’s operations, attention has been devoted to increasing resources and improving the
efficiency of the operations and delivery of the service. Increasing capacity through increased
resources is constrained by costs and availability of human and physical resources which
points to improving the efficiency of delivery as a key pathway. Studies like Green (2005)
and VanBerkel and Blake (2007) examine the optimal management of capacity and show

3

the potential for dramatic impacts on wait times. Improving the scheduling and operations
of specialized services has also been extensively studied both directly by improving policies
(Froehle and Magazine 2013, Ahmadi-Javid et al. 2017a) and by providing incentives to
surgeons to hit wait time targets (Frank and Brunsberg 1999, Marcus et al. 2009, Viberg
et al. 2013a).
This study considers how a referral system can build policies which acknowledge the
operational challenges and are coordinated with the provider’s incentives. We consider a
centralized intake system where a single agent receives all referrals from primary care and
allocates these referred patients between the full set of independent providers. Specialized
care may include surgical procedures, imaging or other consultations where a referral is
needed. The referral is received by a single provider which may represent a unique health
care professional (e.g. surgeon or consulting physician) or a centre managing multiple
professionals (e.g. working in a centre, hospital or region). The centralized intake system
model, also referred to as a pooled referral system, is becoming an increasingly popular
replacement for the traditional decentralized model for improving equitable access to specialized
medical services (e.g. Saskatchewan-Initiative 2013). In the decentralized model, patients are
directly referred from primary care to specialized services. The centralized model can take
into account a broader set of information at the time of the referral and has the potential
to improve resource utilization and fairness from the point of view of both patients and
providers. A number of papers, such as Kinchen et al. (2004a), Barnett et al. (2012b) and
An et al. (2018) explore the adverse affects that stem from poor referral decisions. However,
these papers are expository in nature and do not provide prescriptive suggestions on how a
centralized intake system can rectify these shortcomings.
Our paper takes advantage of this transition to centralized intake which provides the
opportunity for increased optimization of the referral process. The broader research question
of interest is how to design centralized referral mechanisms that are both optimized and fair.
More precisely, the referral should both minimize wait times and ensure that access to low
wait time specialized services is equitably distributed throughout the network and patient
populations. Despite the increased applied interest in these systems best practices regarding
the operations of these systems and realizing these goals remains poorly understood.
We study the problem of designing a centralized referral system which includes the
receipt of the referral, the allocation of the referral to the provider and the providers
scheduling of the procedure. To permit tractable analysis of this system, we take a different
approach from much of the scheduling literature. We avoid focus on the algorithmic and
mathematical details of a particular scheduling policy by defining a model for achievable
scheduling outcomes associated with the providers’ operational capabilities. To motivate
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this approach we compute the achievable region for a prioritized queueing system and show
that the key properties can be modeled via a simple reduced form. This approach allows
us to study the implications of particular operational capabilities to the management of the
referral system. While this reduced form approach appears to be somewhat novel, it is not
the first use of a general achievable region function to derive results which are generalizable
to a range of operational settings. Pavlin (2017) for instance uses a general convex function
to characterize achievable wait times for prioritized queueing systems. The approach taken
in this paper leads to a tractable two-stage optimization problem which can encompass the
range of scheduling challenges present in healthcare systems.
The centralized referrer and the providers both seek to maximize the proportion of all
patients served within their target wait times. This incentive is considered due to the
fact that in many countries including Canada providing patients with on-time access to
specialized services has become the key measure performance for assessing access to care.
The province of Ontario for instance maintains a public website which shows the proportion
of cases seen within procedure specific target wait times for a wide range of specialist services
(Government of Ontario 2022). Using access to diagnostic imaging as an example, there are
four patient priority levels and the target times for the first and forth priority patients are 24
hours and 28 days respectively. In October of 2021, 96% of first priority and 51% of fourth
priority patients were scanned within target time. While we focus on on-time delivery, other
incentives such as maximizing revenue or throughput might also be relevant in certain referral
networks. Our analysis maps patient demand, system capacity and operational capabilities
to an optimal referral policy and a scheduling outcome. The referral policy determines
the allocation of patients to providers and the scheduling outcome describes the proportion
of each patient stream served within their wait time targets. The key results include the
following:
1. When operational abilities are low for both providers, it is optimal for the providers
to prioritize one stream of patients. Depending on provider capacities the referral
policy may vary. When capacities are heterogenous, the centralized referrer may focus
providers on particular patient streams. When capacities are low for both providers,
the optimal referral policy may result in providers relegating one of their patients
streams to poor quality service where there is zero probability of receiving the service
within the wait time targets.
2. When operational abilities vary between providers, the provider with higher operational
ability will offer more evenly distributed levels of service. The provider with higher
operational ability will also receive more patients allowing the lower ability provider
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to offer higher levels of service.
3. Requiring providers to provide equal levels of service with respect to target wait times
decreases the overall system performance defined as the number of patients who are
served within their wait time targets. However, the negative impact diminishes as
operational abilities increase.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We first review the related medical and
operations management literature. In Section 2 we describe the general setting of our models
and define the objective function of our problem. We also discuss the provider problem and
optimal scheduling policies. In Section 3, we define the referrer problem and analyze optimal
referral policies under different circumstances. Section 4 studies the fair allocation model
which extends the standard model by enforcing parity. We conclude the paper in Section 5
with a summary of our findings, managerial insights, and limitations of our study.

2.1.1

Literature and Positioning

Patient referral decisions play a critical role in determining cost and quality of care by acting
as the bridge between primary care and access to specialized healthcare services (Barnett
et al. 2012b). It is estimated that 30% of patients in the United States and 14% of patients
in the United Kingdom are referred to providers each year (Forrest et al. 2002). The referral
decision is difficult because of the range of patient specific and systemic factors that need
to be taken into account when managing sometimes conflicting objectives such as timeliness
and quality. There are several relevant literatures particular to our problem of optimizing
referral and scheduling policies which we discuss in turn. Because of the unique methods to
derive insights in this paper, we subsequently discuss relevant methodology.
The problem of finding appropriate policies for referring and scheduling patients has been
investigated from three perspectives: (1) Gatekeeper (2) Appointment scheduling and (3)
Referral Management. The gatekeeper perspective studies the appropriateness of referrals
with particular emphasis on ascertaining whether a patient should be treated by a GP
or referred to a provider (Shumsky and Pinker 2003). Studies following the appointment
scheduling perspective focus on the problem of optimizing scheduling of patients for provider
services and typically treat the rate of referrals as exogenous. Stochastic programming
and queueing theory approaches have been extensively applied for scheduling patients and
allocating physicians capacities with the aim of minimizing costs of wait times and overtime
or minimizing the number of patients that exceed waiting-time targets (Castaing et al.
2016, Cayirli and Gunes 2014, Chen and Robinson 2014, Kuiper and Mandjes 2015, Tang
et al. 2014, Gocgun and Puterman 2014). Finally, papers taking the perspective of referral
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management, are focused on analyzing the impact of different interventions in the referral
process on patient access to provider services (Braybrooke et al. 2007, Bungard et al. 2009,
Akbari et al. 2005). A case-in-point is the study of queue pooling to determine situations
under which having a pooled referral system, modeled as a single queue pooling multiple
arrival streams, is more advantageous than having several separate referral queues (Dijk and
Sluis 2008, Mandelbaum and Reiman 1998). Mahmoudzadeh et al. (2020) and Jiang et al.
(2020) are among the papers that have explored optimal decisions in multi-class patients
scheduling with wait time targets and Li et al. (2015) has investigated patient pooling
optimization to allocate available capacity to different types of patients with different waiting
time targets.
Our paper takes a different perspective on this problem. We seek to bridge the gap
between appointment scheduling and referral management in healthcare networks. We
assume that all the patient arrivals are in real need of specialized services and, considering
wait time targets, study the coordination of referral and provider scheduling policies. These
features distinguish our paper from most of the papers in the literature. As noted by AhmadiJavid et al. (2017a) in their survey of the appointment scheduling literature, most operational
papers have explored the problem by doing micro-level analysis which does not provide
generalizable insights into the longer term decisions required to design a proper network.
The changes in methodology which we introduce in this paper allow for an analytically
tractable model where both the referral and scheduling decisions can be studied jointly,
allowing the coordination problem to be considered.
The methodology introduced in this paper uses an achievable region to represent the space
of possible scheduling outcomes for the provider. The achievable region methodology was
first introduced by Coffman and Mitrani (1980) who identified that the space of performance
characteristics achievable by allowable strategies is a convex region. By optimization over
achievable outcomes rather than available strategies, this methodology allows for a more
tractable problem which can often be expressed as a convex mathematical program and
sometimes solved analytically. Important extensions of the methodology include Federgruen
and Groenevelt (1988), Shanthikumar and Yao (1992) and Bertsimas and Nino-Mora (1996).
An achievable region approach has proved useful in a range of managerial studies including
the design of optimal pricing of prioritization in queues (Afeche and Pavlin 2016), service
differentiation in communication/computer systems (Vanlerberghe et al. 2018) and designing
kidney allocation policies (Ata et al. 2020).
We follow in this vein, representing the space of outcomes of the providers scheduling
strategies as a constrained region consistent with operational characteristics expected in the
real system. As a simple example, the region is larger if the providers capacity is larger. This
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approach allows for a tractable model where the impact of system parameters on referral
and scheduling decisions can be jointly studied.

2.2

Model and Preliminary Analysis

In this section we describe and model a system which allocates specialized healthcare services
to heterogeneous patients. The model considers both patient referral and scheduling decisions
which are respectively made by a referrer and a set of providers. Patient heterogeneity is
defined quite generally and may include patients who are differentiated by different conditions
and procedural requirements or simply different levels of severity of the same condition. The
model includes a framework for expressing positive and negative complementarities in the
ability of the provider to schedule different types of patients. For instance, if the provider
is providing two surgical procedures which have different equipment, staffing requirements
and substantial changeover time, then the provider would most likely be more productive
if they serve a more homogenous set of patients and the complementarity is negative. On
the other hand if the provider is delivering two types of consulations that are each partially
delivered by different allied health professionals, then the provider may be able to serve
more patients when there is a more even mix of the two and more patients can be served
in parallel resulting in a positive complementarity. Our model incorporates the scheduling
complementarities into the provider’s operational constraints and allows both the provider
and referrer to take them into account in their operational decisions as these agents act
to maximize the number of their patients who are served within their target wait times.
We provide the formal description of the model below with respect to the key participating
agents before providing an analysis of the providers decision problem.
Patients: To gain generalizable insights into the impact of operational abilities on managing
referrals of multiple patient types, we focus on a parsimonious model featuring two types of
patients i ∈ {1, 2}. λi represents the total arrival rate of patients of type i to the central
system. In addition, for each type of patient a maximum recommended waiting time is
defined by external policy makers (i.e. experts).
Providers: We focus on a system with a pair of providers enumerated j ∈ {1, 2}. Each
provider has a capacity mj ∈ R+ . We assume that each provider in the system is eligible
to receive both types of patients. The variable λij denotes the rate of arrivals of patients of
type i at provider j. The provider will select a scheduling strategy which is consistent with
their capacity and operational abilities. These operational abilities do not reflect healthcare
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outcomes. Rather, the operational abilities will reflect managerial skill at scheduling and
optimizing patient flows and may also reflect specific operational conditions related to the
types of procedures that are being performed. The variable xij is the probability that
patients of type i allocated to provider j are served within their target wait time. For
convenience we also define Xj = (x1j , x2j ) as the vector of target probabilities for patient
types assigned to provider j. The providers scheduling strategy will result in a particular
proportion of each patient type being served within their target wait times determining xij
for i ∈ 1, 2. Consistent with the achievable region methodology the analysis can ignore
the specific scheduling strategy and wait time targets and focus on the achievable outcomes
of interest, i.e. xij . We allow xij to be a decision variable for the provider j where the
achievable region constraints denoted in Equation 2.1 ensure that the target probability for
patient type i is consistent with a scheduling strategy available to the provider.
xij ≤ Hj (x(−i)j , λij , λ(−i)j , mj )

(2.1)

Equation 2.1, shows the target wait time of the focal patient i is bounded by the achievable
region function Hj (x(−i)j , λij , λ(−i)j , mj ). This function represents the maximum target
probability achievable in the space of available scheduling policies for provider j and depends
on the target wait time x(−i)j and arrival rate λ(−i)j of the other patient type −i at the
provider. In Section 2.2.1 we discuss expected characteristics of Hj and consider a specific
functional form for the achievable region function.
Each provider is dedicated to her own slate of patients and makes decisions independently
in response to the referrer’s allocation decisions. The scheduling problem for provider j
becomes a problem of selecting the achievable target wait times as follow:
P
i λij xij
max P
Xj
i λij

(2.2)

S.t.
0 ≤ xij ≤ 1
xij ≤ Hj (x(−i)j , λij , λ(−i)j , mj )

∀i

(2.3)

∀i

(2.4)

The objective of provider j, denoted in Equation 2.2, is to maximize the proportion of their
patients who are seen within their target wait time. Constraint 2.3 assures that target
probabilities are well defined and Constraint 2.4 ensures that xij is achievable by provider j.
Centralized referrer: Consistent with the centralized intake model, the centralized referrer
receives the streams of patients, λi , from a group of primary care providers and is the sole
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pathway of access to the specialized services. The decisions which the referrer makes is the
volume of each stream which is allocated to each referrer λij . For convenience, we define Λ
as the vector of all λij . The objective of the referrer is to perform the allocation of patients
to providers in a manner which maximizes the number of patients being seen within their
target wait times. We assume that the rate of arrivals of patients at the referrer, λi , is
exogenous and not dependent on the referrer or provider decisions.
We assume that the referrer has knowledge of the providers capabilities and incentives.
The resulting decision problem for the referrer is a bi-level optimization problem where the
final target probabilities are determined by the decisions of the providers as they serve their
particular patient allocations. The mathematical program below shows the complete decision
problem for the referrer.

max
Λ

XX
i

λij xij

(2.5)

j

S.t.
X
λij = λi

∀i

(2.6)

∀j

(2.7)

j

P
i λij xij
max P
Xj
i λij
S.t.
0 ≤ xij ≤ 1

(2.8)

xij ≤ Hj (x(−i)j , λij , λ(−i)j , mj )

∀i

(2.9)

Equation 2.5 denotes the objective function for the referrer. Equations 2.7 through 2.9
denote the providers subproblem. The objective functions of the referrer and provider are
aligned such that the problem is coordinated.

2.2.1

Model of the Achievable Region

The achievable region is the space of performance outcomes corresponding to available
scheduling policies for the provider. In this section we discuss the form of the achievable
region for an M/M/1 queueing system and how we expect this to generalize to other queueing
and scheduling settings. We then present a functional form for the achievable region which
is analytically tractable but flexible enough to model a wide variety of possible forms.
We consider a non-preemptive M/M/1 queueing system where there are two priority
classes and patient arrivals are received from two streams which we label Type 1 and Type
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2. Both Type 1 and Type 2 patients have fixed target wait times. In addition, the system
experiences a switching time when there are consecutive patients of different type. The
switching time models operational complexity and is denoted by S. It may reflect different
operational challenges such as differences in staffing, location or instrumentation between
the procedures for Type 1 and Type 2 patients.
The strategies available to the queueing system are limited to selecting the proportion
of each patient stream placed in the high priority class. For simplicity we assume that
the scheduling strategy assigns a simple probability to each arriving customer and does not
consider historical or future arrivals. The probability of a patient of type i being in the high
priority class is denoted by Pi . We determine the achievable region via a search over this
space of policies. We use a discrete-event simulation to determine the performance metrics
associated with each strategy. The simulations were performed using the SimPy python
package and each simulation was run for 20000 units of time and repeated 50 times.
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Figure 2.1: Example of achievable region for target probabilities in a prioritized M/M/1 queueing system
Figure 2.1 shows the results of this study for a low utilization (Panels a and c) and a
high utilization example (Panels b and d). The two panels show situations where there is
no switching time and where the switching time is equal to 0.25. Each line in the figures
corresponds to a trajectory of strategies where P1 is fixed and P2 is increased from 0 to 1 in
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increments of 0.1. The achievable region is the region below and to the left of the frontier
(emphasized by the black dots).
Figure 2.1 illustrates how the convexity and size of the empirical achievable region varies
depending on the operational challenges facing the system. Comparing Figures 2.1a to 2.1b
and 2.1c to 2.1d shows that the achievable region decreases in size when the utilization of the
service increases. The area decreases primarily through a downward shift of the H function.
On the hand, comparing Figures 2.1a to 2.1c and 2.1b to 2.1d shows decreases in size but in
a different manner when the switching time is increased. This operational change decreases
scheduling complementarities between the two patient types. As a result, the achievable
region shrinks primarily where both patient types are prioritized and the H function moves
from a concave to a convex function.
While we believe the above example is a useful illustration, it is very simple. In practice
enumerating the space of achievable strategies is highly dependent on the particular provider
and their operational conditions and it is very difficult to solve for these regions in closed
form. For example, a simple scheduling strategy available to the provider is to schedule each
patient in the next available appointment slot. More complex strategies are also available
such as reserving some proportion of open slots in the next week for higher priority patients.
Each of these strategies observed over a long time period with a consistent arrival process
will result in steady state performance outcomes. We focus on characterizing an achievable
region which is consistent with our simulation studies and reacts in an expected way to
changes in key parameters. In particular, we require the achievable region (AR) to have the
following characteristics:
1. The AR is a closed region containing target probabilities of 0 for each patient type.
2. Ceteris paribus, the AR is larger for a provider with larger capacity.
3. Ceteris paribus, the AR is larger for a provider with higher operational ability.
4. Ceteris paribus, the AR is smaller for a provider with higher arrival rates.
5. The function H corresponds to the Pareto frontier where any improvement in target
probabilities for type i will result in a reduction in the target probability for type −i.
The form we select for the achievable region function is:
α

H(x(−i)j , λij , λ(−i)j , mj ) =

12

j
mj − λ−ij x−ij
λij

!1/αj
.

(2.10)

Where we introduce the operational ability parameter αj . The role of the parameters in
determining the achievable region becomes more apparent in the provider’s decision problem
where the achievable region constraints can be simplified to the following form:
0 ≤ xij ≤ 1
X
α
λij xijj ≤ mj

∀i

(2.11)
(2.12)

i

It can be verified that each of the required characteristics of the achievable region are satisfied.
Figure 2.2 shows achievable regions (gray region) for target probabilities in a two-type
patient referral system under high and low operational ability scenarios where the capacity
is insufficient to serve all patients within their target wait-times. In this case there is a
tradeoff between the target probabilities for both patient types. In both cases we assume
that mj = 5, λ1j = 4 and λ2j = 5. The achievable region is between the axes and the dashed
boundary line. In the first scenario αj = 2 which corresponds to a higher operational ability.
The opposite holds in the second scenario where αj = 0.35. The convexity of the frontier of
the achievable region (or equivalently of the H function) depends on a provider’s ability. A
provider with higher operational ability is able to provide both types of patients with higher
target probabilities at the same time. On the contrary, the convexity of the H function when
a provider has low operational ability implies that heterogeneous patient populations can be
served only at lower target probabilities.
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Figure 2.2: Example of achievable region for functional form of H(·) (mj = 5, λ1j = 4, λ2j = 5)
Comparing Figure 2.1 with Figure 2.2 shows that the proposed functional form for H can
generate achievable regions similar to the achievable regions for target probabilities observed
in real systems. The operational ability level in our study (i.e. α) has a similar impact on
the convexity of the achievable region as the switching time in the M/M/1 example. This
parameter α can reflect both the ability of the provider to optimally schedule new referrals
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and the inherent challenge in their particular operational setting.

2.2.2

Analysis of the provider’s Decision Problem

In this section we study the providers decision problem. The following theorem provides a
characterization of the optimal scheduling outcomes for a provider in a centralized system
with two types of patients.
Theorem 1. Given a provider with capacity mj , operational ability αj and receiving patient
streams λ1j and λ2j , the optimal provider decisions are given in Table 2.1 and depend on the
following thresholds:
(αj )−1

T h1 = (

mj

(αj )−1

T h2 = (

mj

−1

αj
− (mj − λ1j )(αj ) 1−α
) j
λ1j

(2.13)

−1

αj
− (mj − λ2j )(αj ) 1−α
) j
λ2j

(2.14)

Table 2.1 shows the optimal target probabilities decided on by the provider and the
conditions for which they are optimal. The operational ability level αj = 1 is important in
determining the optimal provider policy. We will refer to providers where αj ≥ 1 as having
high operational ability or HOC and where αj < 1 as having low operational ability or LOC.
When a provider is HOC, the optimal policy is independent of both the arrival rates and
the capacity. If the provider is LOC, there are four candidate optimal policies which depend
on the arrival rates and provider capacity. The optimality conditions show that P1 and P2
are policies which are optimal at higher capacity and P1 prioritizes Type 1 patients while
P2 prioritizes patients of Type 2. P̄1 and P̄2 are optimal at lower capacity and similarly
prioritize patient types. Each of these policies has two conditions either of which is sufficient
for the policy to be optimal. The first condition indicates whether the provider has very
high or low capacity. The second condition is for intermediate capacities and depends on
arrival rate thresholds for the patient types (Equations 2.13 and 2.14).
The optimal policy for a HOC provider sets target probabilities of all types of patients
−1
mj
)(αj ) . When a provider is LOC, the situation is very different. It is always
equal to ( λ1j +λ
2j
best for a LOC provider to provide inequitable service by prioritizing one type of patient over
the other. It can also be seen that for a LOC provider, the optimal scheduling outcomes are
highly dependant on the provider’s capacity and the arrival rates. Note that P1 is identical
to P¯1 and P2 is identical to P¯2 if λij is equal to mj in which case there is full prioritization,
i.e. type i receives target probability of one and the target probability of the other type is
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Index

(x1j , x2j )

1

j
j
S = (( λ1j +λ
) αj , ( λ1j +λ
) αj )
2j
2j

1

m

P1 = (1, (

αj

---

>1

1

m

1

2

Optimality Condition(s)

mj −λ1j αj
)
λ2j

λ2j ≤ λ1j ≤ mj ≤ λ1j + λ2j

)

Or
λ1j ≤ mj < λ2j < λ1j + λ2j
and
λ2j ≥ T h1
λ1j ≤ λ2j ≤ mj ≤ λ1j + λ2j

1

3

P2 =

m −λ
(( jλ1j 2j ) αj

, 1)

<1

Or
λ2j ≤ mj < λ1j < λ1j + λ2j
and
λ1j ≥ T h2
mj ≤ λ1j ≤ λ2j < λ1j + λ2j

1

4

m
P¯1 = (( λ1j ) αj , 0)

Or

j

λ2j ≤ mj ≤ λ1j < λ1j + λ2j
and
λ1j < T h2
mj ≤ λ2j ≤ λ1j < λ1j + λ2j

1

5

m
P¯2 = (0, ( λ2j ) αj )

Or

j

λ1j ≤ mj ≤ λ2j < λ1j + λ2j
and
λ2j < T h1

Table 2.1: The provider problem optimal solutions
zero. When λij is not equal to mj for a high capacity provider prioritization still occurs but
in this case, both patients will have positive target probabilities. For a low capacity provider
where the prioritized type is above the capacity, the scheduling policy results in a positive
target probability for the prioritized type at the expense of a target probability of zero for
the second type.
The characteristics of the scheduling policies selected by the provider in response to
referral decisions are likely to impact patient outcomes and will be discussed in depth in
future sections. The following policy types will be used to frame that discussion.
1. Shared scheduling policy: If the optimal scheduling policy for a provider is to set the
target probabilities of both types of patients equal to each other.
2. Partially prioritized scheduling policy: If the optimal scheduling policy for a provider
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results in target probability of 1 for one type of patient and a positive but lower than
1 target probability for the other type.
3. Fully prioritized scheduling policy: If the optimal scheduling policy for a provider
results in target probability of 1 for one type of patient and 0 for the other type.
Numerical example: The following numerical example illustrates the impact of choosing
the optimal policy on the provider objective function value. Consider a high capacity provider
with capacity of 6 where the arrival rates of patient of types 1 and 2 to this provider are
respectively 5 and 4. The three scheduling outcomes which may be optimal for this high
capacity provider are:
Equal Outcome Policy (EOP): Set target probabilities of both types of patients equal to
each other (x1j = x2j ).
Prioritize Type 1 (PT1): Fully serve patients of Type 1 and allocate the rest of the
capacity to the second type.
Prioritize Type 2 (PT2): Fully serve patients of Type 2 and allocate the rest of the
capacity to the first type.
Figure 2.3 shows f (Xj ) under each policy as αj increases.
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Figure 2.3: Provider objective value under different scheduling policies
It can be seen that if the provider is LOC (αj < 1) then prioritizing Type 1 is the optimal
policy. When αj = 1 , the value of f (Xj ) does not depend on the selected policy. Finally,
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the equal outcome policy is optimal for the provider if they are HOC (αj > 1) and as αj
increases, the gains from using the equal outcome policy over other policies increases.

2.3

Referrer Problem Analysis

In this section we move on to considering the optimal referral policies for a referrer who takes
into account the optimal decisions of the providers. In this Stackleberg game, the referrer
is assumed to accurately predict the resulting target probabilities (i.e. xij ) for each patient
type given the referral rates the referrer chooses. The provider capacities and total arrival
rate of each type of patient to the system are known to the referrer. The referrer’s decision
problem corresponds to the following multilevel programming problem:

max
Λ

XX
i

λij xij

(2.15)

j

S.t.
X
λij = λi

∀i

(2.16)

∀j

(2.17)

j

P
i λij xij
max P
Xj
i λij
S.t.
0 ≤ xij ≤ 1
X
α
λij xijj ≤ mj

(2.18)
∀i

(2.19)

i

Equation 2.16 ensures that patients are properly partitioned between providers. Equations
2.17 to 2.19 denote the provider subproblems.
In order to ensure that the problem is analytically tractable and the exposition is focused
on important cases we make the following series of assumptions:
1. Arrival rate of the second type of patient is less than the arrival rate of the first type
(i.e. λ2 < λ1 ).
2. There are only two providers in the system and m2 < m1 .
3. There is enough capacity in the system to serve each type of patient within their target
wait times independently but not together (i.e. λ2 < λ1 < m1 + m2 < λ1 + λ2 ).
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4. Both providers have enough capacity to serve both types of patients independently (i.e
P
λij ≤ mj ≤ i λij )
5. At least one provider is LOC.
Assumption 1 is without loss of generality. The second assumption allows for heterogeneity
in the pool of providers without resulting in an explosion in the number of subcases. Assumptions
3, 4 and 5 ensure that we focus on the most interesting cases where the solution is non-trivial
and requires decisions regarding which patients to prioritize. Together, these assumptions
lead to the following four feasible capacity scenarios:
1. m2 < m1 < λ2 < λ1 < m1 + m2 < λ1 + λ2 (Low, Low)
2. m2 < λ2 < m1 < λ1 < m1 + m2 < λ1 + λ2 (Mid, Low)
3. m2 < λ2 < λ1 < m1 < m1 + m2 < λ1 + λ2 (High, Low)
4. λ2 < m2 < m1 < λ1 < m1 + m2 < λ1 + λ2 (Mid, Mid)
We name the capacity scenarios as in parentheses above. The first entry in the name
corresponds to the capacity of provider 1 and the second to the capacity of provider 2. We
call provider j’s capacity level “Low” if the provider’s capacity is lower than both arrival
rates (i.e. mj < λi , i = 1, 2). The capacity of j is “Mid” if the capacity is between the
arrival rates (i.e. λ2 < mj < λ1 ). Finally, the capacity is “High” if provider j’s capacity is
higher than both arrival rates (i.e. λ2 < λ1 < mj ).
In the analysis that follows we will find the optimal referral policies for these capacity
scenarios where the pool of providers has both homogeneous and heterogeneous operational
abilities (resp. Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2).

2.3.1

Referrer Decisions with Homogeneous provider ability

In this section we analyze the optimal referral policies for the referrer where both providers
are LOC (i.e. α1 , α2 < 1). Since by assumption, providers have sufficient capacity to
serve both types of patients independently, from Theorem 1, P1 and P2 are the only possible
optimal decisions for each provider. In addition, the assumption λ2 < λ1 < m1 +m2 < λ1 +λ2
implies that it is impossible to have a situation where both providers select solution P2 at the
same time. So, at least one of the providers will serve Type 1 patients with target probability
of 1. Note that in the case that the capacity is entirely utilized by one type, i.e. λij = mj ,
type −i may receive a target probability of zero. Theorems 2-5 explain optimal policies for
the referrer for each capacity scenario when both providers are LOC.
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Theorem 2. [Low provider capacity scenarios] Consider a referral system where both
providers are LOC. For capacity scenario (Low, Low) and (Mid, Low), the optimal referral
policies is the set of feasible policies resulting in G(Λ) = m1 + m2 . The candidate optimal
referral policies are listed in Table 2.2. Of these candidate policies, only Policy 3 is feasible
and optimal under all (Low, Low) and (Mid, Low) scenarios.
Optimal Policy

TP

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )

(x11 , x21 )
(x12 , x22 )

1

(m1 + m2 − λ2 , λ2 − m2 )
(λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 , m2 )

(1, 1)
(0, 1)

2

(m1 , λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 )
(λ1 − m1 , m1 + m2 − λ1 )

(1, 0)
(1, 1)

3

(m1 , λ2 − m2 )
(λ1 − m1 , m2 )

(1, 0)
(0, 1)

4

(λ1 − m2 , m1 + m2 − λ1 )
(m2 , λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 )

(1, 1)
(1, 0)

5

(λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 , m1 )
(m1 + m2 − λ2 , λ2 − m1 )

(0, 1)
(1, 1)

6

(λ1 − m2 , m1 )
(m2 , λ2 − m1 )

(0, 1)
(1, 0)

Index

Table 2.2: Candidate Policies (both providers are LOC, capacity scenarios (Low, Low) and (Mid, Low))
Theorem 2 shows the candidate optimal policies for the referrer under the scenarios
where there is lower capacity in the system and both providers are LOC. The full mapping
of scenario to optimal policy is listed in Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix. Each of the
candidate solutions listed in the theorem is able to reward the referrer with the full capacity
of the two providers and results in a situation where at least one provider fully prioritized
one type of patient over the other type, however, depending on the scenario, the policy may
not be feasible. For (Low, Low) scenarios each of Policies 1-6 may be optimal and for (Mid,
Low) each of Policies 1-4 can be optimal. The only policy which is optimal in all (Low, Low)
and (Mid, Low) scenarios is Policy 3 where each provider focuses on delivering a high quality
of service to a single patient type and results in a set of patients of each type who have a
probability of zero of receiving service within their target wait time.
Theorem 3 shows the optimal referral policy when providers have very different capacity
levels which together are close to the full arrival rate.
Theorem 3. [High heterogeneous provider capacity] Consider a referral system where
both providers are LOC. If the capacity scenario is (High, Low) and 2m2 + m1 ≥ λ1 + λ2
then the optimal policy for the referrer can be either of the following policies:
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Optimal Policy

TP

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )

(x11 , x21 )
(x12 , x22 )

1

(m1 + m2 − λ2 , λ2 − m2 )
(λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 , m2 )

(1, 1)
(0, 1)

2

(λ1 − m2 , m1 + m2 − λ1 )
(m2 , λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 )

(1, 1)
(1, 0)

Index

Table 2.3: Optimal policies (both providers are LOC, capacity scenario (High, Low) and 2m2 + m1 ≥
λ1 + λ2 )

Theorem 3 states that in the case that providers capacities are very different but are
together sufficiently close to the full arrival rate, then the optimal policies result in a situation
where the total number of patients allocated to the first and second providers are m1 and
λ1 + λ2 − m1 respectively. Restricting the arrival rate to the higher capacity provider to
its capacity allows this provider to serve both patient types with target probability one.
provider 2, who has lower capacity, serves more patients than her capacity but the surplus
patients are served with low priority.
Under both policies all types of patients allocated to the the first provider are certain to
be served within their wait time targets and the second provider priorities its full capacity to
one type of patients (patient Type 2 for policy index 1) and provides low quality service to
the remaining patients of the other type. Regardless of policy, the providers objectives are
f (X1 ) = 1 and f (X2 ) = λ1 +λm22−m1 allowing the higher capacity provider to provide higher
quality service. While the providers are indifferent between the referrer’s policy, the patients
are not. Policy 1 provides higher quality of service to Type 2 patients and Policy 2 provides
higher quality of service to Type 1 patients.
Theorem 4, shown below, explores a similar scenario to that of Theorem 3, except that
the total arrival rates are higher than 2m2 + m1 .
Theorem 4. [Low heterogeneous provider capacity] Consider a referral system where
both providers are LOC, capacity scenario is (High, Low) and 2m2 + m1 < λ1 + λ2 . The
optimal referral policy depends on the condition:
−1

m2 (λ2 − m2 )α1

−1

−1

−1

− (m1 + m2 − λ1 )α1 + (m1 − λ1 )α1 > 0

The optimal policy and target probabilities are shown in the following table:
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(2.20)

Optimal Policy

TP

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )

(x11 , x21 )
(x12 , x22 )

Index

Condition (Eq. 2.20)

−1

1

(λ1 , λ2 − m2 )
(0, m2 )

m1 −λ1 (α1 )
)
(1, ( λ
2 −m2
(0, 1)

2

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 − m2 )
(m2 , m2 )

2 −λ1 (α1 )
)
(1, ( m1λ+m
2 −m2
(1, 0) or (0, 1)

)

−1

True
)

False

Table 2.4: Optimal policies (both providers are LOC, capacity scenario (High, Low) and 2m2 + m1 <
λ1 + λ2 )

Theorem 4 shows the only situation where the optimal referral policy results in a provider
partially prioritizing one type of patient over the other type. In particular, due to the higher
arrival rates than in the scenario for Theorem 3, patients of Type 2 seen by the provider 1
have target probability between zero and one.
The two policies shown in Table 2.4 differ most markedly in that in Policy 1, all patients
of Type 1 are allocated to provider 1 allowing provider 2 to focus only on patients of Type
2. This policy results in all patients having a positive probability of being seen within their
wait time targets and is optimal only when Equation 2.20 holds. It can be verified that
the left hand side of this condition is decreasing in m1 and increasing in the arrival rates.
To put this in plain language, this is due to the fact that with sufficient residual capacity
the first provider can see more patients within their target wait time when not overloaded.
This congestion effect pushes more patients to be seen by the second provider and results
in sub-par service for one of the types allocated to this provider. Notably, this condition
does not depend on the second provider’s level of operational ability since this provider is
only able to offer target wait times above zero to an arrival rate of customers equal to its
capacity.
The above theorems have covered all scenarios except for both providers having intermediate
capacity levels. Theorem 5 shows optimal referral policy for this scenario:
Theorem 5. [Intermediate provider capacities] Consider a referral system where both
providers are LOC. If the capacity scenario is (Mid, Mid) then either of the following policies
can be optimal for the referrer are:
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Optimal Policy

TP

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )

(x11 , x21 )
(x12 , x22 )

1

(λ1 − m2 , m1 + m2 − λ1 )
(m2 , λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 )

(1, 1)
(1, 0)

2

(m1 , λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 )
(λ1 − m1 , m1 + m2 − λ1 )

(1, 0)
(1, 1)

Index

Table 2.5: Optimal policies (both providers are LOC, capacity scenario (Mid, Mid))
The two policies are equivalent from the point of view of the referrer and the patients but
differ with respect to the providers objective. The first policy provides higher mean target
probabilities to the first provider and the second policy favours the second provider. Under
the first policy fpolicy−1 (X1 ) = 1 and fpolicy−1 (X2 ) = λ1 +λm22−m1 and under the second policy
fpolicy−2 (X1 ) = λ1 +λm21−m2 and fpolicy−2 (X2 ) = 1. Under both policies the total proportion of
patients that have no chance to be served within their wait time targets is λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 .
Discussion of optimal referral policies: The results of Theorems 2-5 describe optimal
referral policies when both providers are LOC. Prioritization, where at least one provider
provides high quality of service to exactly one type of patients, is ubiquitous throughout all
capacity scenarios. At low capacities (Theorem 2) all capacity scenarios lead to at least one
provider using a fully prioritized scheduling policy. In most cases, intermediate and larger
capacities will also have one stream of patients who have a target wait time probability of
zero. This is due to the low operational ability which limits the rewards from serving both
types of patients with quality service simultaneously. The only exception to this rule is
Theorem 4 policy 1, which is optimal when the condition in Equation 2.20 holds. In this
case, the first provider partially prioritizes one type of patient over the other type, while the
second provider is able to see all patients within the target wait time.
Theorem 4 is also exceptional with respect to the referrers value. In all other cases the
referrer receives utility equal to the total provider capacities m1 + m2 . The policies for
Theorem 4 use some of provider 1 capacity to provide intermediate service levels to Type 2
patients. This occurs because the residual capacity of provider 1 after serving all the Type
1 patients is insufficient to serve remaining Type 2 patients without compromising the wait
time target probability. This required compromise results in the structure of the referral
policy being dependent on the operational ability of provider 1. The achievable region for
provider 1 is similar to the situation shown in Figure 2.2b.
These results motivate our exploration of fair-allocation objectives in the extension
(Section 2.4). In practice it is unlikely to be acceptable to knowingly send patients to a
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facility where they will certainly suffer from extended wait times.

2.3.2

Referrer Problem with Heterogeneous Operational abilities

In this section we focus on the situations where providers differ in their operational abilities.
Specifically, one provider is HOC and thus able to find efficiencies scheduling both patient
types together, while the other is LOC. The assumptions from the previous section are
maintained which results in the LOC provider utilizing scheduling policies P1 and P2 , which
respectively prioritize patient types 1 or 2. The shared scheduling policy S is the only option
for the HOC provider. The theorems below describe the optimal policies for the referrer and
providers for the both scenarios where the HOC provider has higher and lower capacity.
Theorem 6. [Higher capacity HOC provider] Consider a referral system where the
provider with the higher capacity (provider 1) is HOC. The optimal referral and scheduling
policies are as follows:
a) In all capacity scenarios except when both the capacity scenario is (Low, Low) and
2m1 + m2 < λ1 + λ2 , all feasible policies are optimal if and only if they satisfy:
λ12 + λ22 = m2

(2.21)
−1

The resulting target probabilities from such a policy are: x11 = x21 = ( λ1 +λm21−m2 )(α1 )
and (x12 , x22 ) = (1, 1).
b) When the capacity scenario is (Low, Low) and 2m1 +m2 < λ1 +λ2 , the optimal referral
policy depends on the condition:
(λ1 + m1 − m2 )(

−1
m1 + m2 − λ1 α−1
m1
1 −1
)α1 − (2m2 )( )α1 − (m1 + m2 − λ1 )((
) 2 −1 − 1) > 0
λ1 + m1 − m2
2
λ2 − m1
(2.22)

The optimal policy and target probabilities are shown in the following table :
Optimal Policy

TP

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )

xi1
(x12 , x22 )

Index

Optimality Condition (Eq. 2.22)

1

(λ1 − m2 , m1 )
(m2 , λ2 − m1 )

2

(m1 , m1 )
(λ1 − m1 , λ2 − m1 )

m1
1 +m1 −m2

)(α1 )
(1, 0)

(λ

−1

True

−1

( 21 )(α1 )

1 −λ1 (α2 )
(1, ( m2λ+m
)
−m
2

1

−1

)

False

Table 2.6: Optimal policies (first provider is HOC - capacity scenario (Low, Low) and λ1 + λ2 > 2m1 + m2 )
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Theorem 6 describes the referrer and provider policies when the HOC provider has
higher capacity. There are two cases, where case (b) is the exceptional situation where
both providers have very low capacity.
In case (a), the best policy for the referrer is to allocate the LOC provider its full capacity
m2 and the remaining λ1 + λ2 − m2 patients to the higher capacity HOC provider. These
arrival rates allow the LOC provider to provide a target probability of one to both patient
types. While the HOC provider receives more patients than its capacity, it uses the shared
policy which grants both patient types positive target probabilities.
In case (b) there are two referral policies whose optimality is determined by Equation 2.22.
Policy 1 has the LOC provider fully prioritizing Type 1 patients. In Policy 2, both providers
offer positive target probabilities to all patients. At higher capacity and ability levels of
the LOC provider, the referrer moves toward selecting the second policy. As arrival rates
increase the referrer moves toward selecting Policy 1. Policy 1 refers a smaller proportion of
patients to the HOC provider 1 enabling higher target probabilities for these patients. The
additional Type 2 patients referred to the LOC provider receive a target probability of zero.
Theorem 7 describes optimal referral policies in the situation where provider operational
capabilities are heterogeneous and the HOC provider has lower capacity:
Theorem 7. [Lower capacity HOC provider] Consider a referral system where the
provider with the lower capacity (provider 2) is HOC. The optimal referral and scheduling
policies are as follows:
a) In all the capacity scenarios if 2m2 + m1 ≥ λ1 + λ2 then all feasible policies are optimal
which satisfy:
λ11 + λ21 = m1

(2.23)
−1

The resulted target probabilities are: (x11 , x21 ) = (1, 1) and x12 = x22 = ( λ1 +λm22−m1 )(α2 ) .
b) The optimal policy and target probabilities when 2m2 + m1 < λ1 + λ2 depend on the
following equations:
(m1 + m2 − λ1 )((

−1
−1
m1 + m2 − λ1 α−1
α−1
) 1 −1 − 1) − (λ1 + m2 − m1 )1−α2 m2 2 + 21−α2 m2 > 0
λ2 − m2

(2.24)
(m1 + m2 − λ1 )

α−1
1

− (m1 − λ1 )
α−1
1 −1

(λ2 − m2 )

α−1
1

1 −1
− (2m2 )(1 − ( )α2 ) > 0
2

The optimal policy and target probabilities are shown in the following table:
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(2.25)

Capacity

Optimal Policy

TP

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )

(x11 , x21 )
xi2

Index
Scenario

(Low, Low)

Optimality Condition

1

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 − m2 )
(m2 , m2 )

2

(m1 , λ2 − m2 )
(λ1 − m1 , m2 )

1

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 − m2 )
(m2 , m2 )

3

(λ1 , λ2 − m2 )
(0, m2 )

−1

2 −λ1 (α1 )
(1, ( m1λ+m
)
−m
2

Table 2.7:

)

( 12 )

(Mid, Low)

(High, Low)

2
(α2 )−1

(1, 0)

Eq. 2.24 False

−1
m2
)(α2 )
1 +m2 −m1

(λ

−1

2 −λ1 (α1 )
)
(1, ( m1λ+m
−m
2

2
(α2 )−1

( 12 )

−1

m1 −λ1 (α1 )
)
(1, ( λ
2 −m2
1

)

Eq. 2.24 True

)

Eq. 2.25 True

Eq. 2.25 False

Optimal policies (second provider is HOC and 2m2 + m1 < λ1 + λ2 )

Theorem 7 is structurally very similar to Theorem 6. Part (a) describes the first situation
where 2m2 +m1 > λ1 +λ2 and it is always best for the referrer to allocate the LOC provider its
full capacity of m1 patients. Like Theorem 6, the LOC provider is able to provide both types
of patients with a target probability of one. The HOC provider again can take advantage of
complementarities to offer a shared policy where there is a positive chance for all types of
patients to be served within their target wait times.
Part (b) describes optimal policies when there is relatively small capacity in the system.
The specific policy depends on the the capacity scenario and the two Equations 2.24 and 2.25.
The condition 2m2 +m1 < λ1 +λ2 excludes the (Mid, Mid) capacity scenario. Equations 2.24
and 2.25 are both decreasing with respect to λ1 and λ2 and increasing with respect to m1 .
When either condition is true, the same policy (index 1) is used which partially prioritizes
Type 1 patients at the first (LOC) provider and utilizes shared capacity at the second (HOC)
provider. Policy 2 is used when the LOC provider has lower relative capacity, and results
in the LOC provider fully prioritizing Type 1 patients. Policy 3 is used when the capacity
scenario is (High, Low). Under Policy 3 the referrer specializes the referral rates, sending all
Type 1 patients to the first provider. Of note, Policy 3 is optimal under the same capacity
and arrival rate conditions when both providers are LOC (see Theorem 4). This is also the
only policy which is optimal for an HOC provider where shared scheduling is not used.
Discussion of impact of provider heterogeneity on optimal referral policies: With
the exception of Case (b) Policy 3 of Theorem 7, when there is a HOC provider, the optimal
referral policies elicit the use of the shared policy by the HOC provider. In these situations,
the referrer allocates patients to the HOC provider above its capacity level. While this allows
the system to take advantage of operational efficiencies that this provider is able to gather,
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it overloads the HOC provider and results in target probabilities below one for both patient
types. In many cases this allows for less prioritization on the part of the LOC provider and
broadly more equitable patient outcomes. This dynamic is illustrated in Table 2.8 which
shows the impact of a HOC provider on the referral policy and target probabilities when the
capacity scenario is (Mid, Mid).
Optimal Policy

TP

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )

(x11 , x21 )
(x12 , x22 )

(LOC,LOC)

(λ1 − m2 , m1 + m2 − λ1 )
(m2 , λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 )
or
(m1 , λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 )
(λ1 − m1 , m1 + m2 − λ1 )

(1, 1)
(0, 1)
or
(1, 0)
(1, 1)

(HOC,LOC)

λ11 + λ21 = λ1 + λ2 − m2

(LOC,HOC)

λ11 + λ21 = m1

Situation

Table 2.8:

m1
1 +λ2 −m2

xi1 = ( λ

−1

)(α1 )

(1, 1)
(1, 1)
m2
1 +λ2 −m1

xi2 = ( λ

−1

)(α2 )

Optimal policies (capacity scenario (Mid, Mid))

It can be seen that when both providers are LOC there are two optimal policies for
the referrer (Situation (LOC,LOC) in Table 2.8). Both policies feature a provider who
is overloaded and elects to fully prioritize one patient type. For instance, consider the
first policy where provider 2 prioritizes Type 2 patients resulting in target probabilities
(x11 , x21 ) = (1, 1) and (x12 , x22 ) = (0, 1). The first provider is referred a total rate to their
capacity and is able to fully serve both types of patients within their wait time targets.
Holding arrival rates and capacity equal, improving the first providers operational capabilities
from LOC to HOC results in structural changes to the referral and scheduling policies
(Situation (HOC,LOC) in Table 2.8). The referrer takes advantage of the ability to efficiently
schedule both patient types together and allocates more patients to this provider. This
reduces both the target probabilities and the objective value of the first provider. The
reduced demand for the second provider allows all patients sent to this provider to be seen
within their wait time targets which improves the provider’s objective function. In this
case, conditioned on the provider, both patient types have the same probability of receiving
service within their wait time targets and all patient streams have positive wait time target
probabilities. This increased equity is due to the shared scheduling policy favored by the
HOC provider 1. The policies have similar structure when the second provider is the unique
HOC provider (Situation (LOC,HOC) in Table 2.8). In both situations, The difference in
target probabilities between the HOC and LOC provider depends on the total arrival rate
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and the level of operational ability of the HOC provider.
Discussion of impact of patient demand on referral policy: A referral policy is
specialized if a provider receives patients of only one type (i.e. there exists λij = 0).
Theorems 4 and 7 show that these policies can be optimal only for (High,Low) capacity
scenarios. In these scenarios, the lower capacity provider is specialized and receives a referral
rate commensurate with the provider’s capacity and is able to offer a target probability of 1.
Figure 3.2 shows the impact of different parameters on the optimal range of these policies
for (LOC, LOC) and (LOC, HOC) scenarios (resp. Figures 3.2a, 3.2c and 3.2b, 3.2d).
These figures show the referrers objective function, i.e. the arrival rate of patients receiving
treatment within their target wait times, as the arrival rate of Type 2 patients increases.
The region where the referral policy is specialized is shown with the dashed line. In all cases,
as the arrival rate increases the policy transitions to a specialized policy. At low λ2 , there
is a region where the objective function is non-decreasing. For the (LOC, LOC) scenario
this region corresponds to Theorem 3 where exactly m1 + m2 patients are seen within their
target wait time. In the (LOC, HOC) scenario this corresponds to Theorem 7 part (a) where
patients are served within their wait time targets by the LOC provider and the HOC provider
uses a shared policy to serve an increasing rate of patients.
In each scenario, when λ2 is sufficiently large, the policy transitions to a range where the
system remains non-specialized but the number of patients seen within target wait times is
decreasing rapidly. These situations correspond to Theorem 4 Policy 2 (Figures 3.2a,3.2c)
and Theorem 7 Policy 1 (Figures 3.2b,3.2d). In these cases, provider 1 is using a partially
prioritized scheduling policy where the volume of lower priority patients is receiving the
additional Type 2 patients. Comparing Figures 3.2a and 3.2c and Figures 3.2b and 3.2d
shows how the rate of decline depends on the operational ability of provider 1 in this range.
Specialization of referral rates occurs at high arrival rates. When λ2 is sufficiently large
all scenarios transition to a specialized policy where the objective function is decreasing in
the arrival rate. Comparing Figures 3.2a with 3.2b and 3.2c with 3.2d show the region of the
specialization policy decreases when the second provider is HOC. The specialization policy
is also associated with a slower decrease in the objective function. For example for policies
in Theorem 4, the following equations show the derivative of G(Λ) with respect to λ2 for
−λ1 α−1
1 (Λ)
= −(α1−1 − 1)( λm21−m
) 1
specialization and non-specialization policies respectively: dG
d(λ2 )
2
dG2 (Λ)
−1
m1 +m2 −λ1 α−1
and d(λ2 ) = −(α1 − 1)( λ2 −m2 ) 1 . It can be verified that both formula are negative
1 (Λ)
2 (Λ)
and dG
> dG
. This stems from the greater volume of Type 1 patients that are served
d(λ2 )
d(λ2 )
at higher priority by provider 1.
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Figure 2.4: Impact of λ2 on the optimal range of the specialization policy. (m2 , m1 , λ1 ) = (1, 11, 10)

2.4

Analysis with Fairness Constraints

Based on results in the previous section we know that in many situations implementing
optimal referral policy by the referrer will lead to large differences between the target
probabilities of the two referred patient streams. For example in the scenario described
in Theorem 2, under Policies 2 and 3, patients of Type 2 referred to provider 1 receive a
target wait time probability of zero while the patients of Type 1 referred to this provider
have target wait time probability of one. This is unlikely to be acceptable to the referrer
despite this policy maximizing the total number of patients served within target wait times.
To study the impact of mandating the provider to provide fairness we modify the base model
by adding the constraint to the providers scheduling problem that target probabilities of each
patient stream are equal to each other (i.e x1j = x2j , ∀j). This problem is referred to as the
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fair-allocation scheduling problem:
P
λ x
max Pi ij ij
Xj
i λij
St :
0 ≤ xij ≤ 1
n
X
α
λij xijj ≤ mj
i=1

xij = x(−i)j
This additional constraint leads the provider to offer target probabilities of one if capacity
−1
mj
)(αj ) otherwise. Extensive results on the optimal referral
allows and x1j = x2j = ( λ1j +λ
2j
policy are provided in Section A.2.1 of the Appendix. At high operational abilities (αi ≥
1) the shared policy preferred by the providers provides fair scheduling regardless of the
constraint. The fairness constraint will lead to lower objective function values when the
operational abilities are lower. To illustrate the impact of incorporating fairness on target
probabilities and G(Λ) we explore the extreme capacity scenario (Low, Low). We derive
a precise relationship between the provider level of ability and G(Λ). The following table
shows optimal referral policies and associated target probabilities when both providers are
LOC and λ1 + λ2 > 2m1 + m2 .
Candidate Optimal Policies

TP

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )

(x11 , x21 )
(x12 , x22 )

(m1 , λ2 − m2 )
(λ1 − m1 , m2 )

(1, 0)
(0, 1)

Referrer Problem

Standard Problem (Thm. 2 Policy 3)

Fair-allocation Problem

(m1 , m1 )
(λ1 − m1 , λ2 − m1 )
(λ1 − m2 , λ2 − m2 )
(m2 , m2 )

Table 2.9:

−1

xi2

xi1 = ( 12 )(α1 )
−1
2
= ( λ +λm−2m
)(α2 )
1

2

1

−1
m1
)(α1 )
1 +λ2 −2m2
−1
xi2 = ( 12 )(α2 )

xi1 = ( λ

Optimal policies (both providers are LOC, capacity scenario (Low, Low))

The fair-allocation problem has two candidate optimal solutions. The optimal solution
will depend on the relative capacities and operational abilities of the two providers. With
respect to the target probabilities, in the regular system the optimal policy results in a fully
polarized system where the first and second providers only serve Type 1 and Type 2 patients
respectively. However, in the fair-allocation referral system there are positive chances for
all patients to be served within their wait time targets. We can explicitly compare the rate
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at which patients receive service within their target wait times between the standard and
fair-allocation problem. This corresponds to the difference between the referrer objective
functions and is shown in the following equation.
m2
1
−1
−1
)(α2 ) −1 ),
∆(G(Λ)) = min(m1 (1 − ( )(α1 ) −1 ) + m2 (1 − (
2
λ1 + λ2 − 2m1
1 (α2 )−1 −1
m1
−1
m2 (1 − ( )
) + m1 (1 − (
)(α1 ) −1 )).
2
λ1 + λ2 − 2m2

(2.26)

The difference shown in Equation 2.26 is decreasing in operational abilities (α1 , α2 ) and
approaches 0 as α1 and α2 both approach 1. This can be generalized to other situations as
well.
Numerical example: We illustrate the impact of fairness on the system performance and
the optimal policy with a series of numerical examples which are shown in Figures 2.5-a
to 2.5-d. In these figures, the impact on the optimal system objective function is shown
as the operational ability of the first provider is increased. In each of these situations the
second provider is LOC, however, we consider the case where α2 = 0.01 (Figures 2.5a,2.5c)
and α2 = 0.99 (Figures 2.5b,2.5d). Figures 2.5a and 2.5b show the capacity scenario (High,
Low) when 2m2 + m1 < λ1 + λ2 and the second provider has low and moderate operational
ability. Figures 2.5a and 2.5-b a similar example but for a (Low, Low) capacity scenario
when 2m1 + m2 < λ1 + λ2 .
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Figure 2.5: Impact of fairness on G(Λ). (a)-(b): (m2 , m1 , λ2 , λ1 ) = (1, 6, 4, 5), (c)-(d): (m2 , m1 , λ2 , λ1 ) =
(3, 4, 5, 6.5)

In all cases as the operational ability of the providers increase the gap between system
performance for the fair-allocation and regular policies decreases. When α1 is small, the
gap is substantial in all cases, whereas when α1 is large the gap depends on the capacity
situation. In the (High, Low) situations, there is no gap at α1 > 1 as the optimal policy
limits the demand for provider 2 such that all patients can be seen with target probability
of 1 (Theorem 6-a). In the lower capacity scenarios, there is a gap even at higher α1 but
the size of the gap depends to a large degree on α2 and is not visible when α2 = 0.99. The
gap is due to the prioritized optimal policies described in Theorem 6-b. When α2 = 0.01 the
system is fully prioritized with patients allocated to provider 2 receiving target probability
of 1 or 0. When α2 = 0.99 the system is partially prioritized with both types of patients
allocated to provider 2 receiving positive target probabilities.
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2.5

Conclusion

We studied referral and scheduling policies in a centralized system where both the referring
agent and providers delivering the service are attempting to maximize the proportion of
their patients seen within target wait times. Our model allowed study of the impact of
operational parameters through a novel achievable region methodology where providers may
have positive or negative complementarities associated with serving heterogeneous patient
populations. We extracted optimal decisions for the referrer and providers in the centralized
system for different operational parameters.
When operational abilities are high, scheduling complementarities lead the system to
deliver equitable service with high probabilities of patients being seen within their target
wait times. When abilities are low, there is a conflict between maximizing the number of
patients served and fair access services. In particular, providers may be incentivized to fully
or partially prioritize one type of patient over the other. We find that the cost of requiring
equitable service between patient types is highly dependent on the operational abilities of
both providers.
These results highlight how operational structure may influence equitable access to services
for groups of patients with different needs. When scheduling is challenging, there is a strong
incentive to simply prioritize one group of patients over the other. In this paper we have
investigated a single reward mechanism where referrer and provider maximize throughput
of patients receiving service within target wait times. While this is aligned with current
practice, rewards and regulations which explicitly take into account fairness goals may be
required in more challenging instances.
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Chapter 3
The Application of Reinforcement
Learning in Patient Referral Networks
3.1

Introduction

On-time access to specialists has become a major challenge for healthcare systems in many
countries including the United States, Canada, and most European countries (Jaakkimainen
et al. 2014, Alvarez et al. 2019, Viberg et al. 2013b). On-time access to specialists can
be measured by wait time targets (WTT), defined as the recommended time within which
patients should be treated. It has been widely shown that long wait times exceeding WTT
result in deteriorating patient health condition which places additional pressure on healthcare
systems (Lawrentschuk et al. 2003b, Haddad et al. 2002b). Wait times have also been
significantly impacted during COVID-19. For instance, Mayol and Fernández Pérez (2020)
reported that there was reduced capacity and increased wait times for elective surgeries
when resources were rationed for COVID-19 patients in the spring of 2020. Finally, Moir
and Barua (2020) defined the cost of waiting time as the value of time that is lost while
waiting for treatment and estimated that the cost of waiting time per patient in Canada to
be between $2,254 and $6,838.
Patients can gain access to specialized services through two main referral schemes: centralized
and decentralized referral systems. General practitioners (GPs), specialists, and the referral
process are the three main elements of both referral systems. In a decentralized referral
system, a patient is first seen by a GP and in the case that further treatment is needed, the
patient is referred to a specialist directly by the GP. However, under a centralized referral
scheme, if specialized services are needed, the patient is directed by the GP to a central
body (the referrer), which has access to all specialists in the network. The referrer is then
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responsible for allocating the patient to an available specialist.
Research has found that the optimum structure of patient referral networks in many cases
is still unclear (Lorant et al. 2017), but there have been moves toward centralization (Scott
et al. 1999). Reducing the likelihood of patient readmission to hospitals (Mascia et al. 2015),
better continuity of care (Lorant et al. 2017), better equity across the network, wider access
to specialists, streamlining of the referral process and information flow (Scott et al. 1999),
and higher fairness to physicians through balancing referral rates are some advantages of
using a centralized referral scheme.
Despite the potential advantages of a centralized referral network, a referrer’s information
on the characteristics of the network is very limited and there are high levels of uncertainty
in both arrival rates to the network and specialist service times . As a result, finding optimal
referral rates to specialists is still a complex and challenging problem. The complexity of the
problem significantly increases as the network becomes larger (e.g., the number of specialists
in the network increases) or as more factors are incorporated in making referral decisions
(e.g., closeness to specialists and wait times for them). Allocating patients to specialists
close to them can reduce the burden of travel for patients (Piterman and Koritsas 2005) and
therefore, distance between specialists and patients is another important factor besides wait
time that can impact referral decisions in a network (Langley et al. 1997).
In this paper, we use deep learning methodology to model a centralized referral network
where a referrer assigns patients from different locations to a set of specialists. In particular,
we use deep Q-network (DQN), one of the most promising reinforcement learning methodologies
(RL), introduced by Mnih et al. (2015). The methodology is used in complex environments
where, due to incomplete information of a referring agent on environment characteristics;
complexity of interactions within the environment, and a high level of uncertainty in different
elements of the environment, it is not possible to find an analytical solution to the optimal
referring behaviour for an agent. In our model, patients arrive to the system stochastically
and are homogeneous with respect to their health condition. However, the specialists are
heterogeneous with respect to the time they require to treat a patient. This setting is a
representation of health conditions with standardized care pathways such as cataract surgery.
Patients requiring cataract surgery are usually referred to a specialist at a certain stage of
disease progression such as when color intensity is reduced or when a patient has difficulty
in daytime driving (Allen and Vasavada 2006). In practice, a referrer’s information about
system characteristics such as specialists’ service times and patients’ real wait times for
specialists are very limited. These make the system complex to solve using traditional
analytical models such as Markov Decision Process (MDP) and/or queueing system.
We further extend our analysis to incorporate collaboration among adjacent centralized
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referral networks. Due to the uncertainty in patient arrivals and service times, a referral
network can get congested, in which case patient transfer among adjacent referral networks
can improve health outcomes of patients by reducing their wait times (Centre for Substance
Abuse Treatment 2000). Collaboration between the networks further increases the complexity
of finding optimal referral rates to specialists and thus justifies the implementation of machine
learning algorithms. The concept of collaboration between the networks becomes a more
urgent issue once we consider how pandemics such as COVID-19 have affected healthcare
systems in different countries, including Canada. The pandemic has put unequal pressure
on different referral networks, thus resulting in significant increases in arrival rates to some
referral networks and decreases in capacity in others (Moir and Barua 2020). It is still unclear
under what conditions referral networks can collaborate and what could be the results of
this collaboration on patient wait times and referral rates to specialists.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first that applies a DRL methodology
to investigate the potential impact of using an intelligent referrer in centralized referral
networks. Using a state-of-the-art DRL methodology, we seek to answer the following
research questions: 1) To what degree can using an intelligent referrer in a single centralized
referral network improve average patient wait times for specialists, and 2) How can we define
a collaboration mechanism between two intelligent centralized networks and to what degree
would collaboration between the networks improve patient access to specialists?
Our study yields several interesting findings that have policy implications. First, in
comparison with commonly used referral policies such as the shortest queue policy, we find
that depending on a referral’s network characteristics, specialist service times and WTT,
using an intelligent referrer can significantly improve patients’ access to specialists and reduce
wait times in the network. In addition, the performance of the intelligent referrer, with
respect to wait times, increases as WTT decreases and as specialist service times become
more diverse .
Second, we find that it is always better for a referrer to have short-term vision toward
optimizing referral rates to specialists. This is similar to situations where investors might
choose a short-term investment in a highly volatile market. Due to the high level of
uncertainty in arrival and service times, it might be the best practice for a referrer to prioritize
short-term rewards over uncertain long-term rewards.
Finally, we find that collaboration has the potential to further improve patients’ wait
times in the system. However, the impact depends on specific factors such as a compensation
scheme for referrers for each transferred patient and WTT. When WTT is high, meaning
that there is higher flexibility in patient wait times, it is in the interest of an intelligent
referrer to focus on optimizing referral rates to the specialists in its own network and avoid
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transferring them to an adjacent network. In our model, to incorporate potential government
incentives for cross-network collaboration, we allow the payments for a transferred patient to
be set differently than payments for within network referrals. However, we show that there
is an optimal threshold for the payment for transferred patients. While a small incentive
may not motivate the networks to collaborate with each other, a high value of incentive, on
the other hand, could result in over-collaboration which occurs when too many patients are
transferred between the networks and, consequently, average wait times in the whole system
increase. As a result, we show that there is a ”sweet spot” for the incentive to improve the
overall outcome of the system.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. We first review the related operations
management literature. In Section 3.3 we describe different elements of a centralized referral
network and introduce a general mechanism under which collaboration between the networks
can occur. In Section 3.4 we study how a DQN approach can be applied in a single centralized
referral network and in Section 3.5 we study the concept of collaboration between two
centralized referral networks. Section 3.6 is devoted to sensitivity analyses we performed
on different characteristics of the model. We conclude the paper in Section 3.7 with a
summary of our findings, insights, and limitations of our study.

3.2

Literature and Positioning

Convenient and on-time access of patients to specialized services is one of the major concerns
in many countries and evidence suggests that the location of a specialist and its proximity to
patients is one of the factors that can impact referral rates to the specialist (Piterman and
Koritsas 2005, Langley et al. 1997, Olmos et al. 1995). This problem has been investigated
from different perspectives. Studies under the facility-location category have focused on
optimizing the location of the specialized services considering different sets of constraints.
Under this perspective, the main goals are usually to find the optimum number of facilities
and optimum locations to locate the facilities to make sure that patients do not wait more
than a specific amount of time. For instance, Baron et al. (2008) analyzed the Stochastic
Capacity and Facility Location Problem (SCFLP) with the FIFO discipline and general
arrival and service processes. Each facility, modeled as single- or multiple-server queue,
serves customers within a predetermined radius and it is assumed that customers visit the
closest facility. Through decomposition of the problem into three subproblems they showed
that arrivals to facilities have Poisson distribution and developed an algorithm to determine
the optimum number and location of the facilities. Zhang et al. (2009) also investigate the
facility location problem in preventive healthcare with the goal of maximizing the number
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of clients who participate in the program. They focused on a referral network where each
facility is modeled as an M/M/1 queue, and it is assumed that each client favours the facility
with minimum expected total time and the number of arrivals to a facility decreases as the
expected total time increases.
Although optimizing the location of facilities has the potential to improve patients’ access
to specialized services, in most cases re-locating or changing the location of a healthcare
provider is not practical. For instance, if specialized services are only accessible through
specialists, then optimally locating specialists may not be feasible. Therefore, another
perspective is to focus on optimizing interactions within a referral network. Optimizing
referral rates and scheduling policies has been studied extensively (Cayirli and Veral 2003,
Marynissen and Demeulemeester 2019, Ahmadi-Javid et al. 2017b). However, to make the
problem tractable, most of the studies in this category make some restrictive assumptions
that might not represent what happens in practice. For instance, in studies focused on
optimizing scheduling policies, it is usually assumed that the service times of healthcare
providers and their distributions are known and referral rates to these providers are considered
to be exogenous. On the other hand, in most studies focused on optimizing referral rates to
specialists, not only are distance between patients and specialists not considered, but also
referral decisions are made based on average wait time for specialists rather than real wait
time. The first part of our paper where we study the impact of using DQN methodology
in a single referral network falls into the latter category. In our study, a referrer does not
have complete information on the specialists’ service times. In addition, the referrer not
only considers distance between patients and specialists but also takes real wait times for
specialists into account when making its referral decisions. Despite the extensive literature
on optimizing interactions within a referral network, the on-time and convenient access of
patients to specialized services is still one of the challenges yet to be solved.
Another perspective from which optimizing interactions between referral networks has
been studied is on a smaller scale and through a qualitative approach by Peng and Bourne
(2009). They examined the concept of competition between two healthcare networks, including
two core hospitals located next to each other, and their partners, in Taiwan. They proposed
that simultaneous competition and collaboration can exist when each organization has
complementary but distinctly different sets of resources. Since their study investigated one
case study in a single industry, they also argued that their findings might not be generalized.
The second part of our paper utilizes a very different approach from Peng and Bourne (2009)
and provides complementary results including the level of incentives that are required to
initiate collaboration between the networks.
Our paper studies how collaboration between referral networks can improve patient access
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to specialists by applying a RL technique (i.e., DQN). DQN is a RL technique which is the
result of integrating an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) into the Q-learning process. The
approach allows us to analyze the problem in a more practical way where an intelligent
referrer learns optimal behaviour through interacting with different elements of the network.
The methodology has been applied to a variety of topics. Babaev et al. (2019) applied a
deep learning approach for credit scoring in the banking industry. The results indicated
the superiority of the deep learning algorithm versus benchmarks on historical data where
the former resulted in significant higher financial gains for a case study bank. Liu and
Shoji (2019) also applied a deep learning algorithm to predict intelligent vehicle mobility.
The algorithm outperformed other techniques and resulted in significant improvement in
vehicle mobility prediction. Ahn and Park (2020) applied DQN to control balancing between
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems and Dai et al. (2019) used this
methodology to improve the utility of vehicular networks. Deep learning techniques have
also been applied widely in medical image analysis to improve both precision and speed of
diagnosis processes (Ker et al. 2017). To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first
one that examines the application of a deep learning approach in patient referral systems.

3.3

Modelling a Centralized Referral Network

In this section we explain key elements and characteristics of centralized referral networks.
Due to the stochastic control nature of the referral system, we explain how the Markov
Decision Process (MDP) can be applied to analyze the system. However, the MDP model
cannot be analytically solved to find optimal solutions because of the complexity of the
system and the uncertainty in many of the variables. As a result, we then propose a DQN
approach to analyze the MDP system.
In a centralized referral network (Network M), the patient is first seen by a GP. In the
case where specialized services are needed the patient is then referred to the referrer which is
responsible for allocating the patient to one of the specialists in the network (i.e., the referrer
selects a specialist). Once the patient is referred, the selected specialist is responsible for
providing the patient with the required service. Centralized referral networks are widely seen
in different healthcare systems. For instance, the centralization of rheumatology referrals in
Canada (Hazlewood et al. 2016) is one case which improved patient access to rheumatologists.
Another example is the centralization of access to specialized health services in Quebec
(Spagnolo et al. 2021). The key elements of the centralized referral Network M and their
characteristics are defined as follows:
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Patient: Patients are arriving from different locations to the network. We assume that
patients are similar in terms of their health risk. This assumption is reasonable for certain
health conditions such as cataracts for which patients are recommended to have them
removed as soon as they begin interrupting daily activities (Allen and Vasavada 2006).
Arrival rates (λ) are stochastic and the location of patient i ∈ N is represented by (xi , yi ).
Specialist: There are nM specialists in Network M that are responsible for providing the
required service for the patients (e.g., cataract surgery). Service times of specialists are
stochastic and the location of specialist j ∈ {1, ..., nM } in this network is represented by
(xj , yj ).
Referrer: There is one referrer, Referrer M, in the network that is responsible for allocating
arriving patients to specialists. Because all patients need to visit a specialist (as diagnosed
by a GP) and no triage or any other processes are done by the referrer, patients are referred
to a specialist immediately upon arrival (i.e., no wait time at the referrer stage). We assume
that the location (i.e., address) of patients and specialists are known to the referrer. We use
Euclidean distance as the measure for the distance between patient i located at (xi , yi ) and
specialist j located at (xj , yj ).
Dij = ((xi − xj )2 + (yi − yj )2 )0.5

(3.1)

Because the distance cost is a standardized cost, the distance measure does not impact the
referral policies (see discussion in Section 3.3.1 ). Upon the arrival of a patient, the referrer
seeks to allocate the patient to a specialist that is close to them and will have a low wait
time.

3.3.1

Model Structure

We model a centralized referral network (Network M) as a Markov Decision Process (MDP).
Table 3.1 shows the model parameters:
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Index
λM
nM
µj
Dij
qj−t
pr
xij
sij−t
Wij

Definition
Arrival rate to Network M
Number of specialists in Network M
Service rate of specialist j, j ∈ {1, ..., nM }
Distance between patient i ∈ N and specialist j
Real time queue size for specialist j at state t
Payment per each patient referred to a specialist
Binary variable, the value is 1 if patient i is referred to specialist j
Binary variable, the value is 1 if patient i is served by specialist j at time step t
Patient i wait time for specialist j
Table 3.1: Single Network Parameters

For Network M, the state of the system at time t, st , is defined as the number of patients
waiting for each specialist (i.e. qj−t , ∀j). Therefore, st = {q1−t , ..., qnk −t }. We assume that
decision epochs are short enough such that only one of the following events can occur at
each time step:
1. A patient arrives to the network
2. A patient is served by one of the specialists and leaves the network
3. No event
where each event occurs with a specific probability. Note that this implies a memoryless
property which is easy to compactly encode into the MDP. However, the deep reinforcement
learning which we use and describe in the next section does not require as compact a
representation and could be generalized in future work or implementations. The first two
events are the only ones that can change the state of the system. A ={Refer,Wait} is the
action set for Referrer M. In the case where there is an arrival to the system, the referrer
action is {Refer}, otherwise (i.e., if a patient is served by a specialist or no event occurs) the
only action is {Wait}. The {Refer} action is itself a set of specific choices of referring the
patient to one of the nM specialists in the network.
Allocating patient i to specialist j at state t results in the following outcomes for Referrer
M:
1. Fixed payment (pr ): A government payment per each patient referred to a specialist
in the network.
2. Immediate cost: The immediate cost is a distance-dependent cost which is realized by
the referrer immediately upon referring a patient to a specialist. In our model, F (Dij )
represents the immediate cost of referring patient i to specialist j.
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3. Delayed cost: The delayed cost depends on the patient wait time for the specialist
and is realized by the referrer once the patient is served by the specialist (i.e. when
sij−t′ = 1, t′ > t). In our model, G(Wij ) represents the delayed cost of referring patient
i to specialist j.
Therefore, Referrer M’s reward function for referring patient i to specialist j at state t
can be defined as follows:
RM −t (i, j) = {pr } − {F (Dij )} − {sij−t′ G(Wij )}

t′ > t

(3.2)

Note that when there is no arrival to the network there is also no reward for the referrer.
More specifically, there is no reward associated with the action {wait}. For our analysis, we
D
set pr = 2 and define F (Dij ) = maxjijDij which is the ratio of the distance between the patient
and the selected specialist over the distance between the patient and the farthest specialist
W
from the patient in the network. We also define G(Wij ) = W TijT which is the ratio of the
patient real wait time for the specialist over the WTT. Therefore, the reward function can
be re-written as follows:
RM −t (i, j) =2 − (

Wij
Dij
)−(
)
maxj Dij
WTT

(3.3)

In Equation 3.3 both F (Dij ) and G(Wij ) are between 0 and 1 if the patient receives the
required service within the WTT. This standardization of costs allows the referrer to equally
incorporate the distance and wait time when optimizing its referral decisions. However, if
W
the patient waits more than WTT to see the specialist, then wait time cost (i.e. W TijT )
becomes greater than 1. This will allow the referrer to balance wait time in the network by
prioritizing shorter wait times over closer distance.
Since the reward function of the referrer depends on the distances between patients and
selected specialists, the probabilities of patient arrivals are distance-dependent. In practice,
it is difficult for the referrer to know these distance-dependent arrival probabilities. In
addition, in practice the referrer has limited information on the service times of specialists
and their scheduling policies. Therefore, in the transition matrix of the MDP model, the
probabilities associated with patients being served by specialists are unknown to the referrer.
As a result, it is not possible to get analytical results from this MDP.

3.3.2

DQN Architecture

Sutton et al. (1998) introduced reinforcement learning (RL) as a self-taught process that
can be represented by an MDP. The main goal of the RL is to find a policy π, defined as
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a mapping from states to actions that results in the highest reward. RL algorithms can
be divided into policy-based and value-based methods depending on the learning objectives
(Rückstiess et al. 2010). To gain the maximum total reward in the future under a policybased RL method, an agent (e.g., referrer) must learn a policy, only from the data, such
that the action executed at each state is optimal. Value-based methods learn the policy by
maximizing a value function denoted as V (s) where s is the current state of the system at
time step t. Then, the value-based RL methods will find a policy which results in V ∗ (s)
defined as
V ∗ (s) = max Vπ (s)

(3.4)

π

P∞ k

where Vπ (s) = E
γ
R
|s
=
s,
π
is the expected long-term return of state s
t+k
t
k=0
under policy π. γ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor which determines the importance of distant
future rewards versus immediate rewards.
Q-learning, introduced by Watkins (1989), is a value-based RL technique that replaces
the value function with an action-value function Q(s, a) where Q : S × A → R. As a result,
the action-value function for taking action at in state st is calculated as
Q(st , at ) =

X

P (st , st+1 , at ).[Rt (st , st+1 , at ) + γ max Q(st+1 , a)]
a

st

(3.5)

where st ∈ S is the input state, st+1 ∈ S is a state accessible from st , at is agent’s action
in st , and P (st , st+1 , at ) is the probability of moving from state st to state st+1 given action
at . Rt (st , st+1 , at ) is the reward the referrer obtains from taking action at in state st and
moving to state st+1 . Initially, all Q(s,a) values, or simply Q values, are set to zero. The
Bellman Equation is then applied to update the Q values at each step as follows:
Qnew (st , at ) = Qold (st , at ) + α[Rt (st , st+1 , at ) + γ max Q(st+1 , a) − Qold (st , at )]
a

(3.6)

where α is the learning rate, Qold (st , at ) is the old Q-value of the pair (st , at ) and
maxa Q(st+1 , a) is the maximum possible future reward considering all possible actions in
the new state st+1 . The learning rate determines to what degree old information overrides
by the newly obtained information. An episode of the algorithm ends if st+1 is a terminal
state. Q-values are then disposed in a table, known as Q-table, and the agent will apply a
greedy strategy choosing the optimal choice of action a∗ as follows:
a∗ = arg max(Q(s, a))
a
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(3.7)

Although some reinforcement learning methods such as Q-learning allow referrers to
extract optimal policies when they have limited information about the environment, these
methods can be applied only on small environments and quickly lose their feasibility as the
number of states and actions in the environment increase (Hester et al. 2018). To overcome
these challenges, Mnih et al. (2015) introduced DQN where the idea is to replace a Q-table
with a neural network. The neural network is trained to learn weights in order to approximate
the Q-function. A trained network receives a state as input and selects the action with the
highest Q-value. For a better understanding of the deep learning process in neural networks
readers are referred to Nielsen (2015).

3.3.3

Implementation of DQN For a Referral Network

We use Simpy, a process-based discrete-event framework based on Python, to define the
environment where the information about referrers and specialists is stored in a json file.
There are three main classes in our model:
1. Stream: This class is responsible for generating the stream of arrivals to the network.
Each generated patient i has two attributes: 1) location, and 2) referral time, which
shows the time that the patient is referred to a specialist.
2. Referrer: This class is responsible for referring the patient to a specialist (i.e., the
referrer selects a specialist) once an arrival to a network is generated.
3. Specialist: This class includes information about the selected specialist. Under this
class, the selected specialist provides the patient with the required service and then
the patient leaves the system. Each specialist j has two attributes: 1) location, and 2)
service time distribution.
Upon the arrival of a patient at time step t the state of the network is st . At each time
step t, DQN receives the current state st as the input that contains information about the
number of patients waiting for each specialist in the network. Then, DQN approximates a
Q-value for each action that can be taken from that state. For example, if there are three
specialists in the network, upon the arrival of a patient, there will be three estimated Qvalues which show Q-value for referring the patient to each one of the three specialists. The
objective of the network is to find the optimal approximating function.
In each time step the referrer either explores the environment and selects a random action
or exploits the environment and selects the action for the given state that gives the highest
Q-value. This is called the tradeoff between exploration versus exploitation. It is crucial
for the referrer to explore the environment enough so that it can find the optimal referral
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policies in the environment (Cao et al. 2019). Then, the referrer’s experience at each time
step is stored in a data set called the replay memory that is used to improve the performance
of the DQN over time. For example, executing action at at state st is an experience that
moves the system to state st+1 and results in a reward, Rt+1 , for the referrer. Thus, we
define et as the referrer’s experience at time t as follows:
et = (st , at , Rt+1 , st+1 )

(3.8)

All the referrer’s experiences over time are stored in the replay memory. The network
is then trained on random samples from the replay memory, sampling a specific number of
experiences and passing them to the network as input. We define this as the policy-based
network where its objective is to approximate the optimal policy through finding the optimal
function Q∗ (s, a). Forward propagation is then applied and the policy-based network outputs
an estimated Q-value for each action that can be taken from the given input state. Then,
we calculate the loss which is a mean-squared error function that compares the Q-value
outputs from the policy-based network for the actions in the experiences sampled and the
corresponding optimal Q-values, called target Q-value, for the same actions. As a simplifying
example, assume that at time step k a given sample to the network is (sk , ak , Rk+1 , sk+1 ).
The loss then can be calculated as follows:
loss =[Q∗ (sk , ak ) − Q(sk , ak )]2

(3.9)

Where Q∗ (sk , ak ) is the target Q-value and Q(sk , ak ) is the estimated Q-value. The
policy-based network gives us the value of Q(sk , ak ). In addition, Q∗ (sk , ak ) satisfies the
Bellman requirements. Therefore, it can be written as follows:
Q∗ (sk , ak ) = E[Rk+1 + γ max Q∗ (sk+1 , a)]
a

(3.10)

DQN uses a separate network, called the target network, to find the value of maxa Q∗ (sk+1 , a).
The loss function is then optimized using stochastic gradient descent (Bottou 2012). In short,
at the end of each time step, gradient descent is applied to update the weights in the policy
network in an attempt to minimize the loss. Also, every certain amount of time steps the
weights of the target network are updated to the weights of the policy-based network.
There is a rich literature on different RL algorithms capable of making an agent able
to efficiently learn optimum policies in environments where there is only one final reward
(e.g., win/lose in chess) (Vecerik et al. 2017, Nair et al. 2018). What makes our problem
distinguishable is the fact that every single action that the referrer takes has a delayed
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reward associated with it. In fact, both the time that a delayed reward is recognized, and its
value depend on the selected specialist service time which is stochastic. The learning process
becomes much slower and challenging due to the following reasons:
1. Since there is a delay between every action and its associated reward, a referrer always
makes decisions during the delay period which might not be optimal.
2. The size of the memory is limited and therefore it is not possible to keep all the stateaction pairs in the memory until the referrer’s rewards are realized.
In the following section we present our experimental results.

3.4

Single Network Experimental Results

In this section we explain our experimental results obtained from applying DQN methodology
on Network M defined in Section 3.3. We began by representing our model using cataract
referral data from a local health integration network (LHIN) in Ontario. According to the
data, there were six specialists in the LHIN and 2,621 patients entered the system over a
year. Because distance is a key parameter in the reward function, to let the referrer optimize
referral decision more efficiently and avoid the curse of dimensionality (Poggio et al. 2017),
we assumed that patients arrived to the network from two different sources, located at [8,5]
and [12,6] which loosely corresponds to the major population centres in the LHIN. These
locations were chosen close enough so it would be optimal for the referrer to refer patients
from both sources to all specialists; the centralized referral networks are formed such that
all specialists are accessible to all patients. We assumed that the arrivals (λ) to the network
were from either of these two locations with the same probability.
A set of experiments with the data was performed to calibrate the model and determine
the location and service times of the specialists to get similar results as in practice. The
estimated service times and locations are shown in Table 3.2. In Section 3.6.1 we present
the sensitivity of our results to the service times of the specialists.
Specialist Index
1
2
3
4
5
6

Location
[13,3]
[14,5]
[17,7]
[19,4]
[18,8]
[20,3]

Service Time Mean (Hour)
15
16
17
20
18
14

Table 3.2: Network M Specialists’ Characteristics
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To better examine how changing the wait time targets (WTT) can impact the performance
of the DQN model, we considered three different WTT values [24,168,720] in hours (i.e., 1
day, 1 week, and 1 month). In the following, we explain the steps we took to train and test
models for each value of WTT, and the terminology we used in the rest of the paper.
1. We considered five different values for the discount factor (i.e. γ ∈ (0, 1)) to study if it
is better for a referrer to focus on the short-term rewards (when γ is small) versus the
long-term rewards (when γ is large) when it makes referral decisions. The considered
values are [0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9].
2. In the learning phase, for each value of γ we iterated the model ten times. We ran
each trial for a million hours using the same random seed to ensure comparability
among the trials.
3. The performance measure is, then, the average performance of models with the
same value of γ taken over the ten trials. For example, when we refer to average
expected wait time when γ = 0.1, we used the average wait time in the network taken
over the ten trials with γ = 0.1. The same concept also holds for the average expected
accumulated reward. From now on, we call average expected wait time and average
expected accumulated reward as average wait time and average accumulated reward,
respectively.
4. The best discount factor is the one which (on average) results in higher accumulated
reward and lower average wait time in the network.
5. For each value of WTT, the best trained model is defined as the model which outperforms
the rest of the nine models with the same value of γ with respect to accumulated reward
and average wait time in the network.
6. We used the best trained models in the testing phase to compare the performance of
the DQN methodology with other policies such as shortest queue policy and random
allocation policy. To incorporate the effect of randomness on the performance of the
models, we performed the test ten times using different seeds. However, to have
comparable results across policies, the ten seeds used in the testing phase were the
same across all policies.
Next, we presented the results of the training process of Referrer M. Then, we extracted
the best trained model for each value of WTT and tested its performance with respect to the
resulted average wait time to study to what degree applying DQN methodology in a single
referral network can improve patient access to specialists.
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3.4.1

Referrer M: Training Phase

We began with the training phase of Referrer M where 150 models in total were trained (3
WTT values × 5 gamma values × 10 trials). Figure 3.1 shows the average performance of
models with respect to the average wait time in Network M for different values of WTT.
Because a certain number of patients are served at different times in each trial, we used
number of patients served on the x-axis of Figure 3.1 to compare across models.
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Figure 3.1: Average Wait Time in Network M (Training Phase)
In all cases of γ across different WTTs, the average wait time initially increased but,
after a while, started to decrease. This, intuitively, is an indicator that the referrer learned
better referral policies over time and was therefore able to improve its performance.
In all WTT scenarios, models with γ = [0.7, 0.9] have the worst performances. This
suggests that having a long-term vision for optimizing referral rates to specialists may not
result in the best outcomes. In fact, Figure 3.2, which focuses on the last 50,000 patients
served, shows that in all the three WTT scenarios the best results are gained when γ = 0.1.
In plain words, due to the high level of uncertainty in the system considering a long vision
makes it very challenging for the referrer to learn a good referral policy.
In addition, the referrer is able to achieve lower average wait time in Network M as WTT
decreases. This is because as WTT decreases the delayed reward term in the utility function
of the referrer becomes more important. Therefore, low wait time for specialists becomes the
determining factor in the referral decision process. This suggests that small WTT values can
help a network achieve lower average wait times if this is the main concern of the network
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decision makers.
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Figure 3.2: Average Wait Time in Network M (Training Phase - Last 50,000 Patients Served)
Figure 3.3 shows Referrer M’s total average accumulated reward for different WTT
scenarios. When WTT is small (i.e., 24 hours) and γ = [0.7, 0.9], the accumulated reward
stays negative at the end of the trials. This is because wait time for specialists is the dominant
factor in the reward function of the referrer when WTT is small. Figure 3.1 shows that when
WTT is 24 hours and γ = 0.9, the average wait time in the network is three days. Therefore,
even if we ignore distance cost in Equation 3.3, on average, Referrer M receives -1 reward
for referring each patient to a specialist. This results in a significant negative accumulated
reward for the referrer at the end. Comparing Figures 3.1 and 3.3 also shows the tradeoff of
wait time and distance. In fact, both wait time and accumulated reward reduce when WTT
becomes smaller.
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Figure 3.3: Referrer-M Average Accumulated Reward (Training Phase)
Figure 3.4 shows the accumulated reward of the referrer for the last 50,000 patients served.
In all scenarios using γ = 0.1 has resulted in the highest average accumulated reward for the
referrer.
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Figure 3.4: Referrer M Average Accumulated Reward (Training Phase - Last 50,000 Patients Served)
The following conclusions are made from results shown in Figures 3.1-3.4. Considering the
performance of the network with respect to average wait times and Referrer M’s accumulated
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reward, on average, γ = 0.1 and γ = 0.9 result in the best and worst outcomes. As discussed
earlier, the better performance of the models with a lower value of γ is due to the existence
of high levels of uncertainty in different elements of the model. Having a long vision toward
optimizing referral rates in this highly volatile environment results in poor decisions which
negatively impacts both wait times and accumulated reward over time.
In addition, we found that as WTT increases the accumulated rewards become more
stable and the referrer is able to achieve higher rewards on average. Higher values of
WTT allow the referrer to better focus on the tradeoff between wait time and distance. In
particular, unlike the situation where WTT is low, referring a patient to a close specialist with
a longer average wait time does not necessarily result in negative reward. Mathematically,
this occurs due to the fact that when WTT is high, the importance of the delayed reward
term in Equation 3.3 decreases. This intuitively means that the impact of uncertainties in
specialist service times on accumulated reward becomes less significant. As a result, the
referrer’s performance becomes more stable, and it can achieve higher accumulated rewards.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 compare the average wait time and accumulated reward of the best
trained models with different values of gamma for different WTT scenarios. Note that the
best trained model is defined as the model which outperforms the rest of the nine models
with the same value of γ with respect to accumulated reward and average wait time in the
network. While we use the average performance of the training set for each gamma to choose
the best gamma, we need to choose the best trained model from that optimal gamma for
the testing phase. Earlier we showed that on average models with γ = 0.1 resulted in both
lower average wait time and higher accumulated reward. We now show that the best trained
model also has γ = 0.1. We then use this best trained model in the testing phase.
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Figure 3.5: Average Wait Time in Network M (Best Model Comparison)
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Figure 3.6: Referrer M Average Accumulated Reward (Best Model Comparison)
In all three WTT scenarios, γ = 0.1 has the best outcomes with respect to wait times
and accumulated reward. Therefore, out of 50 models trained for each value of WTT, the
best model with γ = 0.1 is selected as the best trained model for Referrer M.
To assure that Referrer M has learned a referral policy we analyzed the accumulated
reward it received for every 1,000 patients referred to specialists. If the referrer has in fact
51

learned and implemented a policy, we expect to see that the stability of the reward increases
as time passes. The following figure shows accumulated reward for every 1,000 patients
referred using the best trained model for different values of WTT.
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Figure 3.7: Referrer M Accumulated Reward for Every 1,000 Patients Referred Using Best Trained Model
The fluctuations of the reward per 1,000 patients are expected and caused by the stochastic
nature of the environment. However, the relative stability of the rewards indicate that
Referrer M has learned a referral policy for each scenario.

3.4.2

Referrer M: Testing Phase

In this section we first analyze how the best trained DQN models obtained in the previous
section can handle wait times in the network. We then test the performance of these DQN
models versus shortest queue and random allocation policies.
In order to analyze the performance of the best DQN models, each model was tested 10
times with different random number seeds, each time for 100,000 hours. Each trial tests our
model performance for a different patient arrival and service time scenario. We used the
same seeds in other referral policies to make their results comparable with the DQN model
result. Figure 3.8 shows average wait time in Network M for each run.
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Figure 3.8: Average Wait Time in Network M (Testing Phase)
At the beginning of the simulation there were significant fluctuations in the wait times;
however, in all three scenarios the referrer was able to reach a long-term stable situation with
respect to the average wait time in the network. Similar to the training phase, increasing
WTT resulted in increased average wait time in the network.
Figure 3.9 compares the performance of the DQN model with the performance of random
allocation policy. As shown, in all the scenarios the difference between the performance of
the two policies is significant and the DQN model was able to reduce average wait time in
the network by almost 80% percent (five days in this particular simulation).
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Figure 3.9: Average Wait Time in Network M (Best DQN Model vs Random Allocation Policy)
Figure 3.10 compares the performance of the DQN models with the performance of the
shortest queue policy resulted from 10 trials using the same random number seeds.

53

Average Wait Time In Network M
(WTT: 24)

1.75

Average Wait Time In Network M
(WTT: 168)

DQN
Shortest-Queue

Average Wait Time In Network M
(WTT: 720)

DQN
Shortest-Queue

1.6

DQN
Shortest-Queue

1.6

1.50
1.4

1.4

1.2

1.2

1.00

1.0

1.0

0.75

0.8

0.8

0.6

0.6

0.4

0.4

0.2

0.2

Wait time (Day)

1.25

0.50

0.25

0.00
0

20000

40000

60000

Time (Hour)

80000

100000

0

20000

40000

60000

Time (Hour)

80000

100000

0

20000

40000

60000

Time (Hour)

80000

100000

Figure 3.10: Average Wait Time in Network M (Best DQN Model vs Shortest-Queue Policy)
We show that in all three WTT scenarios the DQN model outperforms the shortest
queue policy, but the performance of the two policies become closer as WTT increases. The
underlying reason is that when WTT is low, wait time for specialists is the key factor in
making referral decisions. Since the DQN model is able to recognize the fastest specialists
in the system the referral policies applied result in lower average wait time in the network.
In particular, upon the arrival of a patient to the network, if the referrer applies shortest
queue policy the patient will be referred to the specialist with the shortest wait list no matter
what the service time of the specialist. Therefore, it is possible that the patient is allocated
to a specialist with a very low service rate (or equivalently with a high service time). In
contrast, the recognition of the fastest specialists in the network allows the DQN model to
make better decisions with respect to patient wait time especially when WTT is restricted.
Our comparisons show that depending on a network’s characteristics, applying the DQN
approach can improve patient access to specialists. In particular, in a network with restricted
target wait times using DQN models can greatly reduce patient wait time over time.

3.5

Collaborative Networks Analysis

In the previous section we showed how applying DQN can improve the performance of a
centralized referral network. However, in practice, to reduce the wait times of a referral
network, patients can be referred to specialists in an adjacent network. Therefore, in this
section we study collaboration between two centralized referral networks (Networks N and
M) where patients from one network can be served by the specialists in the other network.
The stochastic nature of patient arrival and service times and the fact that arrival
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probabilities are distance-dependent make it almost impossible to study the concept of
collaboration using well-known mathematical approaches such as queuing systems. To make
the problem mathematically tractable researchers usually either assume that servers are
identical or combine servers into one or two servers (Wen et al. 2019). It can be shown that
pooling two identical parallel exponential servers would lead to a reduction factor of at least
50% for the mean wait time. Using an approximate formula, van Dijk and van der Sluis
(2008) show that similar reduction factors of at least 50% can also be found for larger groups
of servers to be pooled if 1) the service characteristics are the same, and 2) the workloads
are equal.
Our approach can not only overcome these difficulties, but it is also capable of incorporating
patient (realized) wait times for specialists in referral decisions. In the following we explain
how collaboration between the networks can be modelled and what incentives can be considered
for the networks to collaborate. We assume that Network N is experiencing higher arrival
rates and therefore seeks collaboration from Network M.
Upon an arrival of a patient to Network N, Referrer N can either allocate the patient
to one of the specialists in the network or send a transfer request to Network M. Referrer
M on the other hand can reject or accept the transfer request. If the request is accepted,
the patient will be transferred to Network M and will be allocated to one of the specialists
in this network. Otherwise, Referrer N must refer the patient to one of the specialists in
Network N. As discussed earlier, no queue is allowed for either of the referrers and patients
are immediately referred upon their arrivals to the networks. Once the patient is referred to
a specialist, they will be added to the specialist’s waiting list (queue). Figure 3.11 shows a
general scheme of collaboration between the networks:
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Figure 3.11: Collaboration Between Referral Networks
First, we explain the MDP model for Referrer N and how collaboration between networks
can impact the dynamics of the model presented in Section 3.3.1. Number of patients waiting
for each specialist in Network N defines the state of the network and we assume that decision
epochs are short enough such that only one of the following events can occur at each time
step:
1. A patient arrives to the network (or a transfer request is rejected by Network M)
2. A patient is served by one of the specialists and leaves the network
3. No event
A = {Refer, Transfer, Wait} is the set of actions for Referrer N. In the case where there is
an arrival to the system, the referrer actions are {Refer, Transfer}, otherwise (i.e., if a patient
is served by a specialist or no event occurs) the only action is {Wait}. For example, define
spj as the jth specialist in Network N. Assuming that there are k specialists in Network N
(i.e., nN = k), upon the arrival of a patient to the network, the referrer’s set of actions is
{”refer to sp1 ”, ”refer to sp2 ”, ..., ”refer to spk ”, ”transfer to Network M”}. We assume
that Referrer N receives no reward (i.e., reward equal to zero) for transferring a patient to
Network M.
There can be two streams of patient arrivals to Network M: 1) Patients who arrive directly
to the network, and 2) transferred patients accepted from Network N. One of the following
events can occur at each time step for Network M:
56

1. A patient arrives to the network (direct arrival)
2. Network N requests to transfer a patient and Network M accepts the request (indirect
arrival)
3. A patient is served by one of the specialists and leaves the network
4. No event
We assume that upon the transfer request, Referrer N provides Referrer M with the
location of the patient. Then, for each specialist in Network M, Referrer M calculates the
utility function presented in Equation 3.11.
RM −t (i, j) = ptr − (

Dij
Wj
)−(
)
maxj Dij
WTT

∀j ∈ M

(3.11)

Where Wj is the average wait time for specialist j. If for at least one of the specialists
in the network the utility value is positive, then Referrer M accepts the request. Otherwise,
the request is rejected. Once the request is accepted, the transferred patient is immediately
referred to a specialist, called j, in Network M and Referrer M receives the following reward:

RM −t (i, j) = ptr − (

Wij
Dij
)−(
)
maxj Dij
WTT

(3.12)

Equation 3.11 is equivalent to Equation 3.3 except for the monetary reward that the
network receives for each patient referred to a specialist. Equation 3.11 shows that ptr plays
an important role in motivating Network M to collaborate and accept transfer requests from
Network N. Therefore, ptr can be interpreted as a government incentive for collaboration
among networks. We initially assumed that ptr = 4 > pr = 2, which indicates that Referrer
M receives a higher payment per patient for accepting and allocating a transferred patient
to a specialist in its network. However, in Section 3.6.2 we perform a sensitivity analysis
on the value of ptr to better understand the impact of government incentive on network
collaboration.
Complicating the model presented in Section 3.3.1, when networks are collaborating,
Referrer M has no information about the probability of receiving a request from Network
N at each state. Therefore, there is uncertainty in the indirect arrivals to this network
and as a result, the MDP approach cannot be solved analytically to analyze the impact of
collaboration among networks on different performance metrics.
In the following, we explain our experimental results obtained from applying the DQN
methodology on the two referral networks. According to the data, there are six specialists in
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Network N and 2,883 patient arrivals over a year. Therefore, Network N is facing a higher
arrival rate (around 10% higher) than Network M and therefore seeks collaboration from
this network. The following table shows specialists’ characteristics in Network N:
Specialist Index
1
2
3
4
5
6

Location
[0,10]
[1,2]
[3,5]
[4,0]
[6,6]
[2,7]

Service Time Mean (Hour)
16
15
14
17
15
14

Table 3.3: Network N Specialists’ Characteristics

3.5.1

Referrer N: Training Phase

First, we focus on the training phase of Referrer N and then analyze how much collaboration
between the networks impacts patient access to specialists. We trained 300 models, for which
half the referrer had the option to transfer patients to the adjacent Network M. Using the
best models with different values of γ for each value of WTT, Figure 3.12 shows average
wait time in Network N when patient transfer between networks is allowed. Note that the
general terms used in the rest of the paper as well as the steps taken to train and test the
performance of the models are the same as the process we explained in Section 3.4.
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Figure 3.12: Average Wait Time in Network N (Training Phase - Best Models Comparison)
The right-hand side of Figure 3.12 shows the performance of the best model for each
value of WTT for the last 100,000 hours. When WTT is large (i.e., 168 and 720) γ = 0.1
and when WTT is small (i.e., 24) γ = 0.9 slightly outperform the other models with respect
to the average wait time in Network N. However, to select the best trained model we need
to consider the average wait time in the whole system (i.e., both networks). In fact, a model
with low average wait time in Network N may not be the best option as it may have simply
transferred more patients to the other network which results in high average wait time in
Network M. This, in fact, is the case when WTT is 24 hours and is shown in Figure 3.13.
Figure 3.13 shows average wait time in the whole system using the best trained models for
each value of γ while Referrer N has the option to transfer patients to the other network:
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Figure 3.13: Average Wait Time in The System (Training Phase - Best Models Comparison)
It is clear from 3.13 that in all WTT scenarios, best models with γ = 0.1 has resulted in
the lowest average wait time in the whole system.
Table 3.4 shows the percentage of patients transferred to the other network for different
WTT-γ scenarios:
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WTT = 24
Avg % Transferred
4.54
4.74
5.19
5.80
9.1

γ
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.7
0.9

WTT = 168
Avg % Transferred
3.45
3.47
3.50
3.61
4.00

WTT = 720
Avg % Transferred
3.41
3.43
3.43
3.44
3.50

Table 3.4: Average Percentage of Patients Transferred to Network M (Training Phase)
Table 3.4 shows the percentage of patients transferred to Network M in different scenarios.
We show that higher values of gamma are associated with a higher rate of patient transfer.
In particular, as gamma increases Referrer N transfers more patients to the Network M.
Though this policy results in better outcomes for Network N when WTT is small, it can
result in higher average wait time in the system (Figure 3.13). In addition, Table 3.4 shows
that higher values of WTT are associated with lower transfer rates. The underlying reason
is that as WTT increases the wait time cost becomes less important and thus there is no
need for Referrer N to send patients to the other network. By reducing the transfer rate
Referrer N can better balance the tradeoff between the distance and wait time costs in the
reward function.
To understand the implications of the collaboration between networks, Figure 3.14 compares
the performance of Referrer N for different values of WTT when it has the option to transfer
patients to the other network versus when it does not have that option.
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Figure 3.14: Average Wait Time in The Whole System (Collaboration vs Isolation - Best Model
Comparisons)

Figure 3.14 shows that in all scenarios collaboration between the networks has resulted
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in lower average wait time in the whole system. In comparison with the isolated situation,
collaboration between the networks has reduced average wait time in the system (in the
training phase) by approximately 12%, 6%, and 1% when WTT is 24, 168, and 720 hours,
respectively. As expected, the impact of collaboration decreases as WTT increases. In fact,
when WTT is high, a referrer can perfectly handle arrivals to the network without the need
to transfer them to the other network.
Note that in all three cases, there is a huge gap in performance of the two models at
the beginning. This occurs because during this period, Referrer N was mostly exploring the
environment and referrals were mostly made randomly. However, as time passes, the gap
in performance of the two models first decreases and then starts increasing. As Referrer N
became adept at the referral policy, it matched the performance of Referrer M. However,
once in the collaborative situation, Referrer N added the transfer policies to its knowledge
and, as it started to take advantage of the transfer option, the gap in performance between
the two networks increased again.

3.5.2

Testing Phase: Both Networks

In this section we test the performance of the best trained models by the two referrers. Each
model is tested 10 times, each time for two years (≈ 18000 hours). To be able to compare
the performance of the referrers when different allocation policies are applied, in each run
we use a random generated seed to generate arrival rates to the networks. Moreover, none of
the random number seeds used to test the referrers’ performance was the same as the seeds
used to train the models.
Table 3.5 shows the percentage of patients transferred from Network N to Network M in
the testing phase.
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Run #
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Avg

WTT = 24
% Transferred
2.26
1.83
1.43
1.76
1.68
1.77
1.86
2.26
1.57
1.95
1.84

WTT = 168
% Transferred
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

WTT = 720
% Transferred
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Table 3.5: Percentage of Patients Transferred to Network M (Testing Phase-Both Networks)
On average, around 2% of patients were transferred when WTT was low (i.e., 24 hours)
and no patient was transferred when WTT was high (i.e., 168 and 720 hours).
Similar to the training phase, it can be seen that WTT can greatly impact transfer rates
to the adjacent network. Comparing Tables 3.4 and 3.5 shows a huge difference between
transfers in training and testing phases. The underlying reason is that in the training phase
most transfers occurred for the learning purpose of the model (exploration) because the
referrer was analyzing the potential impact of this option. However, in the testing phase the
referrer is no longer exploring and therefore it only transfers patients if necessary. This is
evident in the testing phase as no patient is transferred when WTT is 168 and 720 hours.
Therefore, when WTT is high it is in the interest of Referrer N to focus on optimizing referral
rates to specialists in its network rather than transferring them to the other network.
Referrals to Specialists
In this section we focus on the referral rates to specialists made by Referrer N during the
testing phase. Figure 3.15 shows the average proportion of patients referred to each specialist
in Network N for different values of WTT. Note that for each value of WTT the average is
taken over the 10 runs.
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In all three cases, Specialist 6 is the first choice of the referrer, receiving, on average,
around 21% of the referrals. Based on values in Table 3.3, Specialists 3 and 6 have the fastest
service times. When WTT is 24 hours, on average, around 40% of patients are referred to
these two specialists. However, as WTT increases the rate of referrals to Specialist 3 decreases
and it even becomes the last choice for the referrer when WTT is 720 hours. On the other
hand, referral rates to some specialists, such as Specialist 5, increase as WTT increases.
The underlying reason is that as WTT increases, the weight of the delayed reward in the
referral decision function reduces and closeness to the selected specialist becomes a more
important factor. This is represented in Figure 3.16 which shows the percentage of patients
that are referred to the closest specialists under different WTT scenarios. According to the
figure, When WTT is low only 13% of patients are referred to specialists close to them. This
amount increases to 19% and 22% when WTT is 168 and 720 hours, respectively.
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Average Proportion of Patients Referred By Referrer N To Closest Specialists
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Figure 3.16: Average Proportion of Patients Referred to Closest Specialists by Referrer N
DQN vs Shortest Queue
In this section, we test the performance of the DQN model with collaboration between
networks in the case where each network applies a shortest queue policy for its referrals
(Figure 3.17).
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Figure 3.17: Average Wait Time in The Whole System (Best-Trained DQN Models vs Shortest Queue)
In all scenarios DQN models outperform the shortest queue policy and the difference
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in performance becomes more significant as WTT decreases. When WTT is low, the best
trained DQN model with the transfer option is able to reduce average wait time in the
system by 13% and 26% in comparison with the DQN model without the transfer option
and shortest queue policy, respectively. Note that patients experienced an average wait time
of 30 hours under the best trained model which is still higher than their 24-hour wait time
threshold. We further analyze this in the next section where we conduct a sensitivity analysis
on specialists’ service times.
The DQN models are able to reduce the average wait time in the system by 14% and 7%
when WTT is 168 and 720 hours, respectively. On average, when the DQN model is used to
find the referral and transfer policies, patients waited for around 36 and 39 hours when WTT
is 168 and 720 hours, respectively. In these scenarios, no patient was transferred between
the networks and the performance of the models with and without the transfer option were
barely different from each other. This is already shown in 3.5.

3.6

Sensitivity Analysis

In this section, we first investigate how much changing the initial values of service times
presented in Table 3.2 can impact the performance of the DQN model versus the shortest
queue policy. Next, to understand the impact of government incentives on motivating
collaboration between the networks, we perform a sensitivity analysis on the ptr parameter
introduced in Section 3.5.

3.6.1

Sensitivity Analysis on Specialist Service Times

In the initial model presented in Section 3.4.1, we used data from the cataract referral
network to estimate the service times of the specialists. However, the variation in service
times may impact the performance of the DQN model. Therefore, in this section we perform
the following two sets of sensitivity analyses on the service times of specialists in Network
M:
1. Homogeneous Services Times: We assume that all specialists in Network M have equal
service times.
2. Heterogeneous Service Times: We consider a wide range of service times for the
specialists.
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Homogeneous Service Times
We set service times of all specialists in Network M equal to 12 hours. Then, for each value
of γ = [0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9] we train the model 10 times, each time for 1,000,000 hours.
Overall, 50 models are trained and then the best trained model is selected through the same
process explained in Sections 3.4.1 and 3.5.1. The performance of the best trained model
is then tested against the shortest queue policy. In the testing phase, for each policy we
run the model 10 times (using 10 specific seeds), each time for two years (≈ 18000 hours).
In order to make the results comparable we use same seeds in all scenarios to generate the
arrival rates to the network.
Figure 3.18 compares the average performance of the DQN model versus shortest queue
policy when WTT is 24 and 720 hours.
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Figure 3.18: Average Wait Time in Network M (Best DQN Models vs Shortest Queue Policy - Average
Performance)

From Figure 3.18 we conclude that specialist service times can greatly impact the performance
of the DQN models. When specialists are identical in terms of their service times and WTT
is low, the performance of the DQN model and the shortest queue policy become very similar.
However, as WTT increases the shortest queue policy becomes the better option with respect
to the average wait time in the network. This is because when WTT is high the closeness
of patients to the selected specialists becomes the dominant force in referral policies for the
DQN model. In other words, wait times for specialists become less important for the referrer.
As a result, more patients are allocated to the specialists that are close to them, though these
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specialists may not be the best options in terms of patient wait time.
Heterogeneous Service Times
Using the same training and testing procedure described in Section 3.6.1, we trained our
model using service times, presented in Table 3.6, that have higher variability compared to
the original model’s service times.
Specialist Index
1
2
3
4
5
6

Location
[13,3]
[14,5]
[17,7]
[19,4]
[18,8]
[20,3]

Service Time Mean (Hour)
1
7
10
14
12
4

Table 3.6: Specialist Service Times in Network M
Figure 3.19 shows the average performance, taken over the 10 runs, of the DQN models
versus the shortest queue policy with respect to average wait time in Network M when
specialist service times are heterogeneous.
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Figure 3.19: Average Wait Time in Network M (Best-Trained DQN Models vs Shortest Queue- Avg
Performance)

As the variability in service times increases, the DQN model becomes the better option
even at a high level of WTT. Specifically, in comparison to the shortest queue policy, the DQN
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models have improved wait time in Network M by about 25%. The significant performance
improvement is because in the DQN models, the referrer is able to recognize the difference
between fast-service specialists (such as Specialists 1 and 6 in Table 3.6) with those who are
slower (such as Specialists 4 and 5). This recognition allows the referrer to allocate patients
in an efficient way which results in a significantly lower average wait time in the network
when compared to the shortest queue policy.
Moving from homogeneous to heterogeneous service times shows us that the DQN models
are outperforming the shortest queue policy in environments with higher variability in service
times.

3.6.2

Sensitivity Analysis on Payment Per Transfer

Previously we assumed that Referrer M receives four units of payment if it accepts a patient
from the other network. Even with this high amount of payment (compared to the two units
of payment in the main model), in Section 3.5.2 we show that no patients are transferred
between the networks when WTT is high.
In this section, we focus on the situation where WTT is 24 hours and study how changing
the value of the ptr can impact collaboration between the networks. This will determine to
what degree government incentives can motivate collaboration between networks and what
would be the impact on patients’ access to specialists. The training and testing phases are
similar to the procedures used in 3.5.
Overall, 200 models were trained and then for each value of ptr the best trained model
was extracted and tested. Table 3.7 shows the average percentage of patients transferred
between the networks for different values of payment per transfer. The average is taken over
the 10 runs.
Payment Per Transfer
2
4
6
8

Average Percentage Transferred
1.3
1.8
2.1
2.6

Table 3.7: Percentage of Patients Transferred (Testing Phase)
Table 3.7 shows that increasing the value of payment per transfer results in higher levels
of collaboration between the networks and consequently higher transfer rates to Network M.
Specifically, increasing the value from 2 to 8 has doubled the transfer rate to Network M
(from 1.3 to 2.6).
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Figure 3.20 shows the impact of changing payment per transfer on average wait time in
the whole system. In all scenarios, collaboration between the networks has resulted in lower
wait time in comparison with the isolated scenario where patient transfer is not allowed.
Our sensitivity results show that the impact of transfer payment on system performance
is not monotonic. In particular, the average wait time decreases as the transfer payment
increases to ptr = 6. However, a higher transfer payment (ptr = 8) results in higher average
wait time compared to payments 4 and 6. The 95% confidence intervals for the average wait
time when payment is 6 and 8 are [1.3166, 1.3193] and [1.3921, 1.3951], respectively.
Based on the intervals the difference between the average wait times is significant and this
indicates the fact that an uncontrolled amount of payment can result in over-collaboration
between the networks which, in turn, negatively impacts patients’ access to specialists.
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Figure 3.20: Average Wait Time in The Whole System (Average Performance)

3.7

Conclusion

We study the impact of using intelligent referrers in centralized referral networks and collaboration
between such networks on improving patients’ access to specialists. Our approach allows us
to focus on medium-size referral networks where both arrival rates and specialist service times
are unknown to the referrers. On-time access to specialists (i.e., wait time for specialists)
and convenient access to them (i.e., proximity to specialists) are considered the key factors
in making referral decisions. Overall, we trained 750 models, each for 1,000,000 hours, and
the performance of the selected models with respect to different metrics were tested enough
to assure the robustness of the results.
We found that using an intelligent referrer in a single centralized referral network can
greatly reduce average wait time in the network and improve patients’ access to specialists.
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In our study, the referrer was able to learn a referral policy which outperformed two currently
used allocation policies in the real world (random allocation and shortest queue policies).
In comparison with the shortest queue policy, our DQN model for Network M was able to
reduce average wait time in the network by 17%, 14%, and 10% when WTT was 24, 168,
and 720, respectively. The sensitivity analysis results also revealed that the performance
of the DQN model increased as the variability in specialists’ service times increased. In
comparison with the shortest queue policy, our model was able to reduce average wait time
by 25% in a centralized system with widely varied service times. In addition, we show that
it is always beneficial for a referrer to set short-term vision toward optimizing referral rates
to specialists. We show that the intelligent referrer is able to recognize the fastest specialists
in a network and this helps the referrer to significantly improve patient wait time in the
network, specifically when wait time target (WTT) is low. The referrer is also able to adapt
itself to distance-dependent arrival rates and take advantage of this information in its referral
decisions when WTT is high.
Further, we find that collaboration between networks has the potential to further improve
wait times and thus patients’ access to specialists. However, we show that wait time
targets (WTT) and government incentives can play a major role in motivating networks to
collaborate. Referral networks tend to collaborate more as WTT decreases and government
incentives increase. We show that when WTT is low, in comparison with the shortest queue
policy, the DQN model with collaboration was able to reduce average wait time in the
whole system by 28%. The impact can further increase given that the right incentives are
provided by the government. In fact, sensitivity analysis results show that there is a critical
threshold for government incentives. While a low value for incentive may not motivate the
networks enough to collaborate, a high value for incentive can result in over-collaboration
which negatively impacts patients’ average wait time in the whole system.
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Chapter 4
Analyzing Patient Access to Surgeons
in a Cataract Centralized Referral
Network in the Waterloo Region
4.1

Introduction

On-time access of patients in need of cataract surgery to surgeons is one of the major
concerns of health care systems in different countries including Canada (Rachmiel et al.
2007). It is projected that the number of cataract operations in Ontario face a 128% growth
from 2006 to 2036 (Hatch et al. 2012). While an aging population has affected all areas of
the healthcare system, ophthalmology is estimated to face the greatest growth in demand
for services among surgical specialties (Etzioni et al. 2003, Roos et al. 1998). Considering
the impact of the aging population on demand, Taylor (2000) estimated that 50% of people
will need to have cataract surgery. In a study of over 4,900 patients, Klein et al. (2002) also
found that cataracts are age-related and that about 50% of people between 55 and 64 years
old, and 85% of people over 75 years old will develop cataracts.
Patients in need of cataract surgery in the Waterloo region can gain access to surgeons
through a centralized referral network named ”Ocean”. The network connects referrals in
three cities, namely Cambridge, Guelph and Kitchener, and referral decisions are made based
on a patient-choice process. Upon the arrival of a patient to the network, the patient is first
seen by a primary care provider (PCP). In the case where a cataract surgery is needed, the
patient will be provided with a referral form with three options to choose from: 1) the closest
surgeon, 2) the first available surgeon, or 3) a specific surgeon. Once the referral decision is
made by the patient, the referral form will be sent to the centralized intake system by the
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PCP and then it is the central referrer who is responsible to allocate the patient to one of
the surgeons in the network.
Two different types of wait times, called wait time 1 (WT1) and wait time 2 (WT2),
are defined in the system where WT1 represents how long it takes for a patient to get in to
see the selected surgeon in the office, and WT2 shows how long it takes after that to get in
for surgery. The total wait time is then defined as the sum of WT1 and WT2. When the
patient chooses the first available surgeon option, WT1 is the primary decision factor used
by the referrer as it is challenging to estimate and use WT2 information due to the following
reasons:
1. WT2 not only depends on the scheduling policy of the surgeon but also the availability
of operation rooms, the number of beds in the hospitals and even each hospital practice
of allocation of its capacities to surgeons.
2. For each patient, WT2 can only be calculated once the patient is served by the selected
surgeon. At this point, for the majority of surgeons, WT2 is more than a year. As a
result: 1) it is challenging for the central referrer to monitor WT2 for each individual
patient and therefore, the central referrer information on WT2 is provided by surgeons,
and 2) it is better to use WT1 to determine the first available surgeon as the impact of
patient aggregation in the surgeons’ queues on wait times can be realized much sooner
using WT1 rather than WT2.
Both testimonials from the decision makers in the referral network as well as the data
itself support the fact that WT1 is the main factor used to determine the first available
surgeon in all three major cities. For instance, while one of the surgeons in one of the major
cities had a total wait time of around 300 days, the majority of patients allocated to the
first available surgeon in this city were referred to a surgeon with the lowest WT1 but a high
WT2, making their total wait time around 800 days.
Long wait times for surgeons and potential inequity in patient access to specialized
services are amongst the major concerns of the decision makers in the system. The negative
impact of long wait times for surgeons on patient satisfaction has previously been shown by
Dunn et al. (1997). Gimbel and Dardzhikova (2011) also found that waiting for more than
six months for cataract surgery is associated with negative outcomes such as vision loss,
reduced quality of life and even depression. Laidlaw et al. (1998) and Harwood et al. (2005)
found that expedited cataract surgery resulted in better outcomes for patients who received
it.
We use Simpy, a process-based discrete-event simulation framework based on Python,
to simulate the system and study how changing current referral processes and introducing
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new policies can impact patient access to surgeons. In particular, we introduce two models
named the base-model and the multinomial-model. In the base-model, the values of every
parameter in the model, including patient preferences, are directly derived from real data
from the network. We use the base-model to analyze the system performance in the near
future. On the other hand, in the multinomial-model, a multinomial logistic regression is
applied to determine patient preferences over time.
To the best of our knowledge our study is the first that studies a patient-choice centralized
network and investigates how modifying this process can impact patient access to surgeons
over time. The following is a list of key findings:
1. The system currently has a high utilization rate and limiting patient choices does not
have any significant impact on patient average wait times to see surgeons (WT1) in
the system.
2. If patient options are limited to the first available surgeon, the majority of arrivals to
the network would be seen by surgeons within 180 days.
3. Eliminating patients’ option to travel to another city for the first available surgeon
does not necessarily improve average patient wait time to see surgeons (WT1) in the
network.
4. Adding a new surgeon to the network can significantly reduce patient wait time to see
surgeons (WT1) in the network. Kitchener and Guelph are also the best options for
the new surgeon to be located.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. We first review the related operation
management literature. In Section 2 we analyze the data in detail. In Section 3 we introduce
key parameters of the network and how they are modeled. In Section 4 we present our
results for the base-model and multinomial-model and study how introducing new policies
can impact patient access to surgeons. We conclude the paper in Section 5 with a summary
of our findings, insights, and limitations of our study.

4.1.1

Literature Review and Positioning

Cataracts are considered the most common eye disorder in most countries including the
USA and Canada (Hatch et al. 2012). While on-time access of patients in need of cataract
surgery can result in better outcomes such as improved quality of life (Olson et al. 2017),
long wait times for surgeons can deteriorate patient conditions (Freeman et al. 2009). In
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addition, Conner-Spady et al. (2004) found that patient satisfaction decreases as wait time
for cataract surgery increases.
Numerous reasons for long wait times for cataract surgery are considered in the literature.
Rachmiel et al. (2007) compared cataract surgery referral data from 1992 to 2004 and found
a significant negative correlation between the number of surgeons per million people and
cataract surgery rates. However, Wormald and Foster (2004) argued that the number of
surgeons is not the limiting factor, and cataract surgical rates need to be increased. Hopkins
et al. (2008) also estimated that an annual increase of 4% in treatment volume is needed
to meet the stated wait time targets for cataract surgery in Ontario. Boisjoly et al. (2010)
were able to double the rate of cataract surgery at a hospital in Montreal through the
implementation of a cataract efficiency program where surgical technicians were trained and
new technologies were used.
In addition to long wait times, equity in access to surgeons is another major concern in
the healthcare community of most countries including the USA and Canada (Johnston et al.
2020, Hong et al. 2016, Gauer et al. 1994). While the need for cataract surgery is estimated
to increase (Hatch et al. 2012), due to the aging population, the number of surgeons per
million people in Ontario decreased by around 14% from 1992 to 2004 (Rachmiel et al.
2007). This raises the question of whether there is equity in access to surgeons in the current
referral scheme and to what degree adding more resources to the system can balance access
to surgeons.
Simulation has been used to design and analyze patient flows in referral networks and
hospitals (Gibbons and Samaddar 2009, Donker et al. 2010). For instance, Yao et al. (2020)
used simulation to analyze referral rates between two hospitals in Taiwan. To the best of our
knowledge, however, our paper is the first that 1) applies simulation to study a centralized
referral network, and 2) uses real data from a centralized referral network and analyzes the
impact of a patient-choice referral process on patient access to surgeons. We also study how
adding more surgeons to the network can further increase the proportion of patients seen
(WT1) within a specific target wait time.

4.2

Data Description

For our study, we gained access to data from the Waterloo Region cataract referral network
which is a centralized network with 16 surgeons that covers arrivals from three major
cities, namely Kitchener, Guelph and Cambridge, and more than 140 townships. For each
individual patient, the data contains information on their time of arrival to the network,
preference for surgeon, city, age, gender, selected surgeon and wait time to see the selected
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surgeon (i.e., WT1). Due to the high values of WT2 for the majority of surgeons, WT2 data
for each individual patient was not available at the time of receiving the data. However,
surgeon cities and the average value of WT2 for each surgeon are provided on the network
website (Waterloo-Eye-Program 2021). Therefore, with respect to the wait time, for each
individual patient we have WT1 and the average value of WT2 for the selected surgeon.
Upon the arrival of a patient to the network, the patient is first seen by a PCP and if
further treatment is needed the patient is provided with a referral form with three options to
choose from: 1) A specific surgeon, 2) the closest surgeon, or 3) the first available surgeon.
If a patient selects a specific surgeon, then they are required to select one of the 16 available
surgeons in the network.
Any arrival patient is also asked to specify whether they are willing to travel to another
city for service. In the rest of the paper, we use term ”locally referred” if a patient is referred
to a surgeon in their city. Therefore, if a patient selects the first available surgeon and is
not willing to travel to another city, they are locally referred to the first available surgeon.
The central referrer then receives the completed form and refers the patient to the selected
option.
During an eight-month period of time, 1,671 patients in total arrived to the system where
the majority of patients (more than 98%) were 50+ years old. Categorizing arrivals by city
show that 594 patients came from townships, 517 came from Kitchener, 473 came from
Guelph, and 87 came from Cambridge. Figure 1 shows a summary of the total number of
arrivals in each month:
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Figure 4.1: Monthly Arrival Rate to the Network
From May to August 2021 (i.e., prior to the discovery of the Omicron variant of Covid19), the average monthly arrival rate to the network was 275.25 patients and reduced to
142.5 from September to December.
Analyzing patient preferences revealed that around 33% of patients chose the first available
surgeon, 19% chose the closest surgeon, and 48% chose a specific surgeon. Figure 2 shows
how patient preferences change over time. While the number of patients who chose the
closest surgeon did not change significantly over time, changes in the other two options is
noticeable and both options follow a similar trend from May to September.
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Figure 4.2: Patient Preferences Over Time
Table 4.1 shows how many patients of each gender selected each one of the options and
Figure 4.3 shows the proportion of each gender by their choices.
Gender
Female
Male

Closest
183
131

Preferences
First Available Specific Surgeon
298
480
257
322

Table 4.1: Patient Preferences by Gender
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Figure 4.3: Proportion of Patient Preferences by Gender
Figure 4.3 shows that the majority of patients selected a specific surgeon option followed
by the first available surgeon. In both genders, the closest surgeon is selected by roughly
18% of patients and men choose the first available surgeon more than women.
Figure 4.4 shows the proportion of patients who choose each option in each city.
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Figure 4.4: Patient Preferences by City
In all cities the majority of patients have selected the specific surgeon option. In addition,
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the closest surgeon option is the least selected option in all cities except Guelph where around
30% of patients selected this option.
The following table shows the percentage of patients in each city referred to surgeons in
the same city:
Patient City
Kitchener
Guelph
Cambridge

Surgeon City
Kitchener
Guelph
Cambridge

Percentage
93%
89%
70%

Table 4.2: Percentage of Arrivals Allocated to Surgeons in the Same City
Most arrivals from these three major cities are locally referred. Further analysis shows
that 53% of those patients who are not locally referred chose the first available surgeon and
45% had a preferred surgeon. Finally, 53% and 45% of arrivals from townships were referred
to surgeons in Guelph and Kitchener, respectively.
To analyze the relationship between patient age and preferences we defined two age groups
where patients in the first and second groups are under and over 70 years old, respectively.
The first group contains 637 patients and the second group contains 1,034 patients. The
following figure shows patient preferences by their age group.
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Figure 4.5: Average Wait Time by City and Patient Preferences
In both age groups, around 50% of patients selected the specific surgeon option. However,
the difference in the other two options is noticeable. While more than 20% of patients over
70 years old selected the closest surgeon option, only around 10% of patients in the other
group selected this option.
We also analyzed patient average WT1 for surgeons in the network. Figure 4.6a shows a
histogram of patients’ WT1 to see surgeons and Figure 4.6b shows patients’ approximated
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˜ 2j as the real wait time of
total wait time to receive the surgery. Define W T 1ij and W T
patient i to see surgeon j and the average W T 2 for the surgeon. The approximation of the
˜ 2j
total wait time for patient i is estimated by adding the real value of WT1 to the W T
˜ 2j ). For instance, if patient i waited 100 days to see surgeon j (i.e.,
(i.e., W T 1ij + W T
˜ 2j = 150), then
W T 1ij = 100) and the average WT2 for the surgeon was 150 days (i.e., W T
the total wait is approximated to be 250 days. We used the term ”total wait time” instead
of ”estimated total wait time” in the rest of the Figures.
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Figure 4.6: Patient Average Wait Time
On average, patients waited more than 130 days to see surgeons in the network. Average
WT1 for surgeons in Kitchener, Guelph, and Cambridge were 145, 169, and 56 days,
respectively. The majority of patients (≈ 73%) waited less than 180 days to see surgeons in
the network and around 8% waited more than 300 days.
According to our estimation, only 7% of patients will receive cataract surgery within one
year and more than 50% of patients will have to wait more than 600 days to receive the
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surgery.
We also further studied wait times for different types of patients in each city. Figure
4.7a shows how long each type of patient from each city waited, on average, to see surgeons
(WT1) and Figure 4.7b shows average total wait time for different types of patients to receive
service from surgeons in the network.
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Figure 4.7: Average WT1 and Total Wait Time by City and Patient Preferences
Overall, patients who chose the first available surgeon experienced lower average WT1
and total wait time than the other two types of patients. With respect to the patient city,
patients from Guelph experienced higher wait times than patients from the other two cities.
Due to the unavailability of WT2 for individual patients as well as the reasons mentioned
in Section 4.1 in our simulation study, we only focused on patient access to surgeons in the
network and in particular on WT1 rather than WT2. Therefore, in the rest of the paper all
wait times and analyses done on the wait times are only about WT1 and not WT2.
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4.3

Analysis of System Design Decisions

In this section we introduce different elements of the cataract centralized referral network in
Waterloo and how they are incorporated in the simulation process.
According to the data on patient cities and townships we considered four major cities
in our simulation. Each city is considered as a circle in a coordinate plane defined by the
following equations:

Kitchener :(x − 8)2 + (y − 15)2 = 25

(4.1)

Guelph :(x − 30)2 + (y − 25)2 = 9

(4.2)

Cambridge :(x − 22)2 + (y − 4)2 = 4

(4.3)

T ownships :(x − 21)2 + (y − 21)2 = 36

(4.4)

The following figure shows the cities on a coordinate plane:

Figure 4.8: Cities Covered by The Centralized Cataract Network
Note that distances between the centers of the circles represent an average distance
between the cities in the real world. In addition, the radius of each circle is a representation
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of the arrival rate from the city that the circle symbolizes. Finally, we assume that townships
are between Kitchener and Guelph and closer to Guelph as, according to the data, 70% and
29% of patients in the townships who chose the closest surgeon were referred to surgeons in
Guelph and Kitchener. Four main elements of the referral network and their characteristics
are listed below:
Patient A patient can come to the network from any point inside a circle. Patient
characteristics, including patient gender and age, are generated based on the information
derived from the data.
PCP As we only focus on those patients who are in need of cataract surgery and to
maintain our focus on the impact of the patient-choice referral process on the performance
metrics of the system we represent the population of PCPs with three main ones in each
city (in total, nine PCPs) except the townships. According to the data, no surgeon in the
townships is connected to the centralized referral network. In each city, the first PCP receives
the stream of patients who have a preferred surgeon. The second PCP receives the stream
of patients who choose to go to the closest surgeon to their home. Finally, the third PCP
receives the stream of patients who choose to go the first available surgeon.
Central Referrer The central referrer is responsible for allocating patients to surgeons
based on their choice and has information about wait times and locations of surgeons.
Surgeon Surgeons are located in different places in the network and they each receive a
stream of patients who are in need of cataract surgery. Once a patient receives the required
service from a surgeon, they leave the system immediately. Note that surgeons in each city
are placed on the city circle’s perimeter.
Figure 4.9 shows the histogram plot of daily interarrival times in an hour.
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Figure 4.9: Patient Interarrival Times (Hour)
The daily interarrival for most of the arrivals to the network (≈ 95%) are less than three
hours. In addition, approximately 57% of daily interarrivals are lower than 30 minutes.
Using statistical analysis, in Figure 4.10 we show that exponential distribution is a good fit
for the interarrival times.
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Figure 4.10: Interarrival Distribution
Figure 4.10(b) shows that exponential distribution performs fairly well in representing
interarrival times shown in Figure 4.10(a). Chi-square statistics and the QQ plot (shown in
Figure 4.10(c)) also suggest that exponential distribution is a good fit in approximating
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”interarrival” data. Therefore, we assume that arrivals to the network have a Poisson
distribution with the means extracted based on the real data from the network.
Finally, in order to extract surgeon service rates, we modeled each surgeon as an M/M/1
queuing system. Using the number of referrals to the surgeon and their associated waiting
time from the data, we estimated the service rate of each surgeon in the system. As discussed
earlier, based on testimonial data from decision makers in the system there have been times
when surgeons have rejected referrals to keep their waiting list short. We incorporated this
feature into our model by considering specific capacities for surgeons. The service rates and
capacities were then further adjusted in the simulation model to make sure that the results
of the model for each individual surgeon was close to what we observed in practice. Table
4.3 compares the results of the base-model that we ran for eight months with the results
from the available data.
Data/Simulation
All Network
Kitchener
Guelph
Cambridge

# of Referrals to Surgeons
D
S
1671
1677
819
800
749
758
103
119

Avg Wait Time
D
S
132.5
132
145
142
167
169
56
59

Wait Time 75%
D
S
97
80
73
67
110
97
25
35

Table 4.3: Base-Model Comparison with Data (Where D Stands for Data and S Stands for
Simulation)
We further assured that the results of the simulation model with respect to the number
of referrals and resulted average wait time for each individual surgeon in each city were close
to what we observed in practice.
In total, there are 16 surgeons in the system: three surgeons in Cambridge, four in Guelph,
and nine in Kitchener. However, due to the low referral rates to three specific surgeons in
the Kitchener area, we combined the data on these surgeons and used one surgeon in our
simulation model instead of these three surgeons. Table 4.4 shows surgeon locations in the
network:
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City

Kitchener

Guelph

Cambridge

Surgeon
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Location (x, y)
(8,20)
(13,15)
(8,10)
(12,12)
(4,12)
(4,18)
(3,15)
(27,25)
(33,25)
(30,28)
(30,22)
(22,2)
(22,6)
(24,4)

Table 4.4: Surgeon Locations
Note that surgeon locations are determined based on the available data on the referral
rates between the four cities.

4.4

Results

In this section we analyze the behaviour of the current system and estimate how different
policies impact patient access to surgeons. We considered two scenarios. In the first scenario
we used a model, called a base- model, where model parameters including arrival rates of
each type of patient from each city, referral rates to surgeons, and patient preferences are
derived directly from the available data. The base-model mimics the behaviour seen over
eight months in practice very closely. This model is then used to analyze the future of
the current system over the next two years and examine how policies such as adding more
capacities to the system can improve patient access to surgeons.
To better understand how the patient choice referral system can impact important
performance metrics such as average wait time in the system, in the second scenario we used
a simulation model, called the multinomial-model, where we applied a multinomial logistic
regression in a simulation model to determine patient preferences. This makes referral rates
to surgeons dependable on different characteristics of both surgeons and patients and allows
us to analyze the behaviour of the system for a more distant future.
In the following sections we first present our results for the base-model and then focus
on the multinomial-model.
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4.4.1

Base-Model Results

In this section we study the future of the cataract referral system using the base-model. The
model was run 100 times and values shown in the rest of the papers are the average values
taken over these 100 runs. Note that the base-model is simulated for only two years as one
of the main assumptions in this model is that system characteristics, including arrival rates
to the system, surgeon service rates, and patient preferences, remain unchanged over time.
The following figure shows average wait time for surgeons in the network over the next two
years:
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Figure 4.11: Expected Average Wait Time
where ”C” is the indicator of the current year. If system characteristics, including arrival
and service rates, remain unchanged, the average wait time in the network is expected to
increase from 130 days to around 200 days over the next two years. Figure 4.12 gives a
better understanding of how average wait times for surgeons will be impacted in each city:
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Figure 4.12: Expected Average Wait Time by City
Wait times for surgeons are expected to increase in all cities over the next two years if no
new policy or capacity is added to the network. In comparison with other cities, surgeons in
Kitchener are expected to experience higher wait times at the end of the second year.
Finally, Figure 4.13 shows average wait times for different types of patients.
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Figure 4.13: Expected Average Wait Time by Type
Figure 4.13 shows that over the next two years, patients who choose the first available
surgeon are expected to experience lower average wait times for surgeons in the network.
On the contrary, patients who choose a specific surgeon will experience higher wait times
than the other types. This result is comparable with what is observed in practice where
patients who chose a specific surgeon waited, on average, 154 days to see surgeons while
others who chose the first available surgeon and closest surgeon waited for 121 and 131 days,
respectively.
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Base-Model: Policy Analysis
The base-model application is limited. One limitation is that there is no mechanism in
this model that allows changes in referral rates to surgeons if system characteristics change
over time. Another limitation is the fact that patient preferences are directly derived from
the data and therefore they are fixed. As a result, we can only study how patient access
to surgeons will be affected over the next two years if patient options are reduced to one
option. For instance, if we only eliminate the first available surgeon option, then there is
no mechanism in this model that allows us to understand what proportion of patients who
had chosen this option would now prefer each one of the other two options. Since wait times
are a main concern in the network, in our study we analyze what would happen to patient
wait times if the only option is the first available surgeon. We considered two scenarios. In
the first scenario we incorporated the percentage of patients from each city who were locally
referred. This information was derived directly from the data. In the second scenario, which
we used as a benchmark, patients were allocated to the first available surgeon in the whole
network no matter where the locations of the patient and selected surgeon are. Figure 4.14
shows the impact of this policy for each scenario on patient average wait time in the network
and across each city.
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Figure 4.14: Policy Comparison: Expected Average Wait Time in the Network
Figure 4.14 shows that limiting patient options to only first available surgeon did not
reduce patient average wait time significantly. More interestingly, the first scenario, in
which we incorporated the percentage of patients from each city who were locally referred,
resulted in lower average wait times than the second scenario. The main underlying reason
for this is that the first available surgeon is not necessarily the fastest surgeon in the network
. This is also the reason why patients who chose the first available surgeon in Kitchener and
Cambridge experienced longer wait times, on average, than the other two types of patients
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in practice.
We now examine how much adding a new surgeon to the system improves patient access
to surgeons. Note that the surgeon is added at the beginning of year 1 in the simulation.
For the location of the added surgeon, we consider two scenarios, named L1 and L2, for each
city. In the L1 scenario the new surgeon is located in the center of each circle, shown in
Figure 4.8, and in the L2 scenario the surgeon is located close to the other cities to increase
the chance of receiving patients from outside the city. Finally, for the service rate of the new
surgeon we consider three scenarios, named S1, S2, and S3. In S1, the service rate of the
new surgeon is the same as the fastest surgeon in the network. In S2, the service rate of the
added surgeon is the average of all the surgeons in the network. In S3, the service rate is
the average of all the surgeons in the city in which the surgeon is added. Since the surgeon
is newly added to the network, we assume that 1) the surgeon capacity is not limited, and
2) none of the patients who have a preferred surgeon select the new surgeon. For scenario
L2, the surgeon location in each city is provided in the following table:
City
Kitchener
Guelph
Cambridge

New Surgeon Location
(12,18)
(27.6,23.2)
(20.8,5.6)

Table 4.5: New Surgeon Location in Scenario L2
Figure 4.15 shows the impact of adding a new surgeon to Kitchener on patient average
wait time in the next year.
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Figure 4.15: Impact of Adding a Surgeon to Kitchener
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The average wait time in the system will significantly reduce if the added surgeon has a
fast service rate. In addition, adding the surgeon to the border of the city has resulted in lower
wait times than the L1 scenario. The underlying reason is that in Scenario L1 the surgeon
is located in the middle of the city and therefore the majority of patients who choose the
closest surgeon option are being referred to the new surgeon. This intuitively makes referral
rates imbalanced and as a result average wait time in the network is increased. The same
trend can be seen in Figure 4.16 which shows the results for Guelph and Cambridge.
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Figure 4.16: Impact of Adding a Surgeon to Guelph and Cambridge
Comparing Figures 4.15 and 4.16 shows that in all scenarios adding a new surgeon to
the system can reduce patient average wait time over the next year. However, the impact
depends on the surgeon location and service rates. Since the majority of patients prefer
a local surgeon, adding the new surgeon to Cambridge has not resulted in any noticeable
changes in average wait times. Finally, adding the surgeon to Kitchener has resulted in
slightly better outcomes in comparison with Guelph.

4.4.2

Multinomial-Model Results

In this section we introduce the multinomial-model used to analyze how patient preferences
impact their access to surgeons over the next four years. In contrast to the base-model
where we derived patient choices directly from the available data, in the multinomial-model
we applied a multinomial regression model in the simulation process to determine patient
preferences. The details of the regression model can be found in the Appendix.
We used patient age, gender, city and three variables associated with wait time, namely
average wait time, fifth percentile, and 95th percentile, as the independent variables and
patient preference as the dependent variable in the model. In particular, upon the arrival
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of a patient from a city to the network the model calculates the average wait time, the
5th percentile, and 95th percentile for the past ten arrivals from that city. Considering the
patient age and gender, the model then estimates three probabilities, each associated with
one of the patient preferences. In order to improve the performance of the model, patient
choices are derived from the probability distribution of the regression model. Define pF as
the estimated probability for the first available surgeon option. Similarly, define pC and pS
for the closest and specific surgeon options and assume that pF > pC > pS . In order to
determine the patient preference, we generate a random floating point number, called rv, in
the range [0, 1]. The following shows how the model determines a patient preference.
Random Variable Value
rv <= pS
pS < rv <= pS + pC
rv > pS + pC

Patient Choice
Specific Surgeon
Closest Surgeon
First Available Surgeon

Table 4.6: Patient Choice Using Regression Model Probability Estimates
It has been shown that previous experience of a PCP with a surgeon can impact the
choice of surgeon by the PCP (Barnett et al. 2012a, Kinchen et al. 2004b). Since our data
lacks information about patient history and PCPs, it is difficult to understand why a patient
might select a specific surgeon. Therefore, in our model if a patient choice is a specific
surgeon, the surgeon is selected based on the probabilities derived from the data.
Using the multinomial regression process to determine patient choices has the following
advantages over the base-model: 1) we can analyze the performance of the system for a
more distant future, 2) to study the impact of patient preferences, we are not obligated to
reduce patient options to only one; in fact, we can estimate what the impact would be of
removing one of the options on patient access to surgeons, and 3) we can study how surgeon
characteristics impact patient preferences. For instance, if average wait time for a surgeon
reduces, it might impact the referral rate to the surgeon as more patients who choose the first
available surgeon will be directed to them. However, as discussed earlier, the base-model is
better when the main concern is how changing different parameters of the system impacts
patient access to surgeons in the near future.
We considered two scenarios for the arrival rates to the network. In the first scenario we
assumed that arrival rates remain unchanged over time. Using real data from the cataract
referral network in Ontario, Hatch et al. (2012) predicted that demand for cataract surgery
would see a 128% growth from 2006 to 2036. Using this information, in the second scenario
we considered a 2.79% annual increase in arrival rates to the network. Each scenario was run
100 times and the same seeds (each run with a different seed) were used in both scenarios to
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make the results comparable. For each scenario, all the results presented in the rest of the
paper are the average values taken over the 100 runs.
Depending on patient condition, various target wait times, ranging from seven days to
six months, are mentioned in the literature (Hodge et al. 2007, Government of Ontario 2022)
for cataract surgery. For the multinomial-model we considered two performance metrics,
namely average wait times for surgeons and number of patients seen within 180 days. This
gives us a better understanding of how different policies impact patient access to surgeons
and their satisfaction over time.
The following figure shows patient average wait time over the next four years and the
percentage of patients served within 180 days for each scenario.
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Figure 4.17:
The Expected Performance of the Network Over the Next Four Years
(Multinomial-Model)
The average wait time in the network is expected to increase by around 13% yearly and
reaches over 320 days four years from now. Since surgeon service rates are not changing and
no new capacity is added to the network, the gap between the average wait times in the first
and second scenarios increases over time and reaches 14 days in the fourth year. Under the
fixed arrival rate scenario and over the four years of simulation, patients on average waited
around 250 days to get served by surgeons and 75% of patients received service within 326
days. Finally, in both scenarios, the proportion of patients who receive service within 180
days is expected to halve and reaches around 30% at the end of the fourth year.
Figure 4.18 shows average wait time for surgeons in each city.
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Figure 4.18: Average Wait Time for Surgeons in Each City (Multinomial-Model)
In both scenarios, the average wait time for surgeons in Kitchener is higher than the other
two cities and will double after four years if the annual increase in arrival rate is considered.
Higher arrival rates to this city and the fact that the majority of patients prefer a local
surgeon are the main reasons why wait times in Kitchener are higher than the other two
cities.
Multinomial-Model: Policy Analysis
In this section we present our policy analysis results for the multinomial-model for the
second scenario where arrival rates to the network increase annually. In addition to the
policies introduced in Section 4.4.1 we study how eliminating either of the ”closest surgeon”
or ”specific surgeon” options can impact patient access to surgeons. Figure 4.19 compares
patient average wait time in the network when different policies for patient options are
implemented.
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Figure 4.19: Impact of Different Patient Choice Policies on Patient Average Wait Time
(Multinomial-Model)
Limiting patient options to only the first available surgeon option and incorporating
patient local preferences has resulted in the best outcomes with respect to the patient average
wait time. An additional noticeable advantage of reducing patient options to only first
available surgeon is the higher proportion of patients seen by surgeons within 180 days in
the end of the fourth year (40% compared with ≈ 30% under other policies). However,
from the figure it can be seen that all policies have resulted in very close average wait times
in the network. This indicates that the utilization rate of the current system is very high
and therefore modifying current policies has limited impact on improving patient access to
surgeons over the next four years. This leads us to the next policy where we study how
adding a new surgeon to the network can reduce patient wait time in the system. The same
scenarios explained in Section 4.4.1 are considered here for the location and service rate of
the new surgeon. For each city we then calculate the average wait time over all six defined
scenarios.
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Figure 4.20: Impact of Adding a New Surgeon to the Network (Multinomial-Model)
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Figure 4.20 compares the impact of adding a new surgeon to the network if surgeon
characteristics remain unchanged. Like the base-model, adding a surgeon to Kitchener results
in the best outcomes; it reduces patient average wait time by up to 43% at the end of the
fourth year and makes the chance of being seen by a surgeon within 180 days near 70%.

4.5

Conclusion

We study the referral process in the cataract referral network in the Waterloo region using
real data from the network and examine how different policies, including reducing variations
in patient preferences and adding a new surgeon to the network, could impact patient access
to surgeons.
We introduce two specific models, called the base-model and the multinomial-model,
which allow us to analyze system performance in the future. In the base-model, the values of
all parameters are fixed and directly derived from the data. Due to this limitation and the fact
that no element of the model can impact patient preferences the base-model is used to analyze
system behaviour in the near future. In the multinomial-model, we consider two arrival
scenarios and to determine patient preferences we apply a multinomial regression model in
the simulation. This allows patient preferences to be affected by different parameters of the
system including patient wait times to see surgeons. Although the structure of the models
is different, the results from both models are consistent.
We find that limiting patient options does not significantly improve patient average wait
time to see surgeons (WT1) in the system. This indicates the high utilization rate of the
system where changing referral policies does not improve the tradeoff between demand and
supply. However, in comparison with other modifications of patient choices, our results
from the multinomial-model suggest that more patients could be seen within 180 days if the
only available option is to allocate patients to the first available surgeon. We also find that
eliminating patients’ option to travel to another city for those patients who choose the first
available surgeon does not necessarily improve patient average wait time to see surgeons in
the network.
Finally, we examine the impact of adding a new surgeon to the network. Different
scenarios for the location and service rate of the new surgeon are considered. Our results
from both models suggest that Kitchener and Guelph, respectively, are the best options to
locate a new surgeon. Our results from the multinomial-model also suggest that adding a
new surgeon to Kitchener can reduce patient average WT1 by up to 43% by the end of the
fourth year.
The models and insights gained from the analysis presented in this paper are a first
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step in understanding the performance of various referral policies on managerial and health
outcome measures. In particular, due to the limited WT2 data for individual patients in
this paper we study how implementing new referral policies or potentially adding more
capacity to the network could improve patient access to surgeons (reduce WT1). However,
on-time delivery of service (in our case, cataract surgery) to patients is yet another important
topic that requires further investigation. Analyzing the impact of hospital operation room
availability and WT2 for each surgeon (and understanding the relationship between hospital
bed availability and surgeon scheduling policies) would be another interesting line of research
for future exploration. We would like to thank all the people from the Waterloo Centralized
Intake System and the surgeons in the network who supported us and provided us with
reliable data resources throughout the whole study.
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Appendix A
First Chapter Proofs
A.1

Online Appendix

The Appendix consists of three sections. In the first section we present our proofs for the
standard centralized referral system and theorems discussed in the main text (Sections 2.2.2
and 2.3, Theorems 1-7). The second section is dedicated to the optimal policies and proofs
for the fair-allocation referral system (Section 2.4).

A.1.1

Proofs of Results for the Standard Centralized Referral
System

The proofs presented in this appendix follow the order in the text.

A.2

Results for Section 2.2.2 (optimal provider scheduling)

We begin with the results characterizing optimal behavior of the provider. The following
lemma is an intermediate result for proving Theorem 1. This result allows us to consider
only a discrete number of candidate optimal scheduling policies for the provider.
Lemma 1. Consider the providers optimization problem shown in Equations 2.17-2.19.
An interior point (x1j , x2j ) where 0 < xij < 1, ∀i, may be optimal only if x1j = x2j =
−1
mj
( λ1j +λ
)(α1 ) .
2j
Proof of Lemma 1. Based on the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions for the provider
problem under the proposed achievable region we have:
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λ1j
α −1
= uαj λ1j x1jj =⇒

λ1j + λ2j


λ2j
α −1
= uαj λ2j x2jj =⇒

λ1j + λ2j
α

λ1j = 0
1
λ1j +λ2j

α −1

= uαj x1jj

(i)

λ2j = 0
1
λ1j +λ2j

α −1

= uαj x2jj

(ii)

α

u(λ1j x1jj + λ2j x2jj − mj ) = 0 (iii)
Variable u is a Lagrangian multiplier. From Equations (i) and (ii), u cannot be 0. In
addition, since 0 < xij < 1, ∀i ⇒ λij ̸= 0. Therefore,
from equations (i) and (ii) we have:

 x1j = x2j


αj −1
αj −1
αj −1
αj −1
uαj x1j = uαj x2j ⇒ x1j = x2j ⇒
or


 αj = 1
Therefore, if αj ̸= 1 then x1j must be equal to x2j . Since u ̸= 0, for equation (iii)
α
α
we have λ1j x1jj + λ2j x2jj = mj . Substituting x1j = x2j = x in equation (iii) results in
−1
mj
)(αj ) .
x1j = x2j = ( λ1j +λ
2j
Proof of Theorem 1. Table 2.1 shows the five candidate optimal solutions, the interior point
S and the boundary points {P1 , P2 , P¯1 , P¯2 } and the scenarios where they are optimal. We
will go through each of these cases to confirm this correspondence.
Case 1: αj > 1.
−1
mj
)(αj ) is the necessary condition for an
In Lemma 1 we show that x1j = x2j = ( λ1j +λ
2j
interior point to be optimal. Now, we prove that this point is the optimal solution for a
provider if αj > 1. First, let’s compare f (S) with f (P¯1 ) and f (P¯2 ). Since αj > 1 → 0 <
1
< 1. Therefore, we have:
αj
−1

−1
−1
λ1j
λ1j
λ1j
( λ1j +λ
) < ( λ1j +λ
)(αj ) → ( λ1j +λ
)( λ11j )(αj ) <
2j
2j
2j
−1
−1
λ1j
m
mj
( λ1j +λ
)( λ1jj )(αj ) < ( λ1j +λ
)(αj ) ⇒ f (P¯1 ) < f (S)
2j
2j

(αj )
1
(αj )−1 ×(mj )
( λ1j +λ
)
−
−
−
−
−
−−→
2j

−1

−1
−1
λ2j
λ2j
λ2j
( λ1j +λ
) < ( λ1j +λ
)(αj ) → ( λ1j +λ
)( λ12j )(αj ) <
2j
2j
2j
−1
−1
λ2j
m
mj
( λ1j +λ
)( λ2jj )(αj ) < ( λ1j +λ
)(αj ) ⇒ f (P¯2 ) < f (S)
2j
2j

(αj )
1
(αj )−1 ×(mj )
( λ1j +λ
)
−
−
−
−
−
−−→
2j

Now, let’s compare f (S) with f (P1 ). When mj < λ1j then f (P1 ) is undefined. Therefore,
f (S) and f (P1 ) are comparable when λ1j ≤ mj < λ1j + λ2j . Define ∆1 f = f (S) − f (P1 ).
λ1j
λ1j
(αj )−1
If we set mj = λ1j then f (P1 ) = λ1j +λ
and
f
(S)
=
(
)
. Since αj > 1 and
λ
+λ
2j
1j
2j
λ

1j
0 < λ1j +λ
< 1 we can conclude that if mj = λ1j ⇒ ∆1 F > 0 ⇒ f (S) > f (P1 ). In addition,
2j
if we set mj = λ1j + λ2j then f (S) = f (P1 ) = 1. Therefore, in order to prove that when
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λ1j ≤ mj < λ1j + λ2j then f (S) > f (P1 ) we need to show that

d∆1 f
dmj

< 0.

m −λ

−1

m −λ

−1

λ1j + λ2j ( jλ2j 1j )(αj )
mj
(αj )−1
)
−
∆1 f = f (S) − f (P1 ) = (
λ1j + λ2j
λ1j + λ2j
m

j
( λ1j +λ
)(αj )
d(∆1 f )
2j
=
dmj
αj mj

−1

( jλ2j 1j )(αj )
λ2j
−
λ1j + λ2j αj (mj − λ1j )

Now we have:
mj < λ1j + λ2j → mj λ1j < (λ1j + λ2j )λ1j → mj λ1j + mj λ2j < (λ1j + λ2j )λ1j + mj λ2j →
λ +λ
m
λ +λ
m
mj λ1j + mj λ2j − λ1j λ2j − λ21j < mj λ2j → 1jλ2j 2j < mj −λj 1j → ( 1jλ2j 2j )αj −1 < ( mj −λj 1j )αj −1 →
mj (λ1j +λ2j )αj −1
α
λ2jj

α

<

mj j
λ2j (mj −λ1j )αj −1

−1
λ +λ
mj
( 1jλ2j 2j )( λ1j +λ
)(αj )
2j
−1
mj
( λ +λ
)(αj )
1j
2j

αj mj
λ2j
λ1j +λ2j

<

→(

λ1j +λ2j αj
mj
) ( λ1j +λ
)
λ2j
2j

−1
m
m −λ
( mj −λj 1j )( jλ2j 1j )(αj )

m

< ( mj −λj 1j )αj (
−1
mj
)(αj )
1j +λ2j

(λ

→

mj

mj −λ1j
)
λ2j

<

→

(
λ2j
λ1j +λ2j

mj −λ1j (α )−1
) j
λ2j

(mj −λ1j )

→

<

−1
m −λ
( jλ 1j )(αj )
2j

1f )
⇒ d(∆
<0
dmj
The same process can be done in order to show that when λ2j ≤ mj < λ1j + λ2j then
λ2j
f (S) > f (P2 ). Define ∆2 f = f (S) − f (P2 ). If we set mj = λ2j then f (P2 ) = λ1j +λ
2j

αj (mj −λ1j )

−1

λ

λ

2j
2j
and f (S) = ( λ1j +λ
)(αj ) . Since αj > 1 and 0 < λ1j +λ
< 1 we can conclude that when
2j
2j
mj = λ2j → f (S) > f (P2 ). In addition, if we set mj = λ1j + λ2j then f (S) = f (P2 ) = 1.
Therefore, in order to prove that when λ2j ≤ mj < λ1j + λ2j then f (S) > f (P2 ) we need to
2f
< 0.
show that d∆
dmj
Therefore, if αj > 1 then point S is the only optimal solution to the provider problem.

λ1j (
mj
−1
∆2 f = f (S) − f (P2 ) = (
)(αj ) −
λ1j + λ2j
−1
mj
( λ1j +λ
)(αj )
2j

d(∆2 f )
=
dmj

αj mj

mj −λ2j (αj )−1
)
λ1j

+ λ2j

λ1j + λ2j
m −λ

−1

( jλ1j 2j )(αj )
λ1j
−
λ1j + λ2j αj (mj − λ2j )

We have:
×λ2j
+mj λ1j
mj < λ1j + λ2j −−−→ mj λ2j < (λ1j + λ2j )λ2j −−−−→ mj λ2j + mj λ1j < (λ1j + λ2j )λ2j +
m
λ +λ
λ +λ
mj λ1j → mj λ2j + mj λ1j − λ1j λ2j − λ22j < mj λ1j → 1jλ1j 2j < mj −λj 2j → ( 1jλ1j 2j )αj −1 <
m

( mj −λj 2j )αj −1 →
→

mj (λ1j +λ2j )αj −1
α
λ1jj

−1
λ +λ
mj
( 1jλ1j 2j )( λ1j +λ
)(αj )
2j

−1
mj
( λ +λ
)(αj )
1j
2j

αj mj

<

λ1j
λ1j +λ2j

<

α

<

mj j
λ1j (mj −λ2j )αj −1

→(

−1
m
m −λ
( mj −λj 2j )( jλ1j 2j )(αj )

−1
m −λ
( jλ 2j )(αj )
1j

kj (mj −λ2j )

⇒

d(∆2 f )
dmj

<0
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λ1j +λ2j αj
mj
) ( λ1j +λ
)
λ1j
2j

→

−1
mj
)(αj )
1j +λ2j

(λ

mj

<

m

< ( mj −λj 2j )αj (
(
λ1j
λ1j +λ2j

mj −λ2j
)
λ1j

mj −λ2j (α )−1
) j
λ1j

(mj −λ2j )

→

Case 2: αj < 1, λij ≤ mj ∀i.
Let’s prove that if a provider has enough capacity to serve both types of patients
independently then solutions P1 and P2 are the only optimal solutions. We prove that
when λ2j < λ1j ≤ mj < λ1j + λ2j then solution P1 is the optimal solution to the problem.
Let’s begin with comparing
f (P1 ) and f (P2 ):

λ1j

f (P1 ) = λ1j +λ

2j
1
λ1j −λ2j α
If mj = λ1j →
λ1j ( λ
) j +λ2j

1j
 f (P2 ) =
λ1j +λ2j

∆1 f = f (P1 ) − f (P2 ) =

λ1j − λ1j (

λ1j −λ2j (αj )−1
)
λ1j

− λ2j

λ1j + λ2j

Since λ2j < λ1j let’s define λ1j = λ2j + a. ∆1 f can be rewritten as follows:
−1

∆1 f =

(λ2j + a) − λ1j ( λa1j )(αj )
λ1j + λ2j

− λ2j

−1

=

a − λ1j ( λa1j )(αj )
λ1j + λ2j

−1

=

λ1j ( λa1j − ( λa1j )(αj ) )
λ1j + λ2j

Since 0 < λa1j < 1 and 0 < αj < 1 when mj = λ1j , ∆1 f = f (P1 ) − f (P2 ) > 0. In addition,
when mj = λ1j + λ2j , f (P1 ) = f (P2 ) = 1 and consequently ∆1 f = 0
1f
Therefore, showing that λ2j < λ1j < mj < λ1j + λ2j implies d∆
< 0 is sufficient to
dmj
prove that f (P1 ) > f (P2 ).

d∆1 f
1
mj − λ1j (αj )−1 −1
mj − λ2j (αj )−1 −1
=
((
)
−(
)
)
dmj
αj (λ1j + λ2j )
λ2j
λ1j
m −λ

−1

m −λ

−1

Let’s define H = ( jλ2j 1j )(αj ) −1 − ( jλ1j 2j )(αj ) −1 . Now we show that whenever 0 <
1f
αj < 1 and λ2j < λ1j < mj < λ1j + λ2j then H < 0 and therefore d∆
< 0. We have:
dmj
mj < λ1j + λ2j → mj (λ1j − λ2j ) < (λ1j + λ2j )(λ1j − λ2j ) → mj λ1j − λ21j < mj λ2j − λ22j →
−1
−1
mj −λ1j
m −λ
m −λ
m −λ
< jλ1j 2j → ( jλ2j 1j )(αj ) −1 < ( jλ1j 2j )(αj ) −1 → H < 0 → d∆G
< 0.
λ2j
dmj
Now let’s compare
 f (P1 ) and f (S). Define ∆2 f = f (P1 ) − f (S).
λ1j

f (P1 ) = λ1j +λ
2j
If mj = λ1j →
1j
(αj )−1
 f (S) = ( λ λ+λ
)
1j
2j
λ

1j
Since 0 < λ1j +λ
< 1 and 0 < αj < 1 ⇒ f (P1 ) > f (S) when mj = λ1j . In addition,
2j
when mj = λ1j + λ2j , f (P1 ) = f (S) = 1.
2f
Therefore, if we prove that when λ1j < mj < λ1j + λ2j then d∆
< 0then we actually
dmj
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have proved that f (P1 ) > f (S).
mj
1
mj − λ1j (αj )−1 −1
d∆2 f
−1
=
((
)
−(
)(αj ) −1 )
dmj
αj (λ1j + λ2j )
λ2j
λ1j + λ2j
m −λ

−1

m −λ

−1

Let’s define G = ( jλ2j 1j )(αj ) −1 − ( jλ1j 2j )(αj ) −1 . Now we show that whenever 0 <
2f
< 0. We have:
αj < 1 and λ2j < λ1j < mj < λ1j + λ2j then G < 0 and therefore d∆
dmj
2
mj < λ1j + λ2j → mj λ1j < λ1j (λ1j + λ2j ) → mj λ1j − λ1j − λ1j λ2j < 0 → mj λ1j − λ21j −
−1
−1
m −λ
mj
m −λ
mj
λ1j λ2j + mj λ2j < mj λ2j → jλ2j 1j < λ1j +λ
→ ( jλ2j 1j )(αj ) −1 < ( λ1j +λ
)(αj ) −1 → G <
2j
2j
2f
0 → d∆
< 0.
dmj
−1
m
Now, let’s compare f (P1 ) and f (P¯2 ).For solution P¯2 we have x2j = ( j )(αj ) . It can
λ 2j

be seen that since λ2j < λ1j < mj < λ1j + λ2j , x2j in solution P¯2 is greater than 1.
Therefore, if λ2j < λ1j < mj ¡λ1j + λ2j then solution P¯2 is not a feasible solution. The same
−1
m
logic is also true for solution P¯1 . In fact, for solution P¯1 we have x1j = ( λ1j )(αj ) . Again
j
λ2j < λ1j < mj < λ1j + λ2j and consequently x1j becomes greater than 1 in solution P¯1 .
Therefore, if λ2j < λ1j < mj ¡λ1j + λ2j then solution P¯1 is not a feasible solution too. We
proved that if 0 < αj < 1 and λ2j < λ1j < mj < λ1j + λ2j then solution P1 is the optimal
solution.
The same reasoning process can applied for other scheduling policies presented in Table
2.1.

Results for Section 2.3.1 (optimal referral policy)
We begin by presenting two lemmas which are useful in the proof of Theorems 2-5 and then
present the proofs of these theorems.
Lemma 2. Consider the referrer problem described in Equations 2.15-2.19. When both
providers are LOC, m1 + m2 is an upper bound on the referrer objective function.
Proof of Lemma 2. The following equations show the referrer objective functions for each
case feasible under the capacity and arrival rate assumptions:
m1 − λ11 (α1 )−1
m2 − λ12 (α2 )−1
)
+ (λ22 )(
)
λ21
λ22
m1 − λ11 (α1 )−1
m2 − λ22 (α2 )−1
G(P1 , P2 ) = λ11 + λ22 + (λ21 )(
)
+ (λ12 )(
)
λ21
λ12
−1
−1
(m1 − λ21 )(α1 )
(m2 − λ12 )(α2 )
G(P2 , P1 ) = λ21 + λ12 +
+
(λ11 )(α1 )−1 −1
(λ22 )(α2 )−1 −1

G(P1 , P1 ) = λ11 + λ12 + (λ21 )(
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−1

−1

11 (α1 )
12 (α2 )
Let’s focus on the case (P1 , P1 ). Since both x21 = ( m1λ−λ
)
and x22 = ( m2λ−λ
)
21
22
are between zero and one and (α1 )−1 and (α2 )−1 are greater than 1, the maximum values
for x21 and x22 can be achieved if α1 = α2 = 1 which results in G(P1 , P1 ) = m1 + m2 . The
same logic can be applied to prove that the maximum achievable values for G(P1 , P2 ) and
G(P2 , P1 ) is m1 + m2 .

Lemma 3. Consider the referrer problem described in Equations 2.15-2.19. When both
providers are LOC, the referrer objective function is strictly convex.
Proof of Lemma 3. We need to prove that the Hessian at feasible points in all the three cases
(P1 , P1 ), (P1 , P2 ) and (P2 , P1 ) is positive semidefinite.
Case 1: (P1 , P1 ).
Since both providers best solutions is solution P1 and they both have enough capacity to
visit each type of patients independently therefore based on conditions in Table 1 we have
λ2j ≤ λ1j ≤ mj , j = 1, 2.

G(P1 , P1 ) = λ11 + λ12 + (λ21 )(

m2 − λ12 (α2 )−1
m1 − λ11 (α1 )−1
)
)
+ (λ22 )(
λ21
λ22

Since λ11 + λ12 = λ1 , λ12 + λ22 = λ2 and 0 < αi < 1, ∀i the function can be rewritten as
follows:

−1

(m1 − λ11 )(α1 )
G(P1 , P1 ) = λ1 +
(λ21 )(α1 )−1 −1

−1

(m2 − λ1 + λ11 )(α2 )
+
(λ2 − λ21 )(α2 )−1 −1

−1
−1
Let’s define
" k1 = (α
# 1 ) and k2 = (α2 ) . The Hessian matrix for case (P1 , P1 ) is
A1 B1
H(P1 , P1 ) =
where:
B1 C1

d2 G(P1 , P1 )
k1 (k1 − 1)(m1 − λ11 )k1 −2 k2 (k2 − 1)(m2 + λ11 − λ1 )k2 −2
+
=
dλ211
(λ21 )k1 −1
(λ2 − λ21 )k2 −1
d2 G(P1 , P1 )
k1 (k1 − 1)(m1 − λ11 )k1 −1 k2 (k2 − 1)(m2 + λ11 − λ1 )k2 −1
B1 =
=
+
dλ11 dλ21
(λ21 )k1
(λ2 − λ21 )k2
d2 G(P1 , P1 )
k1 (k1 − 1)(m1 − λ11 )k1 k2 (k2 − 1)(m2 + λ11 − λ1 )k2
+
=
C1 =
dλ221
(λ21 )k1 +1
(λ2 − λ21 )k2 +1
A1 =

Since k1 > 1, k2 > 1 λ11 ≤ m1 , λ12 ≤ m2 → λ1 − m2 ≤ λ11 → 0 ≤ m2 − λ1 + λ11 and
λ21 ≤ λ2 all A1 , B1 and C1 are positive. Therefore, since λi1 ≥ 0, i = 1, 2 it can be concluded
that Hessian is positive semidefinite at all feasible points.
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Case 2: (P1 , P2 ).
For case (P1 , P2 ) the assumptions are λ21 ≤ λ11 ≤ m1 and λ12 ≤ λ22 ≤ m2 . We have:
G(P1 , P2 ) = λ11 + λ22 + (λ21 )(

m2 − λ22 k2
m1 − λ11 k1
) + (λ12 )(
)
λ21
λ12

The function can be rewritten as follows:
G(P1 , P2 ) = λ2 + λ11 − λ21 +

(m1 − λ11 )k1 (m2 − λ2 + λ21 )k2
+
(λ21 )k1 −1
(λ1 − λ11 )k2 −1

k1 = (α1 )−1 and k2 = (α2 )−1 . The Hessian matrix for case (P1 , P2 ) is H(P1 , P2 ) =
" Where #
A2 B2
where:
B2 C2
k1 (k1 − 1)(m1 − λ11 )k1 −2 k2 (k2 − 1)(m2 + λ21 − λ2 )k2
d2 G(P1 , P2 )
=
+
dλ211
(λ21 )k1 −1
(λ1 − λ11 )k2 +1
d2 G(P1 , P2 )
k1 (k1 − 1)(m1 − λ11 )k1 −1 k2 (k2 − 1)(m2 + λ21 − λ2 )k2 −1
B2 =
=
+
dλ11 dλ21
(λ21 )k1
(λ1 − λ11 )k2
k1
2
k1 (k1 − 1)(m1 − λ11 )
k2 (k2 − 1)(m2 + λ21 − λ2 )k2 −2
d G(P1 , P2 )
=
+
C2 =
dλ221
(λ21 )k1 +1
(λ1 − λ11 )k2 −1
A2 =

Again, since k1 > 1, k2 > 1 λ11 ≤ m1 , λ22 ≤ m2 → λ2 − m2 ≤ λ21 → 0 ≤ m2 + λ21 − λ2
and λ11 ≤ λ1 all A2 , B2 and C2 are positive. Therefore, as λi1 ≥ 0, i = 1, 2 it can be
concluded that Hessian is positive semidefinite at all feasible points.
Case 3: (P2 , P1 ).
For case (P2 , P1 ) the assumptions are λ11 ≤ λ21 ≤ m1 and λ22 ≤ λ12 ≤ m2 .
−1

(m1 − λ21 )(α1 )
G(P2 , P1 ) = λ21 + λ12 +
(λ11 )(α1 )−1 −1

−1

(m2 − λ12 )(α2 )
+
(λ22 )(α2 )−1 −1

The function can be rewritten as follows:
G(P2 , P1 ) = λ1 + λ21 − λ11 +

(m1 − λ21 )k1 (m2 − λ1 + λ11 )k2
+
(λ11 )k1 −1
(λ2 − λ21 )k2 −1

k1 = (α1 )−1 and k2 = (α2 )−1 . The Hessian matrix for case (P2 , P1 ) is H(P2 , P1 ) =
" Where #
A3 B3
where:
B3 C3
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d2 G(P2 , P1 )
k1 (k1 − 1)(m1 − λ21 )k1 k2 (k2 − 1)(m2 + λ11 − λ1 )k2 −2
=
+
dλ211
(λ11 )k1 +1
(λ2 − λ21 )k2 −1
k1 (k1 − 1)(m1 − λ21 )k1 −1 k2 (k2 − 1)(m2 + λ11 − λ1 )k2 −1
d2 G(P2 , P1 )
=
+
B3 =
dλ11 dλ21
(λ11 )k1
(λ2 − λ21 )k2
k1 (k1 − 1)(m1 − λ21 )k1 −2 k2 (k2 − 1)(m2 + λ11 − λ1 )k2
d2 G(P2 , P1 )
=
+
C3 =
dλ221
(λ11 )k1 −1
(λ2 − λ21 )k2 +1
A3 =

Again, since k1 > 1, k2 > 1 λ21 ≤ m1 , λ12 ≤ m2 → λ1 − m2 ≤ λ11 → 0 ≤ m2 + λ11 − λ1 and
λ21 ≤ λ2 all A3 , B3 and C3 are positive. Therefore, as λi1 ≥ 0, i = 1, 2 it can be concluded
that Hessian is positive semidefinite at all feasible points.
We proved that the referrer function is always convex no matter what case the optimal
policy of the referrer results in.

Corollary 1. The candidates for optimal policies to the referrer problem described in Equations
2.15-2.19 are the boundary points that with the exception of Policies 7 and 8 result in
G(Λ) = m1 + m2 . Table A.1 shows these candidates when both providers are LOC:
Policy

Resulted TP

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )

(x11 , x21 )
(x12 , x22 )

1

(m1 + m2 − λ2 , λ2 − m2 )
(λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 , m2 )

(1, 1)
(0, 1)

2

(m1 , λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 )
(λ1 − m1 , m1 + m2 − λ1 )

(1, 0)
(1, 1)

3

(m1 , λ2 − m2 )
(λ1 − m1 , m2 )

(1, 0)
(0, 1)

4

(λ1 − m2 , m1 + m2 − λ1 )
(m2 , λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 )

(1, 1)
(1, 0)

5

(λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 , m1 )
(m1 + m2 − λ2 , λ2 − m1 )

(0, 1)
(1, 1)

6

(λ1 − m2 , m1 )
(m2 , λ2 − m1 )

(0, 1)
(1, 0)

7

(λ1 , λ2 − m2 )
(0, m2 )

−λ1 (α1 )
(1, ( λm21−m
)
)
2
(0, 1)

8

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 − m2 )
(m2 , m2 )

2 −λ1 (α1 )
(1, ( m1λ+m
)
)
2 −m2
(1, 0)or(0, 1)

Index

−1

−1

Table A.1: Candidate Policies (Both providers are LOC - Regular referral system)
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Proof of Corollary 1. This result follows directly from Lemmas 2 and 3.
Proof of Theorem 2. From Lemma 2 it can be concluded that in a referral system where
both providers are LOC if the referrer objective value under a policy is m1 + m2 then that
policy is optimal. Tables A.2 and A.3 show optimal referral policies extracted from Table
A.1 for the capacity scenario (Low, Low) and (Mid, Low) respectively:
Optimality Conditions

Optimal Policy

2λ1 ≤ 2m2 + m1

1-6

λ1 + λ2 ≤ 2m2 + m1 < 2λ1

1,3,5,6

2m2 + m1 < λ1 + λ2
and
2m1 + m2 ≤ λ1 + λ2

3,6

2m2 + m1 < λ1 + λ2
and
2m1 + m2 > λ1 + λ2

2,3,5,6

Table A.2: Optimal policies (Capacity scenario (Low, Low), Both provider are LOC)

Optimality Conditions

Optimal Policy

2λ1 ≤ 2m2 + m1

1-4

λ1 + λ2 ≤ 2m2 + m1 < 2λ1

1,3,4

2m2 + m1 < λ1 + λ2

2,3

Table A.3: Optimal policies (Capacity scenario (Mid, Low), Both provider are LOC)
As can be seen in the tables, there are more than one optimal policy under each optimality
condition. However, Policy 3 is the only optimal policies in both scenarios. The policy is:
providers 1: (λ11 , λ21 ) = (m1 , λ2 − m2 )
providers 2: (λ12 , λ22 ) = (λ1 − m1 , m2 )
For the first provider we have: m1 +m2 > λ2 ⇒ m1 > λ2 −m2 ⇒ λ11 > λ21 and λ11 = m1 .
Therefore, based on results provided in Table 2.1 the optimal solution for the first provider
is solution P1 and we have (x11 , x21 ) = (1, 0). Similarly for the second provider we have
λ1 < m1 + m2 ⇒ λ1 − m1 < m2 ⇒ λ12 < λ22 and λ22 = m2 . Therefore, the best solution for
the second provider is P2 and (x12 , x22 ) = (0, 1). Now for the referrer we have:
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G(Λ) = λ11 x11 + λ21 x21 + λ12 x12 + λ22 x22 = m1 (1) + (λ2 − m2 )(0) + (λ1 − m1 )(0) + m2 (1) = m1 + m2

The policy is optimal since it is feasible in both capacity scenarios and results in the
highest achievable value for the referrer.
Proof of Theorem 3. We use Lemma 2 to show that policies mentioned in Table 2.3 are
optimal in capacity scenario (High, Low) when 2m2 + m1 ≥ λ1 + λ2 .
For the first policy we have:
1. λ11 + λ21 = m1 ⇒ (x11 , x21 ) = (1, 1)
2. Since λ1 + λ2 ≤ 2m2 + m1 ⇒ λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 ≤ m2 ⇒ λ12 ≤ λ22 . Therefore, the
second provider’s best solution is P2 and (x12 , x22 ) = (0, 1).
Having target probabilities, it can easily be verified that G(Λ) = m1 + m2 . The same
process can be done to show that the second policy is also optimal.
Proof of Theorem 4. Lemma 3 states that when providers are both LOC, G(Λ) is strictly
convex so that the optimal referral policy Λ is a boundary point. Define L as the set of
boundary referral points for capacity scenario (High, Low) when 2m2 + m1 < λ1 + λ2 . L is
listed exhaustively along with the objective functions in Tables A.4-A.6. From Theorem 1
and our assumptions in Section 2.3 we know that there are three potential sets of optimal
scheduling policies S = (P1 , P1 ), (P1 , P2 ), (P2 , P1 ). We consider each of these cases below
identifying the optimal referral policies leading to the scheduling policy (CS∗ ). In each case
we identify Λ ∈ L which lead to the respective scheduling policy. This mapping generates
the set of potential coordinated policies C. The next step is to identify C ∗ which eliminates
dominated coordinated policies for each scheduling policy. Finally, we compare objective
value of policies in CP∗ 1 ,P1 , CP∗ 1 ,P2 , and CP∗ 2 ,P1 which results in two potential policies which may
be optimal depending on Equation 2.20. Let’s begin with the first scheduling policy pair
and define k1 = (α1 )−1 and k2 = (α2 )−1 .
Case 1: (P1 , P1 ). Policies {R1, R2, ...} can under specific parameters result in (P1 , P1 ):
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Referral Policy

Index

G(Λ)

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )

R1

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 − m2 )
(m2 , m2 )

R2

(λ1 − m22 , λ2 −
( m22 , m22 )

m2
2 )

λ1 +

(m1 +m2 −λ1 )k1
(λ2 −m2 )k1 −1

λ1 +

m2
2 +

m
(m1 + 22 −λ1 )k1
m
(λ2 − 22 )k1 −1

m2 +λ2 +λ1
+
2
(2m1 +m2 −λ1 −λ2 )k1
2(λ1 +λ2 −m2 )k1 −1

R3

( λ1 +λ22 −m2 , λ1 +λ22 −m2 )
( λ1 −λ22 +m2 , λ2 −λ21 +m2 )

R4

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 )
(m2 , 0)

λ1 +

(m1 +m2 −λ1 )k1
(λ2 )k1 −1

R5

(λ1 − m2 , λ1 − m2 )
(m2 , λ2 + m2 − λ1 )

λ1 +

(m1 +m2 −λ1 )k1
(λ1 −m2 )k1 −1

Table A.4: Boundary referral policies resulting in case (P1 , P1 )
First, let’s compare G(R1) with G(R4):
×(m1 +m2 −λ1 )k1 (m1 +m2 −λ1 )k1
1
1
1
1
<
−
−−−−−−−−−→
<
→
k
−1
k
−1
λ2
λ2 −m2
(λ2 ) 1
(λ2 −m2 ) 1
(λ2 )k1 −1
k
k
+m2 −λ1 ) 1
1 +m2 −λ1 ) 1
λ1 + (m1(λ
< λ1 + (m
=⇒ G(R4) < G(R1).
k −1
(λ2 −m2 )k1 −1
2) 1

λ2 > λ2 − m2 →
(m1 +m2 −λ1 )k1
(λ2 −m2 )k1 −1

+λ1

<

−−→
Now we compare G(R1) with G(R5):

×(m1 +m2 −λ1 )k1
1
1
1
1
<
−
−−−−−−−−−→
<
→
k
−1
k
−1
λ1 −m2
λ2 −m2
(λ1 −m2 ) 1
(λ2 −m2 ) 1
(m1 +m2 −λ1 )k1
(m1 +m2 −λ1 )k1
λ1 + (λ1 −m2 )k1 −1 < λ1 + (λ2 −m2 )k1 −1 → G(R5) < G(R1).

λ1 > λ2 → λ1 −m2 > λ2 −m2 →
(m1 +m2 −λ1 )k1
(λ1 −m2 )k1 −1

k1

+λ

1
1 +m2 −λ1 )
< (m
−−→
(λ2 −m2 )k1 −1
So far we have shown that Policy R1 results in higher G(Λ) in comparison with policies
∗
R4 and R5. Therefore, C(P
1,P 1) definitely does not include policies R4 and R5.
Now, let’s compare G(R2) with G(R3). Define:

(m1 − λ1 +λ22 −m2 )k1
λ1 − λ2 (m1 + m22 − λ1 )k1
∆G = G(R2) − G(R3) =
+
−
2
(λ2 − m22 )k1 −1
( λ1 +λ22 −m2 )k1 −1
We have:
m1 − λ1 +λ22 −m2 k1 −1
m1 + m22 − λ1 k1 −1
d∆G
)
− ( λ1 +λ2 −m2 )
)
= k1 ((
dm1
λ2 − m22
2
First we show that

d∆G
dm1

< 0. We have:
×(λ1 −λ2 )

m1 + m2 < λ1 + λ2 ⇒ 2m1 + 2m2 < 2λ1 + 2λ2 −−−−−→ 2m1 (λ1 − λ2 ) + 2m2 (λ1 − λ2 ) <
2(λ1 +λ2 )(λ1 −λ2 ) ⇒ 2m1 λ1 −2λ21 +2λ1 m2 < 2m1 λ2 +2λ2 m2 −2λ22 ⇒ (2m1 +m2 −2λ1 )(λ1 +
λ2 −m2 ) < (2m1 +m2 −λ1 −λ2 )(2λ2 −m2 ) ⇒ (m1 + m22 −λ1 )( λ1 +λ22 −m2 ) < (m1 − λ1 +λ22 −m2 )(λ2 −
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m +

m2
)
2

m2

−λ

m −

λ1 +λ2 −m2

m +

k >1

m2

−λ

m −

λ1 +λ2 −m2

1
2
2
⇒ ( 1λ2 −2m2 1 ) < ( 1λ1 +λ2 −m
< 0.
) −−
−→ ( 1λ2 −2m2 1 )k1 −1 < ( 1λ1 +λ2 −m
)k1 −1 ⇒ d∆G
2
2
dm1
2
2
2
2
Therefore, as m1 increases ∆G decreases. So, if we show that ∆G is positive when m1
is equal to its upper limit then we can conclude that ∆G > 0 ⇒ G(R2) > G(R3). We have
2m2 + m1 < λ1 + λ2 ⇒ m1 < λ1 + λ2 − 2m2 . Now, since λ1 + λ2 − m2 > λ1 + λ2 − 2m2 if
we show that ∆Gm1 =λ1 +λ2 −m2 ≥ 0 it implies that ∆Gm1 =λ1 +λ2 −2m2 > 0.

∆Gm1 =λ1 +λ2 −m2

(λ1 + λ2 − λ1 +λ22 −m2 )k1
λ1 − λ2 (λ1 + λ2 + m22 − λ1 )k1
=
+
−
=0
2
(λ2 − m22 )k1 −1
( λ1 +λ22 −m2 )k1 −1

Therefore, ∆Gm1 =λ1 +λ2 −2m2 > 0 ⇒ ∆G > 0 ⇒ G(R2) > G(R3).
So far we have shown that amongst policies presented in Table A.4 only Policies 1 and 2
∗
∗
are eligible to be in C(P
1,P 1) . Through applying the same process we extract C policies for
the next two cases in the followings.
Case 2: (P1 , P2 ).
The following table shows referral policies in C(P1 ,P2 ) resulting in case (P1 , P2 ):
Index

Referral Policy

G(Λ)

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )

R1

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 − m2 )
(m2 , m2 )

R2

(λ1 − m22 , λ2 −
( m22 , m22 )

R6

m2
2 )

(λ1 , λ2 − m2 )
(0, m2 )

λ1 +
λ1 +

m2
2

(m1 +m2 −λ1 )k1
(λ2 −m2 )k1 −1
m

+

(m1 + 22 −λ1 )k1
m
(λ2 − 22 )k1 −1

λ1 + m2 +

(m1 −λ1 )k1
(λ2 −m2 )k1 −1

Table A.5: Boundary referral policies resulting in case (P1 , P2 )
It can be seen that the first two policies (i.e. R1 and R2) are the same as the policies in
Applying the same process we used to compare G(R2) with G(R3) in case (P 1, P 1),
∗
it can be shown that G(R6) > G(R2). Therefore, Policy R2 in C(P
1,P 1) is not anymore a
∗
∗
candidate policy and we can eliminate it from C(P 1,P 1) . So far, we have C(P
1,P 1) = {R1} and
∗
C(P
1,P 2) = {R1, R6} where Policy R1 is the common policy between the two sets.

∗
C(P
1,P 1) .

∗
Case 3: (P2 , P1 ): We now show that any policies in C(P
2,P 1) are dominated by other feasible
policies. The following table shows referral policies in C(P2 ,P1 ) resulting in case (P2 , P1 ):
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Referral Policy

Index

G(Λ)

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )
R3

( λ1 +λ22 −m2 , λ1 +λ22 −m2 )
( λ1 −λ22 +m2 , λ2 −λ21 +m2 )

R5

(λ1 − m2 , λ1 − m2 )
(m2 , λ2 + m2 − λ1 )

R7

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 )
(m2 , 0)

m2 +λ2 +λ1
2

+

λ1 +

(2m1 +m2 −λ1 −λ2 )k1
2(λ1 +λ2 −m2 )k1 −1

(m1 +m2 −λ1 )k1
(λ1 −m2 )k1 −1

λ2 + m2 +

(m1 −λ2 )k1
(λ1 −m2 )k1 −1

Table A.6: Boundary solutions that result in case (P2 , P1 )
In the analysis of cases (P1 , P1 ) and (P1 , P2 ) we showed that G(R6) > G(R2) > G(R3)
and G(R1) > G(R5). Therefore, R3 and R5 in Table A.6 cannot be optimal. Using the same
process used to compare R2 and R3 in case (P 1, P 1) it can be shown that G(R6) > G(R7).
∗
Therefore, C(P
2,P 1) can be ignored.
Conclusion: From the above cases, R1 and R6 (policies 8 and 7 in Table A.1) are the
only potential optimal policies. Comparing the objective values for these two policies leads
directly to the condition EC1. It can be verified that there exist parameters leading to
both policies being optimal. To conclude we have shown that in a centralized referral system
where both providers are LOC if the capacity scenario is (High, Low) and 2m2 +m1 < λ1 +λ2
then depending on the resulted objective value it is best for the referrer to apply one of the
policies presented in the following table:
Index

Referral Policy

G(Λ)

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )

R1

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 − m2 )
(m2 , m2 )

R6

(λ1 , λ2 − m2 )
(0, m2 )

λ1 +

(m1 +m2 −λ1 )k1
(λ2 −m2 )k1 −1

λ1 + m2 +

(m1 −λ1 )k1
(λ2 −m2 )k1 −1

Table A.7: Optimal Policies (Capacity scenario (High, Low), 2m2 + m1 < λ1 + λ2 )

Proof of Theorem 5. We use Lemma 2 to show that when capacity scenario is (Mid, Mid),
policies mentioned in Table 2.5 are optimal.
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Since the capacity scenario is (Mid, Mid) (i.e. λ2 < m2 < m1 < λ1 ) therefore λ11 =
λ1 − m2 > 0 and λ12 = λ1 − m1 > 0. The following shows two possible different situations
for the value of 2m2 + m1 :
1. 2m2 + m1 ≥ λ1 + λ2
2. 2m2 + m1 < λ1 + λ2
From the assumptions we made in Section 2.3 we have λ1 < m1 +m2 (i). In addition, in the
capacity scenario (Mid, Mid) λ2 < m2 (ii). Adding (i) and (ii) results in λ1 + λ2 < 2m2 + m1
which implies that the second situation is not feasible. Therefore, the only feasible situation
is 2m2 + m1 ≥ λ1 + λ2 . For the first referral policy we have:
1. λ11 + λ21 = m1 ⇒ (x11 , x21 ) = (1, 1)
2. λ1 + λ2 ≤ 2m2 + m1 ⇒ λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 ≤ m2 ⇒ λ22 ≤ λ12 which implies that the
second provider best solution is P1 and (x12 , x22 ) = (1, 0).
For the second policy we have:
1. λ12 + λ22 = m2 ⇒ (x12 , x22 ) = (1, 1)
2. Since m1 > m2 ⇒ 2m1 + m2 > 2m2 + m1 ⇒ 2m1 + m2 > 2m2 + m1 > λ1 + λ2 . Now, for
the second policy we have: 2m1 +m2 > λ1 +λ2 ⇒ m1 > λ1 +λ2 −m1 −m2 ⇒ λ11 > λ21
which implies that the best solution for the first provider is P1 and (x11 , x21 ) = (1, 0)
Having target probabilities and referral rates, it is now easy to verify that under both
policies we have G(Λ) = m1 + m2 .
Results for Section 2.3.2 (optimal referral policy)
In this section we present the proofs of Theorems 6 and 7.
Lemma 4. With the exception of capacity scenario (Low,Low), in all other capacity scenarios
we always have 2m1 + m2 ≥ λ1 + λ2
Proof of Lemma 4. Based on our assumptions in Section 2.3 in all capacity scenarios except
(Low,Low) we have λ1 < m1 + m2 (i) and λ2 < m1 (ii). Adding (i) and (ii) together results
in 2m1 + m2 ≥ λ1 + λ2 .
Lemma 5. Given 2m1 + m2 < λ1 + λ2 , no feasible policy satisfies λ11 + λ12 = λ1 + λ2 − m2 .
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Proof of Lemma 5. First, based on Lemma 4 the only capacity scenario where it is possible
to have 2m1 + m2 < λ1 + λ2 is capacity scenario (Low,Low). Since we assumed that each
provider has enough capacity to serve both types of patients allocated to her independently
for provider 1 we have λ11 ≤ m1 and λ21 ≤ m1 and consequently λ11 + λ21 ≤ 2m1 (i). Since
2m1 + m2 < λ1 + λ2 ⇒ 2m1 < λ1 + λ2 − m2 (ii). From (i) and (ii) we have λ11 + λ21 <
λ1 + λ2 − m2 .
Therefore, in capacity scenario (Low, Low) if 2m1 + m2 < λ1 + λ2 then there is no feasible
policy that that satisfies λ11 + λ12 = λ1 + λ2 − m2 .
Proof of Theorem 6-a. Let’s define k1 = (α1 )−1 and k2 = (α2 )−1 where 0 < k1 < 1 and
k2 > 1. Since the first provider is HOC and applies the shared policy we have:
G(Λ) = λ11 x11 + λ12 x12 + λ21 x21 + λ22 x22 = (λ11 + λ21 )(

m1
)k1 + λ21 x21 + λ22 x22
λ11 + λ21

Since the optimal policy for the second provider is either P1 or P2 we need to show that
in both cases the optimal policy for the referrer satisfies λ11 + λ21 = λ1 + λ2 − m2 . Let’s
define G(S, P1 ) and G(S, P2 ) as the referrer objective functions when the best solutions for
the second provider are P1 and P2 respectively. We have:
m2 − λ12 k2
m1
)k1 + λ21 + λ22 (
)
λ11 + λ21
λ22
m1
m2 − λ22 k2
G(S, P2 ) = (λ11 + λ21 )(
)k1 + λ12 (
) + λ22
λ11 + λ21
λ12

G(S, P1 ) = (λ11 + λ21 )(

Let’s assume that the optimal policy satisfies λ11 + λ21 = λ1 + λ2 − x and consequently
λ12 + λ22 = x. Based on our assumptions in Section 2.3, for each provider j we have
mj ≤ λ1j + λ2j which implies m2 ≤ x and m1 ≤ λ1 + λ2 − x ⇒ x ≤ λ1 + λ2 − m1 . Therefore
m2 ≤ x ≤ λ1 + λ2 − m1 . We need to show that for any optimal policy, x is equal to m2
no matter what the second provider solution is. Let’s begin with G(S, P1 ). If x = m2 then
G(S, P1 ) = (λ1 + λ2 − m2 )1−k1 mk11 + m2 . Now we need to show that this is the maximum
achievable value for G(S, P1 ) and as x increases and moves toward its upper limit G(S, P1 )
decreases.
Since k2 > 1 we can rewrite G(S, P1 ) as follow:
G(S, P1 ) = (λ1 + λ2 − x)1−k1 mk11 + λ12 +

(m2 − λ12 )k2
(λ22 )k2 −1

P
Where λi2 ≤ m2 ≤ i λi2 . Let’s split the function into two terms where the first term
k
2 −λ12 ) 2
is (λ1 + λ2 − x)1−k1 mk11 and the second term is λ12 + (m
. It is obvious that as x
k
−1
2
(λ22 )
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increases the first term decreases. Now, let’s focus on the second term. Since λ12 + λ22 = x
if x increases both λ12 and λ22 can increase. It can be seen that if λ22 increases the second
term and consequently G(S, P1 ) decreases. Therefore, in the best policy, λ22 should get the
minimum feasible value. Therefore, if x is increased, it is best to increase λ12 and not λ22 .
Now, let’s assume that we increase x by ϵ. From m2 ≤ x ≤ λ1 + λ2 − m1 we have x = m2 + ϵ.
As λ12 ≤ m2 the maximum value that can be allocated to λ12 is m2 and consequently λ22 = ϵ.
Now from the fact that if λ12 increases G(S, P1 ) decreases we can conclude that if x increases
G(S, P1 ) decreases and consequently the optimal policy is to set x = m2 . Finally, for the
optimal referral policy (i.e. Λ) we have λ11 + λ21 = λ1 + λ2 − m2 , λ12 = m2 and λ22 = 0.
The same process can be done for G(S, P2 ). However the difference is that as λ12 increases
G(S, P2 ) decreases. Therefore, for the optimal policy we have λ11 + λ21 = λ1 + λ2 − m2 ,
λ12 = 0 and λ22 = m2 .
From Lemma 4 and 5 as well as our explanations above we can conclude that in a
centralized system where the first provider is HOC , in all capacity scenarios except when
both the capacity scenario is (Low, Low) and 2m1 + m2 < λ1 + λ2 , all the feasible policies
that satisfy λ11 + λ21 = λ1 + λ2 − m2 are optimal.
Proof of Theorem 6-b. Based on Lemma 5 in capacity scenario (Low, Low) if 2m1 + m2 <
λ1 +λ2 then it is not possible to achieve the highest achievable objective value for the referrer
which is λ11 + λ12 = λ1 + λ2 − m2 . The process of finding optimal policies for this situation
is similar to the one we used to prove Theorem 4. The second provider’s policy can be either
P1 or P2 . Therefore, depending on the second provider’s policy there can be two cases (S, P1 )
and (S, P2 ). First, we simplify referrer objective function in for case by finding the optimal
value of one of the streams to each provider. Having the simplified (Λ), we then prove that
in each case we need to focus on the boundary referral points. Let’s define L as the set
of boundary referral points for capacity scenario (Low, Low) when 2m1 + m2 < λ1 + λ2 .
For each case, we find C ∈ L which defines the boundary referral points that result in that
case. Based on the optimality conditions extracted, for each case, we then find C ∗ which
eliminates dominated coordinated policies for that scheduling policy. Finally, we compare
objective value of policies in C ∗ which results in two potential policies which may be optimal
depending on Equation 2.22.
Let’s begin with G(S, P1 ) and define k1 = (α1 )−1 and k2 = (α2 )−1 where 0 < k1 < 1 and
k2 > 1.
1
12 k2
G(S, P1 ) = (λ11 + λ21 )( λ11m+λ
)k1 + λ12 + λ22 ( m2λ−λ
) = (λ11 + λ21 )1−k1 mk11 + λ1 − λ11 +
21
22

(m2 −λ1 +λ11 )k2
(λ2 −λ21 )k2 −1

It can be seen that as λ21 increases G(S, P1 ) also increases. Since λ21 < m1 < λ2 , in the
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optimal policy λ21 is equal to its upper limit which is m1 and consequently λ∗22 = λ2 − m1 .
Therefore, G(S, P1 ) can be rewritten as follows:
G(S, P1 ) = (λ11 + m1 )1−k1 mk11 + λ1 − λ11 +

(m2 −λ1 +λ11 )k2
(λ2 −m1 )k2 −1

= (λ1 + m1 − λ12 )1−k1 mk11 + λ12 +

(m2 −λ12 )k2
(λ2 −m1 )k2 −1

Since λ11 ≤ m1 ⇒ λ1 − m1 ≤ λ12 . So, for the G(S, P1 ) we have:

 G(S, P ) = (λ + m − λ )1−k1 mk1 + λ +
12
1
1
1
12
1

λ1 − m1 ≤ λ12 ≤ m2

(m2 −λ12 )k2
(λ2 −m1 )k2 −1

Now, it all depends on the value of λ12 . The same process can be done for G(S, P2 ) and
for the optimal policy in case (S, P2 ) we have λ∗12 = λ1 − m1 and:

 G(S, P ) = (λ + m − λ )1−k1 mk1 + λ +
2
2
1
22
22
1

λ1 − m1 ≤ λ22 ≤ m2

(m2 −λ22 )k2
(λ1 −m1 )k2 −1

Now, we prove that in both cases we need to focus on the boundary points. To do so, we
begin with G(S, P1 ) and the same logic can be applied for the second case. We have:
m2 − λ12 k2 −1
m1
dG(S, P1 )
= −k2 (
)
− (1 − k1 )(
)k1 + 1
dλ12
λ2 − m1
λ1 + m1 − λ12
1)
If we show that only three following situation for dG(S,P
are possible then we can conclude
dλ12
that in order to maximize G(S, P1 ) we only need to focus on the boundary points.

1. Strictly positive
2. Strictly negative
3. First negative then positive
1)
to move from positive to negative.
To do so, we prove that it is not possible for dG(S,P
dλ12
dG(S,P1 )
1)
If we set k1 = k2 = 1 then dλ12 = 0. In addition, as k1 decreases dG(S,P
decreases as
dλ12
dG(S,P1 )
well. Therefore, if we keep k2 = 1 and reduce 0 < k1 < 1 then dλ12 < 0. Let’s define
−λ12 k2 −1
−λ12
B = k2 ( mλ22−m
)
where k2 > 1 and 0 < mλ22−m
< 1. We have:
1
1

m2 − λ12 k2 −1
m2 − λ12
dB
=(
)
(k2 ln(
) + 1)
dk2
λ2 − m1
λ2 − m1
It can be verified that the maximum value of B can be achieved if k2 =
that since 0 <

m2 −λ12
λ2 −m1

−λ12
< 1, ln( mλ22−m
) < 0 and
1

−1
ln(
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m2 −λ12
)
λ2 −m1

(A.1)
−1
ln(

m2 −λ12
)
λ2 −m1

. Note

> 0. Two cases can be considered:

1.

−1
ln(

m2 −λ12
)
λ2 −m1

and
2.

dG(S,P1 )
dλ12

−1
ln(

< 1 < k2 : In this case

m2 −λ12
)
λ2 −m1

> 0. Therefore, as k2 increases B increases as well

decreases.

> 1.

(a) If 1 < k2 <
dG(S,P1 )
dλ12

−1
ln(

m2 −λ12
)
λ2 −m1

then

dB
dk2

< 0. Therefore, as k2 increases B decreases and

increases

−1
then
m −λ
ln( λ 2−m12 )
2
1
dG(S,P1 )
decreases
dλ12

(b) If k2 >
and

dB
dk2

then

dB
dk2

> 0. Therefore, as k2 increases B increases as well

1)
Previously we show that if k2 = 1 and 0 < k1 < 1 then dG(S,P
< 0. Therefore, for case 2-a we
dλ12
dG(S,P1 )
−1
have m2 −λ12 < 1 < k2 and therefore dλ12 may remain negative or move from negative

ln(

λ2 −m1

)

1)
to positive. For case 1 and 2-b since as k2 increases dG(S,P
decreases we can conclude that
dλ12
dG(S,P1 )
−1
when 1 < k2 < m2 −λ12 and 0 < k1 < 1 then dλ12 remains negative. Therefore, we show

ln(

λ2 −m1

)

1)
value to move from positive to negative and therefore in
that it is not possible for dG(S,P
dλ12
order to maximize G(Λ) we always need to focus on the boundary points. The following
table shows boundary referral points (i.e. C) resulting in each case:

Case

Index

Boundary Referral Points
(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )

(S, P1 )

1

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 − m2 )
(m2 , m2 )

2

(λ1 − m2 , m1 )
(m2 , λ2 − m1 )

3

(m1 , m1 )
(λ1 − m1 , λ2 − m1 )

4

(m1 , m1 + λ2 − λ1 )
(λ1 − m1 , λ1 − m1 )

4

(m1 , m1 + λ2 − λ1 )
(λ1 − m1 , λ1 − m1 )

5

(m1 , λ2 − m2 )
(λ1 − m1 , m2 )

6

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 − m2 )
(m2 , m2 )

(S, P2 )

Table A.8: Boundary referral points resulting in each case (First provider is HOC)
Since we proved that in case (S, P1 ) we have λ∗22 = λ2 − m1 and in case (S, P2 ) λ∗12 =
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λ1 − m1 therefore policies 1 and 4 in case (S, P1 ) and policy 6 in case (S, P2 ) can be ignored.
The following table shows candidate referral policies (i.e. C ∗ ) resulting in each case.

Case

Index

Referral Policy

G(Λ)

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )
S, P1

S, P2

R1

(λ1 − m2 , m1 )
(m2 , λ2 − m1 )

(λ1 + m1 − m2 )1−k1 mk11 + m2

R2

(m1 , m1 )
(λ1 − m1 , λ2 − m1 )

(2m1 )1−k1 mk11 +
k2
1 +m2 −λ1 )
λ1 − m1 + (m
(λ2 −m1 )k2 −1

R3

(m1 , m1 + λ2 − λ1 )
(λ1 − m1 , λ1 − m1 )

(2m1 + λ2 − λ1 )1−k1 mk11 +
k2
1 +m2 −λ1 )
λ1 − m1 + (m
(λ1 −m1 )k2 −1

R4

(m1 , λ2 − m2 )
(λ1 − m1 , m2 )

(λ2 + m1 − m2 )1−k1 mk11 + m2

Table A.9: Candidate policies (First provider is HOC, capacity scenario (Low, Low), 2m1 + m2 < λ1 + λ2 )
Now we show that G(R1) > G(R4) and G(R2) > G(R3) and therefore in a centralized
system where the first provider is HOC if the capacity scenario is (Low, Low) and 2m1 +m2 <
λ1 + λ2 then the optimal policy for the referrer always result in case (S, P1 ). First, let’s begin
with the comparison of G(R1) and G(R4):
+(m1 −m2 )
0<k <1
λ1 > λ2 −−−−−−→ λ1 + m1 − m2 > λ2 + m1 − m2 −−−1−→ (λ1 + m1 − m2 )1−k1 >
×m

k1

+m

2
(λ2 + m1 − m2 )1−k1 −−−1→ (λ1 + m1 − m2 )1−k1 mk11 > (λ2 + m1 − m2 )1−k1 mk11 −−→
(λ1 + m1 −
1−k1 k1
1−k1 k1
m2 )
m1 + m2 > (λ2 + m1 − m2 )
m1 + m2 ⇒ G(R1) > G(R4)
For G(R2) and G(R3) we have:

+2m

×m

0<k <1

k1

1
λ2 − λ1 < 0 −−−→
λ2 − λ1 + 2m1 < 2m1 −−−1−→ (λ2 − λ1 + 2m1 )1−k1 < (2m1 )1−k1 −−−1→

+λ −m

k1

×m

1
1
(λ2 − λ1 + 2m1 )1−k1 mk11 < (2m1 )1−k1 mk11 −−−
−−→
−−−1→ (λ2 − λ1 + 2m1 )1−k1 mk11 + λ1 − m1 <
(2m1 )1−k1 mk11 + λ1 − m1 (i)
In addition:
−m1
k2 >1
λ1 > λ2 −−→
λ1 − m1 > λ2 − m1 −−
−→ (λ1 − m1 )k2 −1 > (λ2 − m1 )k2 −1 ⇒ (λ1 −m11 )k2 −1 <

1
(λ2 −m1 )k2 −1
×(m1 +m2 −λ1 )k2

k2

k2

1 +m2 −λ1 )
1 +m2 −λ1 )
−−−−−−−−−−→ (m
< (m
(ii)
(λ1 −m1 )k2 −1
(λ2 −m1 )k2 −1
If we add (i) and (ii) we have:
k
k
1 +m2 −λ1 ) 2
1 +m2 −λ1 ) 2
(λ2 −λ1 +2m1 )1−k1 mk11 +λ1 −m1 + (m
< (2m1 )1−k1 mk11 +λ1 −m1 + (m
⇒
(λ1 −m1 )k2 −1
(λ2 −m1 )k2 −1
G(R3) < G(R2)
Therefore, depending on the resulted value for G(Λ), the optimum policies for the capacity
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scenario (Low, Low) when the first provider is HOC and 2m1 + m2 < λ1 + λ2 can be either
of the policies in the following table:
Index

Optimal Policy

TP

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )

xi1
(x12 , x22 )

Optimality Condition (Eq. 2.22)

−1

1

(λ1 − m2 , m1 )
(m2 , λ2 − m1 )

m1
( λ1 +m
)(α1 )
1 −m2
(1, 0)

2

(m1 , m1 )
(λ1 − m1 , λ2 − m1 )

( 12 )(α1 )

True

−1
−1

1 −λ1 (α2 )
)
)
(1, ( m2λ+m
2 −m1

False

Table A.10: Optimal policies (First provider is HOC - Capacity scenario is (Low, Low) and 2m1 + m2 <
λ1 + λ2 )

Lemma 6. In a centralized system where the second provider is HOC, if 2m2 + m1 < λ1 + λ2
then it is not possible to have a policy that satisfies λ12 + λ22 = λ1 + λ2 − m1 .
Proof of Lemma 6. Based on our assumptions in Section 2.3 we have λ12 ≤ m2 and λ22 ≤ m2
and consequently λ12 + λ22 ≤ 2m2 . Since 2m2 + m1 < λ1 + λ2 ⇒ 2m2 < λ1 + λ2 − m1 ⇒
λ12 + λ22 < λ1 + λ2 − m1 .
Proof of Theorem 7-a. The same process applied in Theorem 6-a can be applied here. Let’s
define k1 = (α1 )−1 and k2 = (α2 )−1 where k1 > 1 and 0 < k2 < 1. Since the second provider
is HOC we have:
G(Λ) = λ11 x11 + λ12 x12 + λ21 x21 + λ22 x22 = λ11 x11 + λ21 x21 + (λ12 + λ22 )(

m2
)k2
λ12 + λ22

Since the optimal policy for the first provider is either P1 or P2 we need to show that in
both cases the optimal policy for the referrer satisfies λ11 + λ21 = m1 . Let’s define G(P1 , S)
and G(P2 , S) as the referrer functions where the best solutions for the first provider are P1
and P2 respectively. We have:
m1 − λ11 k1
m2
) + (λ12 + λ22 )(
)k2
λ21
λ12 + λ22
m1 − λ21 k1
m2
G(P2 , S) = λ11 (
) + λ21 + (λ12 + λ22 )(
)k2
λ11
λ12 + λ22

G(P1 , S) = λ11 + λ21 (

Let’s assume that the optimal policy satisfies λ11 + λ21 = x and consequently λ12 + λ22 =
λ1 + λ2 − x. Based on our assumptions in Section 2.3, for any provider like j we have
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mj ≤ λ1j + λ2j which implies that m1 ≤ x and m2 ≤ λ1 + λ2 − x ⇒ x ≤ λ1 + λ2 − m2 .
Therefore m1 ≤ x ≤ λ1 + λ2 − m2 . We need to show that for any optimal policy, x is equal
to m1 no matter what the first provider solution is. Let’s begin with G(P1 , S).
If x = m1 then G(P1 , S) = m1 + (λ1 + λ2 − m1 )( λ1 +λm22−m1 )k2 . Now we need to show that
this is the maximum achievable value for G(P1 , S) and as x increases and moves toward its
upper limit G(P1 , S) decreases.
Since k1 > 1 and 0 < k2 < 1 we can rewrite G(P1 , S) as follow:
(m1 − λ11 )k1
G(P1 , S) = λ11 +
+ (λ1 + λ2 − x)1−k2 mk22
k
−1
1
(λ21 )
P
Where λi1 ≤ m1 ≤ i λi1 . Let’s split the function into two terms where the first term is
k
1 −λ11 ) 1
. It can easily be verified that as
(λ1 + λ2 − x)1−k2 mk22 and the second term is λ11 + (m
(λ21 )k1 −1
x increases the first term decreases. Now, let’s focus on the second term. Since λ11 + λ21 = x
if x increases both λ11 and λ21 can increase. It can be seen that if λ21 increases the second
term and consequently G(P1 , S) decreases. Therefore, in the best policy, λ21 should get the
minimum feasible value. Therefore, if x is increased, it is best to increase λ11 and not λ22 .
Now, let’s assume that we increase x by ϵ. From m1 ≤ x ≤ λ1 + λ2 − m2 we have x = m1 + ϵ.
As λ11 ≤ m1 the maximum value that can be allocated to λ11 is m1 and consequently λ21 = ϵ.
Now from the fact that if λ11 increases G(P1 , S) decreases we can conclude that if x increases
G(P1 , S) decreases and consequently the optimal policy is to set x = m1 . Finally, for the
optimal policy we have λ12 + λ22 = λ1 + λ2 − m1 , λ11 = m1 and λ21 = 0.
The same process can be done for G(P2 , S). However the difference is that as λ11 increases
G(P2 , S) decreases. Therefore, for the optimal policy (λ11 , λ21 , λ12 , λ22 ) we have λ12 + λ22 =
λ1 + λ2 − m1 , λ11 = 0 and λ21 = m1 .
From what is discussed above as well as Lemma 5 we can conclude that in a centralized
system where the second provider is HOC and in all the capacity scenarios if 2m2 + m1 >
λ1 + λ2 then all the feasible policies that satisfy λ11 + λ21 = m1 are optimal.
Proof of Theorem 7-b. Based on Lemma 6 if 2m2 + m1 < λ1 + λ2 then it is not possible to
achieve the highest objective value for the referrer which is discussed in the proof of Theorem
7-a. Note that for the capacity scenario (Mid, Mid) we have m2 > λ2 and m1 + m2 > λ1 . If
we add these two inequalities together it results in 2m2 + m1 > λ1 + λ2 . This implies that in
the capacity scenario (Mid, Mid) the referrer is always able to achieve the highest objective
value.
For this part of the theorem we use the same process applied in Theorem 6-b. For each
capacity scenario we will take the following steps:

119

1. First we simplify the referrer objective function for each case through finding optimal
values for specific streams to providers.
2. Then, we show that to find the optimal referral solutions for each case (P1 , S) and
(P2 , S) we need to focus on the boundary referral points.
3. Boundary referral points resulting in each case (i.e. C) are extracted.
4. For each case, policies in C are compared with each other to find the ones that result
in higher G(Λ) (i.e. C ∗ ).
5. Finally, policies in C ∗ in both cases are compared to each other to find the optimal
referral policies for referrer.
Let’s define k1 = (α1 )−1 and k2 = (α2 )−1 where k1 > 1 and 0 < k2 < 1 . The followings
show the referrer objective function for each case:
11 k1
2
G(P1 , S) = λ11 + λ21 ( m1λ−λ
) + (λ12 + λ22 )( λ12m+λ
)k2 = λ11 +
21
22

(m1 −λ11 )k1
(λ21 )k1 −1

+ (λ1 + λ2 − λ11 − λ21 )1−k2 mk22

21 k1
2
G(P2 , S) = λ11 ( m1λ−λ
) + λ21 + (λ12 + λ22 )( λ12m+λ
)k2 = λ21 +
11
22

(m1 −λ21 )k1
(λ11 )k1 −1

+ (λ1 + λ2 − λ11 − λ21 )1−k2 mk22

For the case (P1 , S) it can be seen that as λ21 increases G(P1 , S) decreases. Therefore,
in the optimal solution λ∗21 should be equal to its lower limit which is λ2 − m2 (λ22 ≤ m2 ⇒
λ2 − m2 ≤ λ21 ). The same logic is true for λ11 in case (P2 , S). Therefore, λ∗11 = λ1 − m2 in
the optimal solution for the case (P2 , S). Therefore, we have:

 G(P , S) = (λ + m − λ )1−k2 mk2 + λ + (m1 −λ11 )k1
1
1
2
11
11
2
(λ2 −m2 )k1 −1

λ1 − m2 ≤ λ11 ≤ m1

 G(P , S) = λ + (m1 −λ21 )k1 + (λ + m − λ )1−k2 mk2
2
21
2
2
21
2
(λ1 −m2 )k1 −1

λ1 − m2 ≤ λ21 ≤ m1
Now we show that to find optimal solutions in both cases we need to focus on the
boundary referral points. We begin with G(P1 , S) and the same logic can be applied for the
other case.
dG(P1 , S)
m1 − λ11 k1 −1
m2
= −k1 (
)
− (1 − k2 )(
)k2 + 1
dλ11
λ2 − m2
λ1 + m2 − λ11
1 ,S)
If we show that the only three situations for dG(P
value are as follows then we can
dλ11
conclude that in order to maximize G(P1 , S) we only need to focus on the boundary points.

120

1. Strictly positive
2. Strictly negative
3. First negative then positive
1 ,S)
value to move from positive to negative.
To do so, we prove that it is not possible for dG(P
dλ11
dG(P1 ,S)
1 ,S)
If we set k1 = k2 = 1 then dλ11 = 0. In addition, as k2 decrease dG(P
also decreases.
dλ11
1 ,S)
< 0.
Therefore, if we keep k1 = 1 and reduce the value of k2 (i.e. 0 < k2 < 1) then dG(P
dλ11
−λ11 k1 −1
−λ11
Let’s define B = k1 ( mλ21−m
)
where k1 > 1 and 0 < mλ21−m
< 1.
2
2
We have:

dB
m1 − λ11 k1 −1
m1 − λ11
=(
)
(k1 ln(
) + 1)
dk1
λ2 − m2
λ2 − m2
It an be verified that the maximum value of B can be achieved if k1 =
cases can be considered:
1.

−1
ln(

m1 −λ11
)
λ2 −m2

and
2.

dG(P1 ,S)
dλ11

−1
ln(

< 1 < k1 : In this case

m1 −λ11
)
λ2 −m2

−1
ln(

m1 −λ11
)
λ2 −m2

. Two

> 0. Therefore, as k1 increases B increases as well

decreases.

> 1.

(a) If 1 < k1 <
dG(P1 ,S)
dλ11

−1
ln(

m1 −λ11
)
λ2 −m2

then

dB
dk1

< 0. Therefore, as k1 increases B decreases and

increases

−1
then
m −λ
ln( λ 1−m11 )
2
2
dG(P1 ,S)
decreases
dλ11

(b) If k1 >
and

dB
dk1

(A.2)

then

dB
dk1

> 0. Therefore, as k1 increases B increases as well

1 ,S)
Previously we show that if k1 = 1 and 0 < k2 < 1 then dG(P
< 0. Therefore, for case 2-a
dλ11
dG(P1 ,S)
−1
where 1 < k1 < m1 −λ11 , dλ11 may remain negative or move from negative to positive.

ln(

λ2 −m2

)

1 ,S)
For cases 1 and 2-b since as k1 increases dG(P
decreases we can conclude that when 1 < k1
dλ11
dG(P1 ,S)
and 0 < k2 < 1, dλ11 remains negative. Therefore, we show that it is not possible for
dG(P1 ,S)
value to move from positive to negative and therefore we always need to focus on
dλ11
the boundary points. Now we focus on extracting boundary referral points that result in
each case (i.e. C).
We begin begin with the capacity scenario (Low, Low). The following table shows
boundary referral points resulting in each case when the capacity scenario is (Low, Low)
and 2m2 + m1 < λ1 + λ2 :
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Case

Index

Referral Policy
(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )

(P1 , S)

(P2 , S)

R1

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 − m2 )
(m2 , m2 )

R2

( λ1 +λ22 −m2 , λ1 +λ22 −m2 )
( λ1 +m22 −λ2 , λ2 +m22 −λ1 )

R3

(λ1 − m2 , λ1 − m2 )
(m2 , λ2 + m2 − λ1 )

R4

(m1 , λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 )
(λ1 − m1 , m1 + m2 − λ1 )

R5

(m1 , λ2 − m2 )
(λ1 − m1 , m2 )

R6

(m1 , m1 )
(λ1 − m1 , λ2 − m1 )

R2

( λ1 +λ22 −m2 , λ1 +λ22 −m2 )
( λ1 +m22 −λ2 , λ2 +m22 −λ1 )

R3

(λ1 − m2 , λ1 − m2 )
(m2 , λ2 + m2 − λ1 )

R7

(λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 , m1 )
(m1 + m2 − λ2 , λ2 − m1 )

R8

(λ1 − m2 , m1 )
(m2 , λ2 − m1 )

R6

(m1 , m1 )
(λ1 − m1 , λ2 − m1 )

Table A.11: Boundary referral points (Second provider is HOC, capacity scenario (Low, Low), 2m2 +m1 <
λ1 + λ2 )

Based on optimality conditions we extracted in the first step, policies R2, R3, R4 and
R6 in case (P1 , S) and policies R2, R7 and R6 in case (P2 , S) cannot be ignored. Therefore,
policies R1 and R5 in case (P1 , S) and policies R3 and R8 in case (P2 , S) are the candidate
solutions for the referrer (i.e. these policies are in C ∗ ). Now, we show that G(R1)(P1 ,S) >
G(R3)(P2 ,S) and G(R5)(P1 ,S) > G(R8)(P2 ,S) and therefore in a centralized system where the
second provider is HOC if the capacity scenario is (Low, Low) and 2m2 + m1 < λ1 + λ2 then
the optimal policy for the referrer always results in case (P1 , S). Let’s compare G(R1)(P1 ,S)
with G(R3)(P2 ,S) :
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(m1 + m2 − λ1 )k1
+ (2m2 )1−k2 mk22
(λ2 − m2 )k1 −1
(m1 + m2 − λ1 )k1
= λ1 − m2 +
+ (λ2 + 2m2 − λ1 )1−k2 mk22
(λ1 − m2 )k1 −1

G(R1)(P1 ,S) = λ1 − m2 +
G(R3)(P2 ,S)

k1

k1

1 +m2 −λ1 )
1 +m2 −λ1 )
Since λ1 > λ2 we have (m
< (m
(i) and (λ2 + 2m2 − λ1 )1−k2 mk22 <
(λ1 −m2 )k1 −1
(λ2 −m2 )k1 −1
(2m2 )1−k2 (ii). From (i) and (ii) we can conclude G(R1)(P1 ,S) > G(R3)(P2 ,S) . For G(R5)(P1 ,S)
and G(R8)(P2 ,S) we have:

G(R5)(P1 ,S) = m1 + (λ1 + m2 − m1 )1−k2 mk22
G(R8)(P2 ,S) = m1 + (λ2 + m2 − m1 )1−k2 mk22
Again, since λ1 > λ2 ⇒ (λ1 +m2 −m1 )1−k2 mk22 > (λ2 +m2 −m1 )1−k2 mk22 ⇒ G(R5)(P1 ,S) >
G(R8)(P2 ,S) .
Doing the same process for the capacity scenario (Mid, Low) we have:
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Case

Referral Policy

Index

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )

R1

(λ2 , λ2 )
(λ1 − λ2 , 0)

R2

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 − m2 )
(m2 , m2 )

R3

( λ1 +λ22 −m2 , λ1 +λ22 −m2 )
( λ1 +m22 −λ2 , λ2 +m22 −λ1 )

R4

(λ1 − m2 , λ1 − m2 )
(m2 , λ2 + m2 − λ1 )

R5

(m1 , λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 )
(λ1 − m1 , m1 + m2 − λ1 )

R6

(m1 , λ2 − m2 )
(λ1 − m2 , m2 )

R7

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 )
(m2 , 0)

R8

(λ2 , λ2 )
(λ1 − λ2 , 0)

R3

( λ1 +λ22 −m2 , λ1 +λ22 −m2 )
( λ1 +m22 −λ2 , λ2 +m22 −λ1 )

R4

(λ1 − m2 , λ1 − m2 )
(m2 , λ2 + m2 − λ1 )

R7

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 )
(m2 , 0)

(P1 , S )

(P2 , S )

Table A.12: Boundary referral points (Second provider is HOC, capacity scenario: (Mid, Low), 2m2 +m1 <
λ1 + λ2 )

Based on the logic we used before, the only policies that are potential to be optimal (i.e.
policies in C ∗ ) are policies R2 and R6 in the case (P1 , S) and policies R4 and R7 in the case
(P2 , S). Now we show that G(R2)(P1 ,S) > G(R4)(P2 ,S) and G(R6)(P1 ,S) > G(R7)(P2 ,S) and
therefore like the capacity scenario (Low, Low), the optimal policy for the referrer always
results in the case (P1 , S). We have:
(m1 + m2 − λ1 )k1
+ (2m2 )1−k2 mk22
k
−1
1
(λ2 − m2 )
(m1 + m2 − λ1 )k1
+ (λ2 + 2m2 − λ1 )1−k2 mk22
= λ1 − m2 +
(λ1 − m2 )k1 −1

G(R2)(P1 ,S) = λ1 − m2 +
G(R4)(P2 ,S)

Since λ1 > λ2 we have

(m1 +m2 −λ1 )k1
(λ1 −m2 )k1 −1

<

(m1 +m2 −λ1 )k1
(λ2 −m2 )k1 −1
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(i) and (λ2 + 2m2 − λ1 )1−k2 mk22 <

(2m2 )1−k2 (ii). From (i) and (ii) it can be concluded that G(R2)(P1 ,S) > G(R4)(P2 ,S) . For
G(R6)(P1 ,S) and G(R7)(P2 ,S) we have:
G(R6)(P1 ,S) = m1 + (λ1 + m2 − m1 )1−k2 mk22
G(R7)(P2 ,S) = λ2 +

(m1 − λ2 )k1
+ (m2 )1−k2 m2
(λ1 − m2 )k1 −1

Now we show that G(R6)(P1 ,S) > G(R7)(P2 ,S) :
+m2
0<k <1
λ1 > m1 ⇒ λ1 − m1 > 0 −−→
λ1 + m2 − m1 > m2 −−−2−→ (λ1 + m2 − m1 )1−k2 >
×m

k2

(m2 )1−k2 −−−2→ mk22 (λ1 + m2 − m1 )1−k2 > mk22 (m2 )1−k2 (i)
k1 >1
−λ2
−λ2 k1 −1
λ1 + λ2 > m1 + m2 ⇒ λ1 − m2 > m1 − λ2 ⇒ 1 > ( λm11−m
) −−
−→ 1 > ( λm11−m
)
⇒
2
2
k
k
1
1
(m1 −λ2 )
1 −λ2 )
(m1 − λ2 ) > (λ(m
k −1 ⇒ m1 > λ2 + (λ −m )k1 −1 (ii)
1 −m2 ) 1
1
2
k1

1 −λ2 )
If we add (i) and (ii) together it results in m1 +(λ1 +m2 −m1 )1−k2 mk22 > λ2 + (λ(m
k −1 +
1 −m2 ) 1
1−k2
(m2 )
m2 ⇒ G(R6)(P1 ,S) > G(R7)(P2 ,S) .
Finally for the capacity scenario (High, Low) we have:
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Case

Referral Policy

Index

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )

(P1 , S )

(P2 , S)

R1

(λ2 , λ2 )
(λ1 − λ2 , 0)

R2

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 − m2 )
(m2 , m2 )

R3

( λ1 +λ22 −m2 , λ1 +λ22 −m2 )
( λ1 +m22 −λ2 , λ2 +m22 −λ1 )

R4

(λ1 − m2 , λ1 − m2 )
(m2 , λ2 + m2 − λ1 )

R5

(λ1 , λ2 − m2 )
(0, m2 )

R7

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 )
(m2 , 0)

R1

(λ2 , λ2 )
(λ1 − λ2 , 0)

R3

( λ1 +λ22 −m2 , λ1 +λ22 −m2 )
( λ1 +m22 −λ2 , λ2 +m22 −λ1 )

R4

(λ1 − m2 , λ1 − m2 )
(m2 , λ2 + m2 − λ1 )

R7

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 )
(m2 , 0)

Table A.13: Boundary points (Second provider is HOC, Capacity scenario(High, Low), 2m2 +m1 < λ1 +λ2 )
The only policies that remain potential to be optimal for the referrer are policies 2 and
5 in case (P1 , S) and policies 4 and 7 in case (P2 , S). In the previous capacity scenarios we
proved that G(R2)(P1 ,S) > G(R4)(P2 ,S) . Now we show that G(R5)(P1 ,S) > G(R7)(P2 ,S) and
like the previous capacity scenario, the optimal policy for the referrer always results in case
(P1 , S).

(m1 − λ1 )k1
+ m2
(λ2 − m2 )k1 −1
(m1 − λ2 )k1
= λ2 +
+ m2
(λ1 − m2 )k1 −1

G(R5)(P1 ,S) = λ1 +
G(R7)(P2 ,S)
Let’s define:

∆G = G(R5)(P1 ,S) − G(R7)(P2 ,S) = λ1 − λ2 +
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(m1 − λ1 )k1
(m1 − λ2 )k1
−
(λ2 − m2 )k1 −1 (λ1 − m2 )k1 −1

Where m2 < λ2 < λ1 < m1 < m1 + m2 < λ1 + λ2 and 2m2 + m1 < λ1 + λ2 . Therefore,
m1 ∈ [λ1 , λ1 + λ2 − 2m2 ]
k
1 −λ2 ) 1
If we set m1 = λ1 then ∆G = λ1 − λ2 − (λ(λ
k
−1 . First we prove that if we set m1
1 −m2 ) 1
equal to its lower limit then ∆G > 0.
+λ1
−λ2 k1 −1
−λ2 k1 >1
−−−→ 1 > ( λλ11−m
)
⇒
m2 < λ2 ⇒ −m2 > −λ2 −−→
λ1 − m2 > λ1 − λ2 ⇒ 1 > λλ11−m
2
2
(λ1 −λ2 )k1
(λ1 −λ2 )k1
λ1 − λ2 > (λ1 −m2 )k1 −1 ⇒ λ1 − λ2 − (λ1 −m2 )k1 −1 > 0 ⇒ ∆Gm1 =λ1 > 0
Now, let’s take the derivative of ∆G with respect to m1 :
m1 − λ1 k1 −2
m1 − λ2 k1 −2
d∆G
− (k1 − 1)(
= (k1 − 1)(
)
)
dm1
λ2 − m2
λ1 − m2
Let’s consider two scenarios where in the first scenario 1 < k1 < 2 and in the second
scenario k1 > 2. For the first scenario since 1 < k2 < 2 we can rewrite d∆G
as follows:
dm1
λ2 − m2 2−k1
λ1 − m2 2−k1
d∆G
= (k1 − 1)(
)
− (k1 − 1)(
)
dm1
m1 − λ1
m1 − λ2
Now we have:
×(m1 −m2 )
λ1 + λ2 > m1 + m2 −−−−−−→ (λ1 + λ2 )(m1 − m2 ) > m21 − m22 ⇒ λ2 m1 − λ2 m2 +
+λ1 λ2
λ1 m1 − λ1 m2 > m21 − m22 −−−
→ λ2 m1 − λ2 m2 + λ1 m1 − λ1 m2 + λ1 λ2 > m21 − m22 + λ1 λ2 ⇒
1<k <2
λ2 −m2
1 −λ2
2 2−k1
λ2 λ1 −λ1 m2 −λ2 m2 +m22 > m21 −m1 λ2 −λ1 m1 +λ1 λ2 ⇒ m
>m
)
>
−−−1−→ ( λm21−m
λ1 −m2
−λ1
1 −λ1
×(k1 −1)

−λ2 2−k1
−λ2 2−k1
2 2−k1
( λm11−m
)
−−−−−→ (k1 − 1)( λm21−m
)
)
> 0.
> (k1 − 1)( λm11−m
⇒ d∆G
−λ1
dm1
2
2
Therefore, if 1 < k2 < 2 as m1 increases ∆G also increases. Since we also showed
that ∆Gm1 =lower−limit > 0 therefore as a conclusion we can say that if 1 < k2 < 2 then
∆G > 0. Now we prove that even if k2 > 1 then ∆G > 0 and therefore we can conclude that
G(R5)(P1 ,S) is always greater than G(R7)(P2 ,S) .
For k1 > 2 we have:

m1 − λ1 k1 −2
m1 − λ2 k1 −2
d∆G
= (k1 − 1)(
)
− (k1 − 1)(
)
dm1
λ2 − m2
λ1 − m2
×(m1 −m2 )

+λ λ

1 2
m1 + m2 < λ1 + λ2 −−−−−−→ m21 − m22 < (λ1 + λ2 )(m1 − m2 ) −−−
→ m21 − m22 + λ1 λ2 <
m1 −λ2 k1 >2
m1 −λ1 k1 −2
m1 −λ2 k1 −2 ×(k1 −1)
−λ1
<
−
−
−
→
(
)
<
(
)
−−−−−→
(λ1 + λ2 )(m1 − m2 ) + λ1 λ2 ⇒ λm21−m
λ
−m
λ
−m
λ1 −m2
2
1
2
2
2
m1 −λ1 k1 −2
m1 −λ2 k1 −2
(k1 − 1)( λ2 −m2 )
< (k1 − 1)( λ1 −m2 )
⇒ d∆G
< 0. Therefore, if k1 > 2 then as m1
dm1
increases ∆G decreases. Now if we show that ∆G > 0 when m1 is equal to its upper limit
then we can conclude that ∆G is greater than zero for all m1 ∈ [λ1 , λ1 + λ2 − 2m2 ]. Since
the capacity scenario is (High, Low) we have m2 < λ2 < λ1 < m1 < m1 + m2 < λ1 + λ2 .
We know that λ1 + λ2 > λ1 + λ2 − 2m2 . Since d∆G
< 0 if we prove that ∆Gm1 =λ1 +λ2 > 0
dm1
then we can conclude that ∆Gm1 =λ1 +λ2 −2m2 > 0. Let’s assume that the higher limit for m1
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is λ1 + λ2 and prove that ∆Gm1 =λ1 +λ2 > 0.
k

∆Gm1 =λ1 +λ2 = λ1 − λ2 +

λ2 1
(λ2 −m2 )k1 −1

k

−

λ1 1
(λ1 −m2 )k1 −1

λ1
λ2
= λ1 (1 − ( λ1 −m
)k1 −1 ) − λ2 (1 − ( λ2 −m
)k1 −1 )
2
2

λ1
λ2
Let’s define A = λ1 (1 − ( λ1 −m
)k1 −1 ) and B = λ2 (1 − ( λ2 −m
)k1 −1 ). Therefore,
2
2
∆Gm1 =λ1 +λ2 = A − B. We have:
×m2
+λ1 λ2
λ2 < λ1 −−→
λ2 m2 < λ1 m2 ⇒ −λ1 m2 < −λ2 m2 −−−
→ λ1 λ2 − λ1 m2 < λ1 λ2 − λ2 m2 ⇒
k1 −1
+1
λ2
λ1
λ2
λ2
λ1
λ1
k1 −1
k1 −1
< λ2 −m2 −−−→ ( λ1 −m2 )
< ( λ2 −m2 )
⇒ −( λ2 −m
)k1 −1 < −( λ1 −m
)k1 −1 −→
λ1 −m2
2
2
λ2
λ1
1 − ( λ2 −m
)k1 −1 < 1 − ( λ1 −m
)k1 −1 (i)
2
2
In addition, we have λ2 < λ1 (ii).
λ1
λ2
)k1 −1 ) < λ1 (1 − ( λ1 −m
)k1 −1 ) ⇒
Multiplying (i) and (ii) results in λ2 (1 − ( λ2 −m
2
2
∆Gm1 =λ1 +λ2 > 0. Therefore, we have proved that ∆G > 0 and consequently G(R5)(P1 ,S) >
G(R7)(P2 ,S) .
We proved that the optimal policy and target probabilities for different capacity scenarios
when the second provider is HOC and 2m2 + m1 < λ1 + λ2 are as follows:

Capacity
Scenario

(Low, Low)
(Mid, Low)

(High, Low)

Optimal Policy

TP

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )

(x11 , x21 )
xi2

1

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 − m2 )
(m2 , m2 )

2 −λ1 (α1 )
)
)
(1, ( m1λ+m
2 −m2
1 (α2 )−1
(2)

Eq. 2.24 True

2

(m1 , λ2 − m2 )
(λ1 − m1 , m2 )

(1, 0)
−1
m2
( λ1 +m
)(α2 )
2 −m1

Eq. 2.24 False

1

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 − m2 )
(m2 , m2 )

2 −λ1 (α1 )
)
(1, ( m1λ+m
)
2 −m2
1 (α2 )−1
(2)

3

(λ1 , λ2 − m2 )
(0, m2 )

1 −λ1 (α1 )
(1, ( m
)
λ2 −m2 )
1

Index

Optimality Condition

−1

−1

Eq. 2.25 True

−1

Eq. 2.25 False

Table A.14: Optimal policies (Second provider is HOC and 2m2 + m1 < λ1 + λ2 )

A.2.1

Fair-Allocation Model Analysis

In this section we extract optimal referral policies for a Fair-allocation referral network. A
summary the optimal policies can be found at the end of the section.
Lemma 7. Consider a referral system where both providers are LOC and fairness is an
important factor in the system. The referrer objective function in this system is convex.
128

Proof of Lemma 7. The following shows G(Λ) where k1 = (α1 )−1 and k2 = (α2 )−1 and
k1 , k2 > 1.

m2
m1
)k1 + (λ12 + λ22 )(
)k2 =
λ11 + λ21
λ12 + λ22
k1
m1
mk22
=
+
(λ11 + λ21 )k1 −1 (λ1 + λ2 − λ11 − λ21 )k2 −1

G(Λ) = (λ11 + λ21 )(
mk11
mk22
+
(λ11 + λ21 )k1 −1 (λ12 + λ22 )k2 −1
And:

d2 F
d2 F
d2 F
mk11
mk22
=
=
=
k
(k
−
1)
+
k
(k
−
1)
1
1
2
2
dλ211
dλ221
dλ11 λ21
(λ11 + λ21 )k1 +1
(λ12 + λ22 )k2 +1
2

2

2

d F
d F
d F
Since dλ
and all of them are positive we can conclude that the Hessian
2 = dλ2 = dλ λ
11 21
11
21
matrix is positive and therefore G(Λ) is convex.

Lemma 7 implies that in order to find the maximum value for the G(Λ) we should focus
on boundary points.
Optimal Referral Policies Capacity Scenario (Low, Low)
The following table shows boundary points when the capacity scenario is (Low, Low) and
λ1 + λ2 > 2m1 + m2 :
Index

Policy

G(Λ)

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )
k

m1 1
+
(m1 +λ2 −m2 )k1 −1
k
m2 2
(λ1 +m2 −m1 )k2 −1

1

(m1 , λ2 − m2 )
(λ1 − m1 , m2 )

2

(m1 , m1 )
(λ1 − m1 , λ2 − m1 )

m1 1
(2m1 )k1 −1

3

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 − m2 )
(m2 , m2 )

m1 1
(λ1 +λ2 −2m2 )k1 −1

4

(λ1 − m2 , m1 )
(m2 , λ1 − m1 )

k

k

+

m2 2
(λ1 +λ2 −2m1 )k2 −1
k

k

+

m2 2
(2m2 )k2 −1

k

m1 1
+
(λ1 +m1 −m2 )k1 −1
k
m2 2
(λ1 +m2 −m1 )k2 −1

Table A.15: Boundary points (Capacity scenario (Low, Low), λ1 + λ2 > 2m1 + m2 )
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Now based on KKT conditions for the G(Λ) we show that the optimal policy for the
referrer is either Policy 2 or Policy 3. Let’s first compare G(policy − 1) and G(policy − 4):
∆G = mk11 (

1
1
−
)
k
−1
1
(m1 + λ2 − m2 )
(λ1 + m1 − m2 )k1 −1

+(m1 −m2 )

Since λ2 < λ1 −−−−−−→ m1 − m2 + λ2 < m1 − m2 + λ1 ⇒ m1 −m1 2 +λ2 > m1 −m1 2 +λ1 ⇒
1
> (m1 −m21+λ1 )k1 −1 ⇒ ∆G > 0 ⇒ G(policy − 1) > G(policy − 4). Now we
(m1 −m2 +λ2 )k1 −1
need to prove that Policy 1 cannot be optimal. In other words, we need to show that
max(G(policy − 2), G(policy − 3)) > G(policy − 1).
The following shows the referrer problem when the capacity scenario is (Low, Low):

M ax

mk22
mk11
+
(λ11 + λ21 )k1 −1 (λ1 + λ2 − λ11 − λ21 )k2 −1

St :
λ11 − m1 ≤ 0
λ21 − m1 ≤ 0
m1 − λ11 − λ21 ≤ 0
λ1 − m2 − λ11 ≤ 0
λ2 − m2 − λ21 ≤ 0
λ11 + λ21 − λ1 − λ2 + m2 ≤ 0
It should be mentioned that we ignored two conditions λ11 ≤ λ1 and λ21 ≤ λ2 as in the
capacity scenario (Low, Low) m1 and m2 are both lower than λ1 and λ2 .
KKT conditions for the problem are as follows:
1.

dG
dλ11

m2
1
= (k2 − 1)( λ1 +λ2 −λ
)k2 − (k1 − 1)( λ11m+λ
)k1 = u1 − u3 − u4 + u6
11 −λ21
21

2.

dG
dλ21

m2
1
= (k2 − 1)( λ1 +λ2 −λ
)k2 − (k1 − 1)( λ11m+λ
)k1 = u2 − u3 − u5 + u6
11 −λ21
21

3. u1 (λ11 − m1 ) = 0
4. u2 (λ21 − m1 ) = 0
5. u3 (m1 − λ11 − λ21 ) = 0
6. u4 (λ1 − m2 − λ11 ) = 0
7. u5 (λ2 − m2 − λ21 ) = 0
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8. u6 (λ11 + λ21 − λ1 − λ2 + m2 ) = 0
From the first and second conditions we have u1 − u4 = u2 − u5 .
Where ui ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., 6 are Lagrangian multipliers. Since the objective function is
convex and the problem is a maximization problem as mentioned earlier we need to focus
on the boundary points.
Let’s focus on the Policy
 1 we
( have:

=0


u1



̸= 0





u2 = 0


(


λ11 = m1
u3 = 0
⇒

λ21 = λ2 − m2
u(
4 = 0





=0


u5



̸= 0



 u =0
6
Since u1 − u4 = u2 − u5 and u2 = u4 = 0 we have u1 = −u5 . Since ui ≥ 0 therefore the
only possible situation is u1 = u5 = 0. This results in u1 = u2 = ... = u6 . Therefore, from
the first and second conditions we have:
m2
m2
1
)k2 − (k1 − 1)( λ11m+λ
)k1 = 0 ⇒ (k2 − 1)( λ1 +λ2 −λ
)k2 =
(k2 − 1)( λ1 +λ2 −λ
11 −λ21
21
11 −λ21
1
)k1 (i)
(k1 − 1)( λ11m+λ
21
Therefore, Policy 1 can be considered as a potential solution if equation (i) holds. Now,
m2
1
)k2 = (k1 −1)( λ11m+λ
)k1 and see if under this condition
let’s assume that (k2 −1)( λ1 +λ2 −λ
11 −λ21
21
Policy 1 can be optimal:
m2
m2
−1
1
1
(k2 − 1)( λ1 +λ2 −λ
)k2 = (k1 − 1)( λ11m+λ
)k1 ⇒ ( λ1 +λ2 −λ
)k2 = kk21 −1
( λ11m+λ
)k1 ⇒
11 −λ21
21
11 −λ21
21
1
Gm (Λ) = (λ11 + λ21 + ( kk12 −1
)(λ12 + λ22 ))( λ11m+λ
)k1 . Where Gm (Λ) indicates the fact that
−1
21
m2
1
G(Λ) is calculated under the the condition (k2 − 1)( λ1 +λ2 −λ
)k2 = (k1 − 1)( λ11m+λ
)k1 .
11 −λ21
21
Therefore:
k1 − 1
m1
)(λ1 + m2 − m1 ))(
)k1
k2 − 1
m1 + λ2 − m2
m1 k1
k1 − 1
Gm (policy − 2) = (2m1 + (
)(λ1 + λ2 − 2m1 ))(
)
k2 − 1
2m1
k1 − 1
m1
Gm (policy − 3) = (λ1 + λ2 − 2m2 + (
)(2m2 ))(
)k1
k2 − 1
λ1 + λ2 − 2m2

Gm (policy − 1) = (m1 + λ2 − m2 + (

Let’s consider two scenarios where in the first scenario k1 ≥ k2 and in the second scenario
k1 < k2 . In the following we show that if k1 ≥ k2 then Gm (policy − 3) > Gm (policy − 1) >
Gm (policy − 2). Let’s first compare Gm (policy − 1) and Gm (policy − 2):
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1. λ2 < m1 + m2 ⇒ m1 + λ2 − m2 < 2m1 ⇒
m1 k1
m1
)k1 > ( 2m
)
( m1 +λ
2 −m2
1

1
m1 +λ2 −m2

>

1
2m1

⇒

m1
m1 +λ2 −m2

>

m1
2m1

⇒

2. k1 > k2 ⇒ k1 − 1 > k2 − 1 ⇒ kk12 −1
> 1 ⇒ ( kk12 −1
)(m1 + m2 − λ2 ) > (m1 + m2 − λ2 ) ⇒
−1
−1
k1 −1
( k2 −1 )((λ1 + m2 − m1 ) − (λ1 + λ2 − 2m1 )) > (2m1 ) − (m1 + λ2 − m2 )⇒ (m1 + λ2 −
−1
−1
m2 + ( kk21 −1
)(λ1 + m2 − m1 )) > (2m1 + ( kk21 −1
)(λ1 + λ2 − 2m1 ))
If we multiply 1 and 2 we have:
−1
m1
m1 k1
)k1 > (2m1 +( kk21 −1
) ⇒
(m1 +λ2 −m2 +( kk12 −1
)(λ1 +m2 −m1 ))( m1 +λ
)(λ1 +λ2 −2m1 ))( 2m
−1
2 −m2
1
Gm (policy − 1) > Gm (policy − 2).
Now, let’s compare Gm (policy − 1) and Gm (policy − 3):
1. λ1 < m1 + m2 ⇒ λ1 + λ2 − 2m2 < m1 + λ2 − m2 ⇒
m1
m1
m1
1
> m1 +λ
⇒ ( λ1 +λm2 −2m
)k1 > ( m1 +λ
)k1
λ1 +λ2 −2m2
2 −m2
2
2 −m2

1
λ1 +λ2 −2m2

>

1
m1 +λ2 −m2

⇒

> 1 ⇒ ( kk12 −1
)(m1 + m2 − λ1 ) > (m1 + m2 − λ1 ) ⇒
2. k1 > k2 ⇒ k1 − 1 > k2 − 1 ⇒ kk12 −1
−1
−1
k1 −1
( k2 −1 )((2m2 ) − (λ1 + m2 − m1 )) > (m1 + λ2 − m2 ) − (λ1 + λ2 − 2m2 )⇒ (λ1 + λ2 −
−1
2m2 + ( kk21 −1
)(2m2 )) > (m1 + λ2 − m2 + ( kk12 −1
)(λ1 + m2 − m1 )) ⇒ Gm (policy − 3) >
−1
Gm (policy − 1).
So far we have shown that if k1 ≥ k2 then Gm (policy − 3) > Gm (policy − 1) > Gm (policy − 2)
and therefore Policy 1 cannot be optimal under this condition. Let’s now focus on the second
scenario where k1 < k2 .
Let’s define:
1
)(2m2 ))( λ1 +λm2 −2m
)k1 −
∆G = Gm (policy − 3) − Gm (policy − 1) = (λ1 + λ2 − 2m2 + ( kk12 −1
−1
2
m1
)(λ1 + m2 − m1 ))( m1 +λ
)k1
(m1 + λ2 − m2 + ( kk12 −1
−1
2 −m2
We have:
m1
1
(λ1 + m2 − m1 )( m1 +λ
)k1 − (2m2 )( λ1 +λm2 −2m
)k1
d∆G
2 −m2
2
=
(k1 − 1)
dk2
(k2 − 1)2

Now we show that

d∆G
dk2

< 0 and consequently as k2 increases ∆G decreases.

1. λ1 < m1 + m2 ⇒ λ1 + m2 − m1 < 2m2
2. λ1 < m1 + m2 ⇒ λ1 + λ2 − 2m2 < m1 + λ2 − m2 ⇒
m1
m1
m1
1
> m1 +λ
⇒ ( λ1 +λm2 −2m
)k1 > ( m1 +λ
)k1
λ1 +λ2 −2m2
2 −m2
2
2 −m2

1
λ1 +λ2 −2m2

>

1
m1 +λ2 −m2

From (1) and (2) we have:
(2m2 )(

m1
m1
d∆G
)k1 > (λ1 + m2 − m1 )(
)k1 ⇒
<0
λ1 + λ2 − 2m2
m1 + λ2 − m2
dk2
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×m

1
−−→

Since k2 > 1 if we show that ∆G is positive when k2 → ∞ then we can conclude that
∆G > 0 ⇒ Gm (policy − 3) > Gm (policy − 1) and therefore Policy 1 cannot be optimal at
all. If k2 → ∞ then we have:
∆Gk2 →∞ = (λ1 + λ2 − 2m2 )(

m1
m1
)k1 − (m1 + λ2 − m2 )(
)k1
λ1 + λ2 − 2m2
m1 + λ2 − m2

We now show that ∆Gk2 →∞ > 0 ⇒ ∆G > 0 ⇒ Gm (policy − 3) > Gm (policy − 1).
2 −2m2
λ1 < m1 + m2 ⇒ λ1 + λ2 − 2m2 < m1 + λ2 − m2 ⇒ λm11+λ
<1
+λ2 −m2
λ1 +λ2 −2m2
λ1 +λ2 −2m2
λ1 +λ2 −2m2 k1
2 −2m2
Since m1 +λ2 −m2 < 1 and k1 > 1 we have m1 +λ2 −m2 > ( m1 +λ2 −m2 ) ⇒ λm11+λ
>
+λ2 −m2
m1

m1
1
)k1 > (m1 +λ2 −m2 )( m1 +λ
)k1 ⇒ ∆Gk2 →∞ > 0
( m1 +λm21−m2 )k1 ⇒ (λ1 +λ2 −2m2 )( λ1 +λm2 −2m
2
2 −m2
λ1 +λ2 −2m2

The following table shows boundary points when the capacity scenario is (Low, Low) and
2m2 + m1 < λ1 + λ2 < 2m1 + m2 :
Index

Policy

G(Λ)

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )
k

m1 1
+
(m1 +λ2 −m2 )k1 −1
k2
m2
(λ1 +m2 −m1 )k2 −1

1

(m1 , λ2 − m2 )
(λ1 − m1 , m2 )

2

(m1 , λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 )
(λ1 − m1 , m1 + m2 − λ1 )

m2 +

m1 1
(λ1 +λ2 −m2 )k1 −1

3

(λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 , m1 )
(m1 + m2 − λ2 , λ2 − m1 )

m2 +

m1 1
(λ1 +λ2 −m2 )k1 −1

4

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 − m2 )
(m2 , m2 )

m1 1
+
(λ1 +λ2 −2m2 )k1 −1
k
m2 2
(2m2 )k2 −1

5

(λ1 − m2 , m1 )
(m2 , λ1 − m1 )

m1 1
+
(λ1 +m1 −m2 )k1 −1
k
m2 2
(λ1 +m2 −m1 )k2 −1

k

k

k

k

Table A.16: Boundary points (Capacity scenario (Low, Low), 2m2 + m1 < λ1 + λ2 < 2m1 + m2 )
Previously we proved that policies 1 and 5 cannot be optimal. In addition, G(policy−2) =
G(policy − 3). Therefore, depending on which policy results in the highest objective value
for the referrer each one of the policies 2, 3 and 4 can be optimal.
The following table shows boundary points when the capacity scenario is (Low, Low) and
λ1 + λ2 < 2m2 + m1 :
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Policy

Index

G(Λ)

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )
k

m1 1
+
(m1 +λ2 −m2 )k1 −1
k
m2 2
(λ1 +m2 −m1 )k2 −1

1

(m1 , λ2 − m2 )
(λ1 − m1 , m2 )

2

(m1 , λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 )
(λ1 − m1 , m1 + m2 − λ1 )

m2 +

m1 1
(λ1 +λ2 −m2 )k1 −1

3

(m1 + m2 − λ2 , λ2 − m2 )
(λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 , m2 )

m1 +

m2 2
(λ1 +λ2 −m1 )k2 −1

4

(λ1 − m2 , m1 + m2 − λ1 )
(m2 , λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 )

m1 +

m2 2
(λ1 +λ2 −m1 )k2 −1

5

(λ1 − m2 , m1 )
(m2 , λ1 − m1 )

6

(λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 , m1 )
(m1 + m2 − λ2 , λ2 − m1 )

k

k

k

k

m1 1
+
(λ1 +m1 −m2 )k1 −1
k
m2 2
(λ1 +m2 −m1 )k2 −1
k

m2 +

m1 1
(λ1 +λ2 −m2 )k1 −1

Table A.17: Boundary points (Capacity scenario (Low, Low), λ1 + λ2 < 2m2 + m1 )
Again policies 1 and 5 can be ignored. In addition, G(policy − 2) = G(policy − 6) and
G(policy − 3) = G(policy − 4). Therefore, depending on which policy results in the highest
objective value each one of the policies 2, 3, 4 and 6 can be optimal.
Optimal Referral Policies Capacity Scenario (Mid, Low)
Now let’s focus on the capacity scenario (Mid, Low). In comparison with the referrer problem
for the capacity scenario (Low, Low), the only constraint that needs to be changed is the
second constraint. The new condition is λ21 ≤ λ2 .
Therefore, KKT conditions for the problem are:
1.

dG
dλ11

m2
1
= (k2 − 1)( λ1 +λ2 −λ
)k2 − (k1 − 1)( λ11m+λ
)k1 = u1 − u3 − u4 + u6
11 −λ21
21

2.

dG
dλ21

m2
1
= (k2 − 1)( λ1 +λ2 −λ
)k2 − (k1 − 1)( λ11m+λ
)k1 = u2 − u3 − u5 + u6
11 −λ21
21

3. u1 (λ11 − m1 ) = 0
4. u2 (λ21 − λ2 ) = 0
5. u3 (m1 − λ11 − λ21 ) = 0
6. u4 (λ1 − m2 − λ11 ) = 0
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7. u5 (λ2 − m2 − λ21 ) = 0
8. u6 (λ11 + λ21 − λ1 − λ2 + m2 ) = 0
The following table shows boundary points when the capacity scenario is (Mid, Low) and
λ1 + λ2 > 2m2 + m1 :
Index

Policy

G(Λ)

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )
k

m1 1
+
(m1 +λ2 −m2 )k1 −1
k
m2 2
(λ1 +m2 −m1 )k2 −1

1

(m1 , λ2 − m2 )
(λ1 − m1 , m2 )

2

(m1 , λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 )
(λ1 − m1 , m1 + m2 − λ1 )

m2 +

m1 1
(λ1 +λ2 −m2 )k1 −1

3

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 )
(m2 , 0)

m2 +

m1 1
(λ1 +λ2 −m2 )k1 −1

4

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 − m2 )
(m2 , m2 )

k

k

k

m1 1
(λ1 +λ2 −2m2 )k1 −1

k

+

m2 2
(2m2 )k2 −1

Table A.18: Boundary points (Capacity scenario (Mid, Low), λ1 + λ2 > 2m2 + m1 )
It can be seen that the first and second KKT conditions are remained unchanged and
therefore the results for the capacity scenario (Low, Low) also apply here. As a result,
Policy 1 can be eliminated from the potential optimal solutions for the referrer. In addition,
G(policy − 2) = G(policy − 3). Therefore, depending on which policy results in the highest
objective value for the referrer each one of the policies 2, 3 and 4 can be optimal.
The following table shows boundary points when the capacity scenario is (Mid, Low) and
λ1 + λ2 < 2m2 + m1 :
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Policy

Index

G(Λ)

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )
k

m1 1
+
(m1 +λ2 −m2 )k1 −1
k
m2 2
(λ1 +m2 −m1 )k2 −1

1

(m1 , λ2 − m2 )
(λ1 − m1 , m2 )

2

(m1 , λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 )
(λ1 − m1 , m1 + m2 − λ1 )

m2 +

m1 1
(λ1 +λ2 −m2 )k1 −1

3

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 )
(m2 , 0)

m2 +

m1 1
(λ1 +λ2 −m2 )k1 −1

4

(m1 + m2 − λ2 , λ2 − m2 )
(λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 , m2 )

m1 +

m2 2
(λ1 +λ2 −m1 )k2 −1

5

(λ1 − m2 , m1 + m2 − λ1 )
(m2 , λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 )

m1 +

m2 2
(λ1 +λ2 −m1 )k2 −1

k

k

k

k

Table A.19: Boundary points (Capacity scenario (Mid, Low), λ1 + λ2 < 2m2 + m1 )
Again Policy 1 can be ignored and G(policy − 2) = G(policy − 3) and G(policy − 4) =
G(policy − 5). The optimal policies can be determined based on the objective value for the
referrer. Therefore, any of the policies 2, 3, 4 and 5 are potential to be optimal.
Optimal Referral Policies Capacity Scenario (High, Low)
The referrer problem and KKT conditions for the capacity scenario (High, Low) are as
follows:

mk22
mk11
+
M ax
(λ11 + λ21 )k1 −1 (λ1 + λ2 − λ11 − λ21 )k2 −1
St :
λ11 − λ1 ≤ 0
λ21 − λ2 ≤ 0
m1 − λ11 − λ21 ≤ 0
λ1 − m2 − λ11 ≤ 0
λ2 − m2 − λ21 ≤ 0
λ11 + λ21 − λ1 − λ2 + m2 ≤ 0
It should be mentioned that we ignored two conditions λ11 ≤ λ1 and λ21 ≤ λ2 as in the
capacity scenario (Low, Low) m1 and m2 are both lower than λ1 and λ2 .
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KKT conditions for the problem are as follows:
1.

dG
dλ11

m2
1
= (k2 − 1)( λ1 +λ2 −λ
)k2 − (k1 − 1)( λ11m+λ
)k1 = u1 − u3 − u4 + u6
11 −λ21
21

2.

dG
dλ21

m2
1
= (k2 − 1)( λ1 +λ2 −λ
)k2 − (k1 − 1)( λ11m+λ
)k1 = u2 − u3 − u5 + u6
11 −λ21
21

3. u1 (λ11 − λ1 ) = 0
4. u2 (λ21 − λ2 ) = 0
5. u3 (m1 − λ11 − λ21 ) = 0
6. u4 (λ1 − m2 − λ11 ) = 0
7. u5 (λ2 − m2 − λ21 ) = 0
8. u6 (λ11 + λ21 − λ1 − λ2 + m2 ) = 0
The following table shows boundary points when the capacity scenario is (High, Low) and
λ1 + λ2 > 2m2 + m1 :
Index

Policy

G(Λ)

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )

1

(λ1 , λ2 − m2 )
(0, m2 )

m2 +

m1 1
(λ1 +λ2 −m2 )k1 −1

2

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 )
(m2 , 0)

m2 +

m1 1
(λ1 +λ2 −m2 )k1 −1

3

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 − m2 )
(m2 , m2 )

k

k

k

m1 1
(λ1 +λ2 −2m2 )k1 −1

k

+

m2 2
(2m2 )k2 −1

Table A.20: Boundary points (Capacity scenario (High, Low), λ1 + λ2 > 2m2 + m1 )
G(policy − 1) = G(policy − 2) an all the three policies above has the potential to be
optimal. The policy that results in the highest objective value for the referrer is the optimal
policy.
The following table shows boundary points when the capacity scenario is (High, Low)
and λ1 + λ2 < 2m2 + m1 :
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Policy

Index

G(Λ)

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )

1

(λ1 , λ2 − m2 )
(0, m2 )

m2 +

m1 1
(λ1 +λ2 −m2 )k1 −1

2

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 )
(m2 , 0)

m2 +

m1 1
(λ1 +λ2 −m2 )k1 −1

3

(m1 + m2 − λ2 , λ2 − m2 )
(λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 , m2 )

m1 +

m2 2
(λ1 +λ2 −m1 )k2 −1

4

(λ1 − m2 , m1 + m2 − λ1 )
(m2 , λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 )

m1 +

m2 2
(λ1 +λ2 −m1 )k2 −1

k

k

k

k

Table A.21: Boundary points (Capacity scenario (High, Low), λ1 + λ2 < 2m2 + m1 )
Like the previous situation, all the four policies here are potential to be optimal and the
optimal policy is determined based on the highest resulted objective value.
Finally for the capacity scenario (Mid, Mid) we have:

mk11
mk22
M ax
+
(λ11 + λ21 )k1 −1 (λ1 + λ2 − λ11 − λ21 )k2 −1
St :
λ11 − m1 ≤ 0
λ21 − m1 ≤ 0
m1 − λ11 − λ21 ≤ 0
λ1 − λ2 − λ11 ≤ 0
−λ21 ≤ 0
λ11 + λ21 − λ1 − λ2 + m2 ≤ 0
KKT conditions for the problem are as follows:
1.

dG
dλ11

m2
1
= (k2 − 1)( λ1 +λ2 −λ
)k2 − (k1 − 1)( λ11m+λ
)k1 = u1 − u3 − u4 + u6
11 −λ21
21

2.

dG
dλ21

m2
1
= (k2 − 1)( λ1 +λ2 −λ
)k2 − (k1 − 1)( λ11m+λ
)k1 = u2 − u3 − u5 + u6
11 −λ21
21

3. u1 (λ11 − m1 ) = 0
4. u2 (λ21 − m1 ) = 0
5. u3 (m1 − λ11 − λ21 ) = 0
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6. u4 (λ1 − λ2 − λ11 ) = 0
7. u5 (−λ21 ) = 0
8. u6 (λ11 + λ21 − λ1 − λ2 + m2 ) = 0
Optimal Referral Policies Capacity Scenario (Mid, Mid)
The following table shows boundary points when the capacity scenario is (Mid, Mid):
Policy

Index

G(Λ)

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )

1

(m1 , 0)
(λ1 − m1 , λ2 )

m1 +

m2 2
(λ1 +λ2 −m1 )k2 −1

2

(m1 , λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 )
(λ1 − m1 , m1 + m2 − λ1 )

m2 +

m1 1
(λ1 +λ2 −m2 )k1 −1

3

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 )
(m2 , 0)

m2 +

m1 1
(λ1 +λ2 −m2 )k1 −1

4

(λ1 − m2 , m1 + m2 − λ1 )
(m2 , λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 )

m1 +

m2 2
(λ1 +λ2 −m1 )k2 −1

k

k

k

k

Table A.22: Boundary points (Capacity scenario (Mid, Mid))
Each one of the policies in the table above can be optimal and the optimal policy is the
one which results in the highest objective value for the referrer.
Now, we focus on the situations where one of the providers is HOC. Let’s begin with the
situation where the first provider is HOC.
G(Λ) = (λ11 + λ21 )1−k1 mk11 +

mk22
(λ1 + λ2 − λ11 − λ21 )k2 −1

First, let’s show that if λ1 +λ2 > 2m1 +m2 then the optimal policy is (λ11 , λ21 ) = (m1 , m1 ).
It can be seen that as λ11 +λ21 increases G(Λ) also increases. The referrer problem constraints
are as follows:
1. λ11 ≤ m1
2. λ21 ≤ m1
3. m1 ≤ λ11 + λ21
4. λ12 ≤ m2 ⇒ λ1 − m2 ≤ λ11
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5. λ22 ≤ m2 ⇒ λ2 − m2 ≤ λ21
6. m2 ≤ λ12 + λ22 ⇒ λ11 + λ21 ≤ λ1 + λ2 − m2
7. λ11 ≤ λ1
8. λ21 ≤ λ2
From constraints 1, 2, 7 and 8 and the fact that in all the capacity scenarios except (Low,
Low) λ2 ≤ m1 it can be concluded that the only capacity scenario in which (λ11 , λ21 ) =
(m1 , m1 ) can be a feasible solution is the capacity scenario (Low, Low). If we add constraints
1 and 2 we have λ11 + λ21 ≤ 2m1 . Therefore, if 2m1 ≤ λ1 + λ2 − m2 then the optimal policy
for the referrer is λ11 + λ21 = 2m1 which implies (λ11 , λ21 ) = (m1 , m1 ). On the other hand,
if 2m1 > λ1 + λ2 − m2 then the optimal policy for the referrer is to set λ11 and λ12 in such
a way that satisfies λ11 + λ21 = λ1 + λ2 − m2 .
Now, let’s focus on the situation where the second provider is HOC. We have:
G(Λ) = (λ12 + λ22 )1−k2 mk22 +

mk11
(λ1 + λ2 − λ12 − λ22 )k1 −1

The same logic that we used above can be applied here and therefore if 2m2 ≤ λ1 +λ2 −m1
then the optimal policy for the referrer is λ12 +λ22 = 2m2 which implies (λ12 , λ22 ) = (m2 , m2 ).
On the other hand, if 2m2 ≤ λ1 + λ2 − m1 then the optimal policy for the referrer is to set λ12
and λ22 in such a way that satisfies λ12 + λ22 = λ1 + λ2 − m1 which implies λ11 + λ21 = m1 .
Summary
Consider the policies shown in the following table:
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Index

Policy

TP

(λ11 , λ21 )
(λ12 , λ22 )

xi1
xi2
−1

( 12 )(α1 )

1

(m1 , m1 )
(λ1 − m1 , λ2 − m1 )

2

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 − m2 )
(m2 , m2 )

1
)(α1 )
( λ1 +λm2 −2m
2
1 (α2 )−1
(2)

(m1 , λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 )
(λ1 − m1 , m1 + m2 − λ1 )

( λ1 +λm21−m2 )(α1 )
1

−1

3

(λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 , m1 )
(m1 + m2 − λ2 , λ2 − m1 )

( λ1 +λm21−m2 )(α1 )
1

−1

4
5

(λ1 − m2 , m1 + m2 − λ1 )
(m2 , λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 )

1
−1
( λ1 +λm22−m1 )(α2 )

6

(m1 + m2 − λ2 , λ2 − m2 )
(λ1 + λ2 − m1 − m2 , m2 )

1
−1
( λ1 +λm22−m1 )(α2 )

(λ1 − m2 , λ2 )
(m2 , 0)

( λ1 +λm21−m2 )(α1 )
1

−1

7

(λ1 , λ2 − m2 )
(0, m2 )

( λ1 +λm21−m2 )(α1 )
1

−1

8
9

(m1 , 0)
(λ1 − m1 , λ2 )

−1

2
)(α2 )
( λ1 +λm2 −2m
1

−1

1
−1
( λ1 +λm22−m1 )(α2 )

Table A.23: Potential Optimal Policies (Fair-Allocation Referral System)
Tables A.24-A.26 show optimal referral policies in a fair-allocation referral system for
different capacity scenarios and operational competency level.
Both providers are LOC The following table shows optimal policies for the referrer in
a referral system where both providers are LOC and fairness is taken into account.
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Capacity Scenario

Optimality Conditions

Optimal Policy

λ1 + λ2 > 2m1 + m2

P olicy − 1
or
P olicy − 2

(Low, Low)

2m2 + m1 < λ1 + λ2
and
λ1 + λ2 < 2m1 + m2

P olicy − 3
P olicy − 4
or
P olicy − 2



λ1 + λ2 < 2m2 + m1

(Mid, Low)

λ1 + λ2 > 2m2 + m1

λ1 + λ2 < 2m2 + m1

(High, Low)

λ1 + λ2 > m1 + 2m2

λ1 + λ2 < m1 + 2m2

(Mid, Mid)

----

P olicy − 3
P olicy − 4
or

P olicy − 5
P olicy − 6

P olicy − 3
P olicy − 7
or
P olicy − 2

P olicy − 3
P olicy − 7
or

P olicy − 5
P olicy − 6

P olicy − 7
P olicy − 8
or
P olicy − 2

P olicy − 7
P olicy − 8
or

P olicy − 5
P olicy − 6

P olicy − 7
P olicy − 3
or

P olicy − 5
P olicy − 9

Table A.24: Optimal policies (Fair-allocation system, Both providers are LOC)
First provider is HOC The following table shows optimal policies for the referrer in a
referral system where the first provider is HOC.
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Capacity Scenario
(Low, Low)

Optimality Conditions

Optimal Policy

λ1 + λ2 > 2m1 + m2

P olicy − 1

λ1 + λ2 < 2m1 + m2
(Mid, Low)

---

(High, Low)

---

(Mid, Mid)

---

λ11 + λ21 = λ1 + λ2 − m2

Table A.25: Optimal policies (Fair-allocation system, First provider is HOC)
Second provider is HOC The following table shows optimal policies for the referrer in
a referral system where the second provider is HOC.
Optimality Conditions

Optimal Policy

λ1 + λ2 > 2m1 + m2

P olicy − 2

λ1 + λ2 < 2m2 + m1

λ11 + λ21 = m1

Table A.26: Optimal policies (Fair-allocation system, Second provider is HOC)
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Appendix B
Third Chapter Multinomial Logistic
Regression Model
B.1

Multinomial Regression Model

In this section we present the result of the multinomial regression model used in Section 4.4.2.
The dependent variable is patient preference and the independent variables are patient gender
(Figure 4.3); patient location (Figure 4.4); patient age (Figure 4.5); and three variables:
moving average for the past 10 patients, and the 5th and 95th percentiles, calculated based
on wait time information.
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Figure B.1: Multinomial Logistic Model Statistics
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